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Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
Corporate Income Taxt
MAiuoRm E. KORNHAUSIER*
INTRODUCTION
Two of the major changes the United States experienced during the
Progressive Era were the growth of large corporations and the acceptance
of the income tax. This Article examines the intersection of these two
changes at a point called the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909.1 The traditional
view of this tax holds that the tax was primarily a political stepping stone
toward the income tax, born of the struggle between pro and anti-income
tax advocates and of the history of tax. It is perceived as a compromise at
best, at worst as a barrier to the eventually triumphant income tax reform.
This view is not wrong, it is simply incomplete. It is too narrow because it
views the tax only in the context of one of the areas of change, taxation.
The true significance of the tax appears only when it is placed at the
intersection of both areas of change: taxation and corporate growth. So
situated, the tax achieves its proper role as a corporate regulatory measure
as well as the ancestor of the modern corporate tax.
The Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 reflects the Progressive Era's attempts
to regulate corporations in several ways. First, the tax debates themselves,
as well as the law's final form, reflected the era's debates about theories
of corporate legal personality, debates occasioned by the rapid growth of
large, non-owner managed corporations. The decision to tax only corpora-
tions rather than certain specified businesses, no matter what form they
were carried on under, was bolstered by an artificial entity theory of
corporations which viewed corporations as entities separate from their
shareholders.
Second, the tax reflected two popular tools of corporate regulation: federal
incorporation and publicity. The tax was an alternative to federal
incorporation proposals which were objected to on the grounds that they
1 © Copyright 1990 by Marjone E. Kornhauser.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
Umversity. I would like to thank Professor Lynne Henderson of Indiana Umversity School of
Law at Bloomington for her insightful reading of an earlier draft, Professor Alan Miles Ruben
of Cleveland State Umversity for his suggestions in the area of early corporate law and Herbert
Walker, a research assistant par excellence. My thanks also to libraries and librarians every-
where, in particular: Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland Public Library, National
Archives and the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. The Cleveland-Marshall Fund
provided support for tls research.
1. Act approved Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
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infringed upon state powers and expanded federal (especially executive
branch) powers too much. These objections also arose in connection with
the tax, but were milder since taxation was an acknowledged federal power.
Thus, the tax provided an attractive alternative for a conservative President
and Congress to the more radical incorporation proposals. The tool of
publicity, or access to information, was a widely advocated method of
curbing a variety of abuses. In an era when even the government, much
less the general public, had little access to information about corporations,
the publicity feature of the tax enabled the government to acquire infor-
mation to help it legislate more knowledgeably, or, in the era's jargon,
more "scientifically," in areas affecting corporations such as tariffs, anti-
trust and interstate commerce generally President Taft consistently sup-
ported the tax precisely because of the supervisory function provided by
the publicity feature. The majority of commentary and debate about the
tax also centered on this feature.
Third, and finally, the tax addressed one specific abuse of the era: stock
watering or overcapitalization. Many people perceived overcapitalization as
the source of trusts and as a danger to investors who were duped by stock
watering schemes. The tax, serving as a form of securities regulation,
addressed this problem in two ways. First, foreshadowing present day
debates on curbing leveraged buyouts through the tax system, the law
attempted to limit the use of debt by limiting the tax deduction for interest.
The second method of attack was publicity of financial information (in the
tax return) which theoretically enabled investors to avoid stock watering
schemes.
This Article holds that the proposal, debate and passage of the Corporate
Excise Tax of 1909 reflected not just a political deflection of the income
tax, but also the deliberate use of tax law by President Taft and Congress
for a non-tax purpose-corporate regulation. Part I of this Article'bnefly
examines the vast corporate changes that occurred between 1890 and 1909
that affected the development of the Corporate Excise Tax. Part II sum-
marily traces the history of the income tax up to 1909. Part III concentrates
on the passage and content of the Corporate Excise Tax in relation to
concerns about corporate power and abuse, particularly the publicity feature
and, to a lesser extent, the interest, dividend and exemption provisions.
Finally, this Article argues that an accurate view of the Corporate Excise
Tax of 1909 places the tax in an historical context as part of two struggles:
the attempt to enact an income tax and the struggle to regulate corporations.
Viewed in this light the tax emerges as a nascent attempt at securities and
corporate regulation as well as the source of our modern corporate income
tax. While it was a moderate, cautious attempt at regulation by a conser-
vative President, it was nevertheless a start.
The Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 is more than an historical footnote.
Students of corporate and securities regulation will find that the tax adds
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detail to their understanding of the areas. Students of taxation who look
to the Corporate Excis& Tax of 1909 will find not just the origins of today's
tax, but a fuller understanding of the depths of the problems confronting
us today in the debt and dividend areas, as well as in the issue of corporate
integration itself.
I. CORPORATIONS AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
A. Introduction
The Progressive Era, roughly from 1890 to 1916, was a umque period of
American history in which broad social and political reforms met and
combined with a great change m our economic system: the rise of corporate
capitalism. 2 The transformation of capitalism from a system of owner/
manager enterprises operating in a largely unregulated competitive market
to a system dominated by a relatively few large, mostly non-owner managed
corporations in a regulated competitive market was a pivotal change. This
change affected, and was affected by, changes in other aspects of society
including politics, law, the role of government, relations among classes,
education and social thought.3 The Corporate Excise Tax was a product of
2. M. SKLAR, THE CO.PORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890,1916, at
1 (1988). Much of tis Part relies heavily on Sklar since his recent and well-written research
so extensively details the growth of corporations and the reaction to this growth m this time
period. Another excellent book on the growth of corporations is A. CHANDIa, Tim VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN -AMERICAN Busimss (1977). Chandler's story is
continued, so to speak, by A. BER.LE & G. MEANS, THi MODERN CORORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968). Other classic studies of the Progressive Era on which I have relied
include: L. GAwmnos, THE PUBUC IMAGE OF BIG BusniNss IN AMERICA, 1880-1940 (1975); R.
HoFsTADTER, Tm Am OF REFORM (Vintage Books ed. 1955); G. KoLKo, THE TRIuMPH OF
CONSERVATISM (1963); R. WIEBE, Busun;ssMc AND REFORM (1962) [hereinafter R. WIEBE,
BusinEssMEN AND REFORM]; and R. WIBBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967) [here-
inafter R. WmBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER].
The years 1890 to 1916 seem to be the heart of the Progressive Era. In using them to define
the period, I follow Martin Sklar. Obviously, these dates are not absolute; other authors mark
the period differently, extending it at either end. Louis Galambos, for example, uses the years
1902 to 1914 to define the Progressive Era. L. GALAaMos, supra, at 117.
3. Changes included the rapid growth of industrialization and urban life in America, and
the growth of a large professional middle class whose expertise would rationalize and manage
government, business and social reform. See generally R. WIER, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER,
supra note 2; M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 1-40. The many historians writing about this period
have interpreted the data in various ways, seeing reform as issuing from any one or combination
,of the following sources: (1) the agrarian Midwest and South seeking a return to the somewhat
mythic small farmer past, and the urban East and Midwest seeking to bring order and scientific
professionalism to bear on the multitudinous problems of urbanization, immigration and the
rapid growth of business, see, e.g., R. WmIE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, supra note 2, at 166-
71, (2) the small businessmen seeking to maintain their place in a world of large competitors,
see, e.g., R. HOFSTAD=ER, supra note 2, at 217, and (3) the new professional middle class, id.
at 218. Some historians saw progressive reform as mainly driven by Yankee-born Americans
1990]
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corporate changes colliding with other changes. These other changes included
the reexamination of the theory of legal personality, changes in federal
governmental powers, shifts in federal-state relations, the rise of the income
tax and the use of tax law to accomplish the non-revenue goal of regulating
corporations.
Although the rise of large scale corporations preceded the Progressive
Era,4 consolidation did not begin until the early 1890s. Rapid consolidation
and merger started in 1898; by 1904, the wave of consolidation was basically
over.5 This growth created dislocation problems for segments within the
economic system (e.g., small businessmen) as well as for the system itself
(e.g., cut-throat competition led to market gluts caused by overproduction).6
As a consequence, the mid-nineteenth century consensus concerning the free
market began to break down. A new consensus requiring some regulation
of the market was growing, but the quality and quantity of that regulation
was not agreed upon since different groups wanted different things. 7 By
1896 the problems created by the growth of large corporations and the
concomitant issues of political, governmental and legal import, collectively
the "trust" issue, had become the issue and would remain so until the end
of this period.' Although a complex issue, the problem, as commonly
conceived by the general populace and legislators, was aptly presented in
1906 by Representative Martin of South Dakota:
Epitomized in few words, the trust is a combination of corporations.
Now, the evils of this new principle are very numerous, but the
most serious and the ones deserving of our most immediate attention
are, first, overcapitalization; second, the tendency to monopoly, and,
third, the destruction of individual enterprise and success. 9
losing status in the midst of all the change. Id. at 185. Others saw the reforms as led by the
newly risen rmddle class driven to improve society's ills through scientific organization (and
thereby also improve and ensconce their positions). Yet others saw reform as a more conser-
vative movement supported by businessmen themselves to bring stability and order to a system
that the private market could not control (and thereby forestall more radical solutions). G.
KoLo, supra note 2.
4. The rise began in the 1850s with the building of the railroads which reached their
large, complex form in the 1880s. L. GALAiMOS, supra note 2, at 6-7.
S. M. SaAR, supra note 2, at 45-46. Most of the consolidation occurred between 1898
and 1900, and from 1904 to 1954 little further concentration of industrial production occurred
through corporate combinations. Id. at 46 (citing various studies).
6. Id. at 54-55.
7. M. SK.AR, supra note 2, at 16-18. He states that this breakdown of consensus occurred
by 1890. Id.
8. Id. at 24-26; see also R. WIEBE, BuswanssmEN AND REFORm, supra note 2, at 43. Many
of the sources listed, supra notes 2-3, deal extensively with the trust issue, as do other books,
articles and textbooks. To list them all would add unacceptable length to this Article, but they
run the gamut from the contemporary, A. WALKER, HIsToRY OF TE SHERmAN LAW OF THE
UNITED STATEs oF AMERICA (1910), to the classic, H. THOimLuu, THE FEDERAL ANTIrTRUST
PoLicy (1954).
9. 40 CONG. REc. 1849 (Jan. 31, 1906).
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His solutions were just as typical: "[A]ny legislation that will be successful,
must combine two or three principles at least. First, publicity; secondly,
free competition; thirdly, close Federal supervision or regulation."' 10 Federal
supervision was proper, Martin stated, because "[T]hese great aggregations
of capital owe . their very existence to the operation of law. They are
the creations of law, and they can be controlled by law ,," This character-
ization of the trust problem and its solution influenced the origins of the
Corporate Excise Tax. In particular, the primary evil with which the tax
dealt was overcapitalization (the evil often leading to other evils); the
principles used by the tax were publicity and federal supervision (indirect
methods often used to achieve the direct goal of free competition). Finally,
the justification for the use of these two principles was a legal theory of
corporate personality that emphasized the artificiality of the corporation.
The remainder of Part I outlines the salient features of these two principles
and the underlying legal theory justifying their use.
B. Theories of Legal Personality
As corporations evolved from a few specially chartered, specific purpose
entities largely managed by owners to numerous large entities organized
under general incorporation statutes and run by non-owners, the theory of
corporations also evolved. During the Progressive Era, when the power and
growth of corporations were at the center of public and political upheavals,
the debates concerning the theory of corporate personality reached a frenzied
zenith. Since both the general evolution of the theory of corporate person-
ality and the course of debates at the turn of the century have been well-
documented, 2 only a summary is needed here. During the period from 1850
to 1880,13 general incorporation statutes gradually replaced the special grant
statutes under which corporations had previously been formed. Under the
grant theory corporations were viewed as fictional, artificial entities created
10. Id. at 1851.
11. Id.
12. To mention only a few of the many articles and books: J. Hursr, Tim LEGrrImACY
OF THm Busn;Ess CO RpOPATioN n THE LAW OF THE UNITrED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); Horwitz,
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 29 CORP. PRAc. COMENTATOR
313 (1987) (published originally at 88 W VA. L. REV 173 (1986)); Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. L.J. 1593 (1988); and Mark, The Personi-
fication of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. Cm. L. Ray 1441 (1987). From
1890 through the 1920s, there was a "virtual obsession in the legal literature with the question
of corporate 'personality."' Horwitz, supra, at 359. Of the numerous articles published during
the Progressive Era, one of the most influential (and most contemporary with the Corporate
Excise Tax of 1909) was the two-part essay by Arthur Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality
(pts. 1 & 2), 24 HARv L. REy 253, 347 (1911). The following discussion draws on the
excellent articles by Hovenkamp and Horwitz.
13. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 323.
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by the states with limited powers which were seen as privileges granted by
the states. The demise of the grant theory took with it the artificial entity
theory since, under general incorporation laws, it was the contract among
individuals, not the power of the state, which created corporations.
The death of incorporation by special grant left a theoretical vacuum
which was filled by animated discussion as to the nature of corporate
personality Thus, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century two
alternative concepts gained credence: the aggregate and the natural entity
theories, with the entity theory ultimately dominant. The aggregate theory,
harking back to earlier in the century,14 focused on the contractual aspects
of corporations and thus viewed the corporation as similar to a partnership.
The corporation was simply an aggregate of its individual members, the
stockholders. Under this model, certain rights of natural persons were
extended to corporations (such as the right to equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment in The Railroad Tax Cases5) because this was the
best way to protect the individuals. There were, however, two significant
differences between a corporation and a partnership: shareholders normally
had limited liability16 for corporate debts and, by this time, shareholders
were merely passive investors, not involved in the management of the
corporation. By the 1890s many commentators realized that an aggregate
(partnership) view of corporations threatened the corporate privilege of
limited liability ,-
14. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1597-1600 for a discussion of the associational view
of corporations. Notice that the now fashionable economic theory of the firm also sees a
corporation as simply a web of contracts. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305 (1976). See
also the November 1989 issue of the Columbia Law Review which contains a symposium
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law which, while dealing with the issue of whether any
corporate laws ought to be mandatory, discusses the contractual theory of the firm. 89 CoLusr.
L. REv 1395-1774 (1989). In particular, Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of
the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv 1757 (1989) provides a succinct overview of the subject. A
logical conclusion of this view of corporations is that a corporation should not be a separate
taxable entity.
15. 13 F 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed sub nom. San Mateo County v.
Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
16. Although limited liability of shareholders existed, it was "far from the norm in America
even as late as 1900." Horwitz, supra note 12, at 350. "Double liability" statutes under which
shareholders were liable for debts up to double their amount of unpaid capital were common
in many states including New York. Id. In California, shareholders had proportionate liability
for debts of the corporation under the 1879 California Constitution. CAL. CoNsT. of 1879,
art. XII, § 3 (repealed 1930). The California Constitution of 1849 provided similarly. CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 36. Both provisions are quoted in Blumberg, Limited Liability and
Corporate Groups, 11 J. CoRP L. 573, 597 (1986). Blumberg states: "Limited liability is a
statutory development that represents the triumph of the rising political power of business
interests." Id. at 576. Blumberg discusses the early history of limited liability in the United
States at pages 587-95.
17 Horwitz, supra note 12, at 347
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Unlike the aggregate theory, the real or natural entity theory of corpo-
rations held that the corporation was an entity separate from its members.
However, this entity, unlike the artificial entity of the grant theory, was a
real or natural entity or person with rights like any other person. The
natural entity theory thus recogmzed the realities of corporate existence
(e.g., limited liability, perpetual life and management separate from own-
erslup). Unlike the grant theory, it recognized the reality of the power of
corporations to act and the inability of the states to limit that power through
doctrines such as ultra vires. 18 Moreover, unlike the aggregate theory, it
gave the legal system a basis to protect-rather than threaten-these features.
By the turn of the century, corporations had many but not all of the rights
of natural persons. However, the theory behind the rights was often a
mixture of aggregate, fictional and entity theory. 9
18. See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1662-63.
[T]he doctnne of ultra vires breaks down when it is tested. It is not true because
it fails to conform to the canon of scientific hypothesis: it does not fit the facts.
We assume the artificiality of our corporation. We suppose that it is no more
than we have made it, with the result that common sense must be thrown to the
winds. What, in brief, the theory compels us to urge is this, that a class of acts
may be performed by the corporation which are not corporate acts. Is it not
better to risk a little for the sake of logic? Our fiction-theory may, indeed, break
down; but we shall bring the law in closer harmony with the facts of life. We
shall then say that the corporation, being a real entity, with a personality that is
self-created, and not state-created, must bear the responsibility for its actions.
Our state may, in the result, be a little less Hegelian, a little less sovereign in its
right of delegation.
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HAtv L. REv 404, 413 (1916) (though speaking
of English law, the quoted provision is applicable to American law).
19. For example, by 1900 corporations, unlike partnerships, could sue and be sued in their
own names and were considered citizens and persons under the fourteenth amendment. In
1809 the Supreme Court's position on citizenship was that a corporation was not a citizen for
federal jurisdictional purposes because it was merely an association of shareholders and
therefore it was the shareholders' state of citizenship and not the corporation's state of
incorporation that mattered. Bank of the Umted States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86
(1809). In 1844 the Court reversed itself, stating that a corporation
created by a state to perform its functions under the authority of that state and
only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, seems to us to
be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and
therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a
citizen of that state.
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844).
In 1853, the Court maintained the same result but changed its theory. It admitted that a
corporation could not literally be a "citizen" ' within the Constitution, but nevertheless, using
a forced aggregate reasomng, it established an irrebuttable presumption that all shareholders
were citizens of the state of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16
How.) 314, 328-29 (1853). Speaking in 1903, Henry Atwater stated that it was doubtful that
the Court would use the same reasoning as in 1853, but it would undoubtedly reach the same
result via another line of reasoning. Atwater, Choice of Corporate Home, 4 MooDY'S MANUAL
op CoRoRAioN SEcurrEs 7 (1903). This result fostered the growth of big business (and the
consequent separation of management from ownership) by facilitating lawsuits involving
1990]
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By 1909 the issue of the nature of both partnerships and corporations
was not settled; it was in fact highly debated. 2° Theorists also contemplated
the nature of a partnership in a debate that mirrored the corporate debate
about legal entity, but ultimately, in 1914, an aggregate theory, with certain
entity aspects, triumphed. 2' In contrast, in the corporate area the natural
entity view was in ascendancy as it best comported with the growth and
corporations.
Similarly, the 1886 Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R.,
118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which the Court opined that a corporation was a person within the
meaning of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, facilitated protection of
shareholder rights through protection of the corporation. Cluef Justice Waite stated that the
Court would not hear argument on the question of whether a corporation was a person for
purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because the Court was
"of the opinion" that it was. Id. at 396. Although the opinion with its use of "person"
appears to suggest a natural entity theory, as Morton Horwitz points out, at the time this case
was not seen as a promulgation of an entity theory but was really seen as an application of
the aggregate theory-that the property of the corporation was really the property of the
shareholders and therefore was entitled to protection. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 319-20. This
decision, too, despite its use of mixed theory, ultimately facilitated the growth of corporations,
the separation of ownership from control and the entity theory: by giving the corporation
constitutional rights, shareholders lost standing to sue. Hovenkamp states that although the
Progressives claimed that decisions such as Santa Clara were pro-big business, they were really
"eminently Jacksonian decisions, representing the constitutional merger of the business cor-
poration into ordinary enterprise." Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1644-45. Thus, another
barrier arose between the owners and their corporation.
20. The list of articles during the era is long. On the eve of the Corporate Excise Tax in
1909, the following articles were published on the subject in the Columbia Law Review:
Burdick, Partnership Reality, 9 CoLuM. L. Rav 197 (1909); Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders'
Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 285 (1909); Hohfeld, The
Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws (pt. 1), 9 COLUM. L. REv 492
(1909); and Thatcher, Corporate Powers, 9 CoLUm. L. REv 243 (1909). In addition, there are
the following articles related to regulation of corporations: Canfield, Is a Large Corporation
an Illegal Combination or Monopoly Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?, 9 CoLUM. L. REv
95 (1909); Goodnow, The Constitutionality of the United States Corporation Tax, 9 COLUM.
L. REv 649 (1909); and Prentice, Federal Common Law and Interstate Carriers, 9 COLUM. L.
Rav 375 (1909).
21. If a group of individuals organized an incorporated association that had its own
personality and legal existence why should not an unincorporated association be treated
similarly? The partnership debate began in 1902 when the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws requested the Committee on Commercial Law to submit a draft on
partnership at the next annual meeting. UNIF. PARTNERsmiP ACT commissioners' prefatory
note, 6 U.L.A. 5 (1969). The major partnership issue at that time was that the then current
common law theory was confused as to the rights of a partner and of a separate creditor of
a partner vis-&-vis the partnership property. According to William Draper Lewis, who chaired
the Committee after the death of the original chair Dean Ames, the Commissioner requested
that the law be drafted under the theory that a partnership was a legal person in order to
solve these problems. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism
(pt. 1), 29 HARV- L. REv 158, 162 (1915). Nonetheless, after considerable drafting, discussion
and apparent confusion, the Conference in 1914 finally adopted what was generally an aggregate
theory although entity aspects were present. According to Lewis the aggregate theory was
chosen because the legal person theory (1) abolished too much of the common law, (2) rested
on "the fiction of group personality" and an assumption contrary to fact, namely that a
third-party considers himself to be dealing with a separate entity (the partnership) rather than
[-Vol. 66:53
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consolidation of corporations. Corporate characteristics of free transfera-
bility of interests, continuity of life, limited liability and centralized man-
agement also emphasized the distinction between the corporation and its
shareholders. Corporate liability was not shareholder liability. The life of
the corporation was independent of that of its shareholders. As corporations
grew and ownership became separated from managemenf, shareholders
became increasingly passive and lost a sense of identification with the
corporation. The corporation became a separate entity. This was in contrast
to a partner's relationship to a partnership. Partners were generally actively
involved in the partnership's business, as well as responsible for the part-
nership debts. Additionally, the life of the partnership was contingent on
the life of its members. These factors created a unity between the partner
and the partnership. Legal theory, following these basic differences between
a corporation and a partnership,, veered toward a natural entity theory in
the corporate area, but resisted it, at least partially, in the partnership area.
The natural entity theory, defining corporations as real people, tended to
give corporations the same rights as individuals. This tendency is not
necessarily logical. Theoretically, corporations could be persons for some
purposes but not others, the choice depending on whether an attribute of
"personhood" furthered a particular social policy. Alternatively, corpora-
tions could be persons, but a different category than individuals, allowing
different legal treatment. These approaches, refinements of the natural entity
theory, were, perhaps, inappropriate in the stage when the theory was
fighting for ascendancy. Such an early stage requires simple, direct and
bold brush strokes to clearly delineate the new theory from the old.
Consequently, this new theory had troubling implications for those who
wished to regulate the growing wealth and power of corporations. If
corporations were natural entities like individuals, with the same rights as
individuals, what basis did the government have for imposing regulations
only upon the corporations? The artificial entity theory, on the other hand,
with the individual partner and (3) the worst of the problems (those dealing with rights to
partnership property) could be solved by abolishing joint tenancy of partnership property. Id.
at 172-73. Lewis stated further: "It should also be added that those with the largest practical
experience present were opposed to regarding the partnership as a 'legal person' because of
the effect of the theory in lessening the partner's sense of moral responsibility for partnership
acts." Id. at 173. See UNIF. PARTNERsHIP ACT commissioners' prefatory note, supra, and
Lewis, supra, for a summary of the history. For a flavor of the debate, see also Crane, The
Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 HARv L. REv 762 (1915), Crane, The Uniform
Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 HARv L. Rav 838 (1916), and Lewis, The Uniform
Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism (pt. 2), 29 HARv L. Rav 291 (1916). In
reality, the end result, especially with the creation of a tenancy by the partnership was such
a mixture of aggregate and entity theory that it led at least one commentator to wonder
whether "the radicals had, in the language of the day, 'put one over on' the conservatives"
by technically retaining the common law aggregate theory but in reality, producing an entity
or "mercantile" view of partnerships. S. WRIOTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS AND SIMILAR RELATIONS § 36, at 145 n.1 (1916).
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because it was grounded in the proposition that the state created the
corporation with certain enumerated powers, provided a basis for govern-
mental control. Thus, in discussions of federal regulation of corporations,
officials frequently emphasized artificial entity (or even aggregate) views to
distinguish between corporations which they wanted to regulate and part-
nerships and individuals which they did not. Anti-regulation legislators, in
contrast, sought to eliminate the distinction between corporations and
partnerships by favoring an aggregate view. 22
As I shall show shortly, the debate on the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909
similarly contained competing views of corporate theory Justifications for
the tax often rested not on the ascending natural entity theory but on the
more ancient and moribund artificial entity theory, as well as on an aggregate
theory.
C. Attempts at Corporate Regulation: Federal Incorporation
and Publicity
On the eve of the Corporate Excise Tax (and the March, 1909 inauguration
of Taft as President), government, business and the public largely agreed
that some corporate regulation was necessary The question was what sort
22. Interestingly, the natural entity view was not raised much. President Theodore Roos-
evelt, for example; referred to a corporation's artificial nature as a basis for regulating it. In
his first annual address to Congress, Roosevelt stated that "[a]rtificial bodies, such as
corporations and joint stock or other associations, depending upon any statutory law for their
existence or privileges, should be subject to proper governmental supervision " First
Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
6641, 6648. In 1902 he stated:
A fundamental base of civilization is the inviolability of property; but this is in
no wise inconsistent with the right of society to regulate the exercise of the
artificial powers which it confers upon the owners of property, under the name
of corporate franchises, in such a way as to prevent the misuse of these powers.
Second Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1902), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 6709, 6711.
In the 1903 debate in the House of Representatives on H.R. 17 a corporation was called an
"aggregation of business enterprises," H.R. 17, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 36 CoNG.
REc. 1820 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Tirrell of Massachusetts), as well as "an artificial
creation" of the legislature, given
certain special privileges and advantages that natural persons do not, and can
not [sic], enjoy. And by reason of having conferred these special pnvileges
and advantages upon corporations, it becomes the duty of the State and, so far
as the United States can, within its sphere, it becomes the duty of the United
States, to regulate and control these corporate organizations in order that they
may-prove beneficial, and not injurious, to the general welfare.
Id. at 1837 (statement of Rep. Littlefield of Maine). The privileges Littlefield mentions are
limited liability, unity of control, continuity of life and the ability of the investor to diversify
his risk by investing in many businesses. Id. at 1837-38. If the last advantage is interpreted to
mean free transferability of interests, then the privileges Littlefield has enumerated are the
four characteristics of a corporation, for tax purposes, stated in the Treasury Regulations.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1983).
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of regulation should occur. Although public opimon concerning corporations
was complex,2 as early as 1896, it could be divided into two basic ap-
proaches.2 The first, largely held by small producers and populists, looked
backwards to a golden age of free competition among small businesses.
This view held that government regulation was necessary to restore the
market of small producers and prevent the harmful and illegal concentration
of private market power.Y The second viewpoint, representing the "emergent
corporate-capitalist outlook," 26 accepted the existence of large corporations.
It held that regulation, preferably by the private market, was necessary to
prevent the tendency toward overproduction.27 Federal regulation was needed,
if at all, to eliminate the confusion caused by the diversity of state laws.U
By 1909 government regulation at the federal level represented a mix of
these two basic approaches. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 favored the small producers' vision of free
competition by holding that all combinations were illegal.29 This view was
offset by the fact that decisions as to which corporations would be prose-
cuted were in the executive's hands. The executive branch, first under
President Roosevelt and then under Taft, accepted the view that large
corporations could legitimately dominate the market. 30
23. See, e.g., L. GA~uoos, supra note 2, at 47-126.
24. M. SKL, supra note 2, at 54.
25. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 55.
26. M. SK.AR, supra note 2, at 54.
27. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 55.
28. R. WIEBE, BusunssmEr AND REFORM, supra note 2, at 212.
29. United States v. Trans-Missoun Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). In 1911 the
Supreme Court restored the common law "rule of reason" exception to illegal restraints of
trade in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and in United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). In Standard Oil the Court modified its past
practice, stating that the Sherman Act did not intend to prohibit all restraints of trade; rather
"it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and
in this country in dealings with subjects of the character embraced by the statute, was intended
to be the measure used" to determine whether a particular act violated the statute. Standard
Oil, 221 U.S. at 60. With this case the Court introduced the "rule of reason," under which
only "unreasonable" restraints of trade were illegal. See, e.g., id. at 67. Under this standard,
the Standard Oil Company was held to have violated the Sherman Act.
30. In his first annual message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated that the growth of
corporate wealth was due to "natural causes" and not to "the tariff nor to any other
governmental action." First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901) reprinted in 15 M.ssAGs AND
PAPERS OF TiE PP.sinDEas 6641, 6645. Moreover, he believed that although abuses had
occurred, this corporate development had produced enormous good and should be left alone
as much as possible. Id. at 6646-47.
Roosevelt consistentiy reiterated his basic support of corporations, while arguing for some
regulation. For example, in his 1907 annual message to Congress, he said:
I am in no sense hostile to corporations. This is an age of combination, and any
effort to prevent all combination will be not only useless, but in the end vicious,
because of the contempt for law which the failure to enforce law inevitably
produces. We should, moreover, recognize in cordial and ample fashion the
immense good effected by corporate agencies in a country such as ours, and the
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By the early 1900s the real issue, despite the rhetoric against "trusts"
and "monopolies" and favoring "free competition," was not how to break
up the big corporations, but rather who was to regulate the big corporations,
how much they should be regulated and what means should be used to
implement regulation. 31 The regulator could be either the federal government,
state governments or the corporations themselves. President Roosevelt be-
lieved not only that the federal. government possessed the power to regulate
corporations without infringing upon states' rights, but that the federal
government was the only possible regulator since states "absolutely lack the
authority to deal with interstate business in any form, and second, because
of the inevitable conflict of authority sure to arise in the effort to enforce
different kinds of state regulation. 3 2 President Roosevelt also believed that
the executive branch was the appropriate "who" within the federal govern-
ment.33
wealth of intellect, energy, and fidelity devoted to their service, and therefore
normally to the service of the public, by their officers and directors. The
corporation has come to stay
Seventh Annual Message, 42 CONG. Rac. 67, 68 (Dec. 3, 1907); see also Eighth Annual
Message, 43 CONG. REc. 16-17 (Dec. 8, 1908).
31. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 180-81.
32. 1908 Annual Message to Congress, 43 CONG. REc. 16, 18 (Dec. 8, 1908).
The opposition to Government control of these great corporations makes its most
effective effort in the shape of an appeal to the old doctnne of States' rights.
The proposal to make the National Government supreme over, and therefore to
give it complete control over, the railroads and other instruments of interstate
commerce is merely a proposal to carry out to the letter one of the prime
purposes, if not the prime purpose, for which the Constitution was founded. It
does not represent centralization. It represents merely the acknowledgement of
the patent fact that centralization has already come in business.
Id. Control of corporations by the federal government would involve "a certain increase in
the use of-not the creation of-power by the Central Government." Id.
In earlier speeches Roosevelt was less adamant about the existence of the power of the
federal government to control corporations. He believed such power existed, but stated that
if Congress felt it was necessary a constitutional amendment should be passed to create the
power. First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PREsmENrs 6641, 6649.
33. See, e.g., N. LAmoREAux, Tim GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERicAN BusNqss,
1895-1904, at 170 (1985). In his 1905 annual message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated
that federal control of interstate corporations should be "unequivocally admimstrative." Fifth
Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), reprinted in 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TEE PRESIDENTS
6973, 6977
In his 1908 annual message to Congress, Roosevelt stated:
I strongly advocate that instead of an unwise effort to prohibit all combinations,
there shall be substituted [for the current Sherman antitrust law] a law which
shall expressly permit combinations which are in the interest of the public, but
shall at the same time give to some agency of the National Government full
power of control and supervision over them. One of the chief features of this
control should be securing entire publicity in all matters which the public has a
right to know, and furthermore, the power, not by judicial but by executive
action, to prevent or put a stop to every form of improper favoritism or other
wrongdoing.
Eighth Annual Message, 43 CONG. Rc. 16, 17 (Dec. 8, 1908).
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Roosevelt, like many others during this era, advocated two tools as
primary methods of regulation: federal incorporation and publicity. 34 Taft
also advocated these two tools but in a more moderate manner with more
emphasis on the judicial branch than the executive branch.
1. Federal Incorporation
Proposals for federal licensing or chartering 35 of corporations occurred
as early as the Constitutional Convention;36 however, during the Progressive
34. The Bureau of Corporations, established in 1903, reflected in its organization and
operation the belief in the efficacy of federal incorporation and publicity, as well as Roosevelt's
view of the executive as the domnnant branch of government involved in supervising corpo-
rations. The Bureau, established as part of the newly formed Department of Commerce and
Labor, was the first federal agency mandated to regulate industry in general. Act approved
Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 827-28. The Act stated:
The said Commissioner [of the Bureau] shall have power and authority to make
diligent investigation into the organization, conduct, and management of the
business of any corporation, joint stock company or corporate combination
engaged in commerce among the several States and to gather such information
and data as will enable the President of the United States to make recommen-
dations to Congress for legislation for the regulation of such commerce; and to
report such data to the President from time to time as he shall require; and the
information so obtained or as much thereof as the President may direct shall be
made public.
Id. at 828. A detailed description of the Bureau, its operations and its relation to Roosevelt
is contained m Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt and the Bureau of Corporations, 45 Miss. VALLEY
HisT. REv. 571 (1959). See also M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 184-203.
Because the Bureau reported to the President, rather than Congress, the executive power
was greatly enhanced. The President had great discretionary power as to which corporations
to prosecute. Under Roosevelt, it was not uncommon for the Bureau and the corporation
under investigation to reach a "gentlemen's agreement" under which the corporation would
cooperate by providing the Bureau access to information and agreeing to correct violations.
In return, the government would not prosecute. This occurred in 1905 with U.S. Steel, for
example, and again in 1907 with The International Harvester Company. R. WIest, BusnIssmEN
AND REsom, supra note 2, at 46; see also Johnson, supra, at 576, 578 (Roosevelt made the
Bureau a "vehicle for executive leadership in dealing with big business"). Some thought the
President had too much discretion. Id. at 576. The Bureau also reflected Roosevelt's belief
that large corporations were a fact of life and that they were best regulated by federal
supervision, by an agency of the executive branch and by some sort of federal licensing.
35. Licensing and chartering are technically different. Chartering would replace state
incorporation, whereas licensing would not. Proposals for both were similar and the terms
were often used interchangeably, as they will be used here. Urofsky, Proposed Federal
Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 166 (1982).
36. On August 18, 1787, James Madison proposed that the federal government have the
power to charter corporations. For a short but comprehensive history of federal incorporation
proposals, see L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITS REGULATION 152-57 (3d ed. 1989). See also
Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47
O1o ST. L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1986). In 1934 a Federal Trade Commssion Report described
the federal history of chartering up until that time. FTC, COPILATION OF PROPOSAL AND
VIEWS FOR AND AGAINST FEDERAL INCORPORATION OR LICENSING OF CORPoRATIONS AND COM-
PILATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY AND CASE LAW CoNCERNiING CORPORATIONS,
WITH PARTIcULAR ATrENTION TO PtmULIc UTIrY HOLDING COMPANiES, S. Doc. No. 92, 7(th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt..69-A (1934) [hereinafter 69-A FTC UTILITY CORPORATIONS]. The Pro-
gressive Era is covered by Urofsky, supra note 35. A good summary of the Progressive Era
as well as a good bibliography is provided by Boyer, supra, at 1048-50.
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period, particularly 1900 to 1914, interest in such proposals was widespread
and intense. Many businessmen supported federal licensing proposals be-
cause such proposals provided the advantage of uniform laws instead of a
multiplicity of state laws. Opponents saw federal incorporation as an in-
fringement upon states' rights. Both groups were often surprisingly vague
about details of their proposals. 37 In 1902, the Industrial Commission,
created by Congress in 1898 to investigate immigration, labor, agriculture,
manufactunng and business,3" recommended a federal incorporation law 39
The Bureau of Corporations in its first annual report in 1904 also recom-
mended federal licensing and continued to do so in later years. 4°
In his annual message of 1907, President Roosevelt urged a federal
incorporation law for corporations engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce, or, if that was "not deemed advisable, a license act for big interstate
corporations might be enacted. ."41 The Bureau of Corporations, echoing
Roosevelt, described in its annual report for 1908 a voluntary, if possible,
system of federal control "based on [the] tested principles of supervision,
publicity and cooperation ' 42 lodged in an office of the executive branch
because administrative supervision could provide the necessary flexibility
that judicial procedures could not.43
The Hepburn Bill of 1908, 44 amending the Sherman Antitrust Act, would
have allowed corporations to voluntarily register with a federal office. The
Bureau of Corporation's 1908 annual report stated that many "promnent"
corporate leaders had said they would register their corporations under the
37 Urofsky, supra note 35, at 174-76. The vagueness of the proposals may be a major
reason business supported them.
38. Act approved June 18, 1898, ch. 466, §§ 1-2, 30 Stat. 476.
39. 19 INDusTRIAL ComissioN, FINAL REPORT 651-52 (1902), as described in L. Loss & J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 36, at 153-57
40. REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR FEB. 26, 1903 - JUNE 30, 1904, H.R.
Doc. No. 165, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. 44-48 (1904) (reported in L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra
note 36, at 154; and Urofsky, supra note 35, at 168-69). In the annual report for fiscal year
1905, for example, the Commissioner stated that "no permanent remedy for existing industnal
evils can be expected until Congress exercises more fully its power of affirmative action under
the commerce clause of the Constitution." REPORT OF =m COMMISSIONER OF CORPOPRATIONS
FOR 1905, H.R. Doc. No. 7, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 75 (1906). The Commissioner sought a
federal licensing or chartering law which would allow the government to inspect corporate
books and records and stop corporate activities, when necessary. Such a law would allow for
"reasonable combinations." Id. at 75-76.
41. Seventh Annual Message, 42 CONG. REc. 70 (Dec. 3, 1907).
42. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR 1908, H.R. Doc. No. 1048, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 307-08 (1909).
43. Id. at 308.
44. H.R. 19745, 60th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 42 CONG. REc. 3769-70 (1908). In the
Senate the bill was introduced April 1, 1908. S. 6440, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 42
CONG. REc. 4212 (1908). The bill also would have modified the Sherman antitrust law to
permit reasonable restraints on competition.
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Act because they recognized that federal registration was "a commercial
asset well purchased by a reasonable degree of publicity. '45 Nonetheless,
the bill received a negative report from the Senate Judiciary Committee and
was never enacted.4
The bill failed for several reasons including the political difficulty, in
light of popular aversion to "trusts," of passing any provisions that might
be seen as pro-business, as well as an aversion to the activist role the bill
would have given the states in regulating the market.47 Another reason for
the Hepburn Bill's failure was the enormous amount of power it gave to
the executive branch, as opposed to the legislative and judicial branches of
government. 48 Finally, while big businesses might have stated that they
favored federal incorporation because it freed them from the confusion of
state laws and provided some protection from antitrust prosecution, they
undoubtedly recognized the inherent danger m federal registration: the
control that would inevitably follow.4 9 If the federal government could
register, it could also de-register. By creating requirements that must be met
to obtain registration, the government could shape the nature of corpora-
tions. For example, in the case of the Hepburn Bill, a corporation, once
having federally registered, could file its contracts with the federal agency
and, if approved, gain exemption for the contracts from prosecution under
the Sherman Act. The perilous down-side of this registration, however, was
that the government retained supervision of all present and future contracts
of the corporation and could at any time revoke registration or decide to
prosecute. 0
The failed Hepburn Bill was Roosevelt's swan song. The debate, however,
on the state role in regulation of corporations continued through Taft's and
into President Wilson's admstration. The debate did not resolve itself
entirely until the passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 and the
establishment of the Federal Trade Commission.
As he stated in his inaugural address to Congress, President Taft saw
himself as carrying out his predecessor's policy of recognizing the value of
45. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR 1908, supra note 42, at 310. Many
corporations favored the Hepburn Bill because it would have provided immunity from pros-
ecution under the antitrust laws and would therefore have helped the industries stabilize. N.
L~moR Aux, supra note 33, at 171-72.
46. SENATE CoMm. ON THE JUDICLRY, AMENDING ANTITRUST ACT: ADVERSE REPORT, S.
REP. No. 848, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (to accompany S. 6440) [hereinafter SENATE Comm.
ON TE JUDICIRnY].
47. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 282-83. For a discussion of the bill, see 1d. at 282-85.
Another reason for the failure of the bill was its exemption of umons from antitrust prosecution.
See, e.g., R. WmBE, BusnmrssMEN AND REFORM, supra note 2, at 81.
48. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 271-82.
49. See SENATE Comm. ON = JuDiciARY, supra note 46, at 9.
50. H.R. 19745, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908).
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corporations but curbing abuses through federal supervision.5 1 Taft's vision,
however, reflected a more conservative faction of the Republican Party and
was more respectful of private property than Roosevelt's program. Taft
pulled back from the active executive role envisioned by Roosevelt. Though
Taft favored federal supervision and federal incorporation, he saw the
judicial branch, not the executive branch, as the primary regulator of
corporations.5 2 In Taft's view, as expressed in his 1910 message to Congress,
voluntary federal incorporation, which he advocated, would be admstered
by a federal agency which would assist Congress in drafting business
legislation but would not directly regulate the market. Among other duties,
the agency would supervise the issuance of securities; it would also provide
for publicity of corporate information. 3 On February 7, 1910, the Taft-
Wickersham voluntary incorporation bills were introduced in Congress;
nevertheless, Taft vacillated on the issue of federal incorporation. 54
51. First Annual Message (President Taft), 44 CONG. REc. 2-3 (Mar. 4, 1909). He reiterated
this position in his 1910 message to Congress:
[I]t is not, and should not be, the policy of the Government to prevent reasonable
concentration of capital which is necessary to the economic development of
manufacture, trade, and commerce. This country has shown a power of econom-
ical production that has astonished the world, and has enabled us to compete
with foreign manufacturers in many markets. It should be the care of the
Government to permit such concentration of capital, while keeping open the
avenues of individual enterprise and the opportunity for a man or corporation
with reasonable capital to engage in business.
Second Annual Message (President Taft), 45 CoNGO. Rac. 383 (Jan. 7, 1910).
52. M. SKIAR, supra note 2, at 365-69.
53. Taft's Special Message to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 484, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan.
7, 1910).
[The law] should provide for the issue of stock of corporations to an amount
equal only to the cash paid in on the stock; and if the stock be issued for
property, then at a fair valuation, ascertained under approval and supervision of
federal authority, after a full and complete disclosure of all the facts pertaining
to the value of such property and the interest therein of the persons to whom it
is proposed to issue stock in payment of such property. [I]t should require
such corporations to file full and complete reports of their operations with the
Department of Commerce and Labor at regular intervals.
Id.
54. S. 1686 was introduced into the Senate by Sen. Clark on February 7, 1910; the identical
bill was introduced into the House by Rep. Parker as H.R. 20142 on the same date. See
69-A FTC UTIITy CORPOATIONS, supra note 36, at 38-39. Nevertheless, Taft was seen as
wavenng on the incorporation issue in February, 1910, because of the American Tobacco and
Standard Oil cases then before the Supreme Court. Large corporations favored federal
incorporation as a means to avoid the Sherman Antitrust Act. Federal Charter Plan In
Abeyance, FNACIAL. AMERICA, Feb. 1, 1910, reprinted in 69-A FTC UTnTY CORPORAATONS,
supra note 36, at 130-31. When the Court decided these cases so as to permit reasonable
combinations, corporate support-and Taft's support-for federal incorporation waned. M.
SK.AR, supra note 2, at 373-74; see also J. German, Taft's Attorney General: George W
Wickersham, 236-37 (1969) (unpublished dissertation available from University Microfilm)
(vacillation of Taft on the federal incorporation issue; the incorporation law will fend off
state socialism).
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2. Publicity of Corporations
A less direct, but more widely accepted, method of curing the trust
problem than the incorporation solution was to require public disclosure of
information concerning corporations. Neither the general public, the gov-
erment nor the stockholders received-much financial information about
the large corporations, except in the case of "public" corporations such as
railroads and financial institutions. Westinghouse Electric and Manufactur-
ing Co., for example, did not publish an'annual financial report or even
hold an annual meeting between 1897 and 1905. 55 State laws did not require
much information either. State laws concerning publicity were of several
types: some required only reports to state officials (which were kept con-
fidential), some required reports to stockholders and some provided for
publication generally for the benefit of the public. By 1900, only sixteen
states required detailed reports to officials; half the states required reports
to stockholders (some only upon demand), 56 and a few required publication
of basic information in local newspapers.57
Information provided through private channels was also in an early stage
of development. Some private credit rating systems had existed in the
mneteenth century, but they were rudimentary and limited by technology
(no computers, no fax machines and only primitive typewriters) in their
information gathenng. 58 The first decades of the twentieth century saw a
rapid growth of private investor services, expanding and consolidating earlier
services. In 1900, for example, Moody's issued its first volume of Moody's
Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous Securities. The Manual contained
1,100 pages describing the larger compames in a fairly standard format,
listing a description of property, capitalization, earnings, a rudimentary
balance sheet, officers and directors and miscellaneous information such as
annual meeting, on which exchange stock was listed and the corporation's
55. Hawkins, The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Practices among American
Manufacturing Corporations, in MANAGING BIG Busmpiss 166, 168 (1986). Other large corpo-
rations such as International Silver Co. (producing about 75% of the country's silver products)
and the American Tin Plate Co. (controlling 95% of the tin-plate production) also issued no,
or almost no information. Id. at 171. A few large corporations such as American Tobacco
Co., General Electric Co. and National Biscuit Co. did issue somewhat detailed financial
statements in annual reports. Id. at 170-71.
56. Id. at 173; see also 36 CoNo. REc. 1854-57 (Feb. 6, 1903) (Exhibit B to Rep. Littlefield's
speech) infra note 98. At common law shareholders had the right to examine corporate records
when some property nght was involved but not out of mere curiosity or speculative desires.
Non-shareholders had no right to inspect corporate books. See also 2 W COOK, A TiiFATisE
IN THE LAW OF CORPoRAIoNs HAVING CAPITAL STOcK §§ 511-519 (6th ed. 1908).
57. 36 CoNG. Rnc. 1854-57 (Feb. 6, 1903) (Exhibit B to Rep. Littlefield's speech) infra
note 98.
58. R.G. Dun & Co., for example, provided credit ratings and statements of capital worth
as early as 1864. J. NoRsuS, R.G. DuiN & Co.. 1841-1900, at 84 (1978).
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agent.5 9 By 1909 the number of corporations listed in the Manual and the
information provided had greatly expanded. 60 Despite this growth in private
59. 1 MOODY'S MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS SECURITIES (1900). Shortly
after the Civil War, Poor's began publishing a Railroad Manual; in 1908 it published the first
volume of Poor's Handbook of Investors' Holdings "[s]howing ownership of securities by
savings banks, trust companies, insurance companies and other institutions, compiled from
state and other documents published m the United States and Canada." I PooR's HANDBOOK
OF INvEsToRS'-HoLDINGs at title page. In 1888 Poor's published Poor's Handbook of Investment
Securities which broadened financial analysis beyond railroads to include some industrial
concerns. This, according to Standard & Poor's, was the "first analytical study of industrial
securities published" in the United States. Standard & Poor's 120 Years of Preserving the
'Right to Know' (undated pamphlet on file with the Indiana Law Journal). In 1910 Poor's
issued its first Manual of Industrials which contained for each company listed a description
of capital stock, some balance sheet information and sometimes a short profit and loss
statement. 1 PooR's MANUAL OF INDUSTRIALS (1910). The detail of the balance sheets and the
profit and loss statements vaned and was never great in any case.
60. In addition, Moody's added a new section providing analysis of stock values of one
hundred railroad securities because, as the publishers stated in their preface, there was "growing
demand on the part of the average investor for more technical information regarding the value
of securities in wich he is interested " 10 MOODY'S MANUAL OF RAILROADS AND CORPORATION
SEcurrms (1909). The increasing sophistication of the Manual is illustrated by tracing one company
through the decade. The 1900 Manual contains information for the American Ship Building Co.,
incorporated "under New Jersey laws, March 16, 1899, to consolidate [various] ship building and
dry dock companies located on the great lakes." 1 MooDY'S MANUAL OF INDusntuiA AND
MISCELLANEOUS SEcUmTEs 584 (1900). After a description of property held and capitalization
(note that the company had no bonded debt), there is a brief section on earnings which lists net
earnings, dividend paid and balance of earned surplus. Id. at 585. The balance sheet which follows
is simple. There are five categories under "assets"- plants and property, improvements, material,
accounts receivable and cash and "work and construction, balance earned and due us." Id.
By 1903 the separate earnings category had joined the balance sheet in a financial statement.
"Assets" had been renamed "resources," but otherwise contained the same categories. The
expansion occurred in the Liabilities section which looked as follows:
Capital Stock, Preferred
Capital Stock, Common
Accounts payable
Bills payable (paid m July)
Reserve for maintenance
Reserve for retirement Buffalo mortgage
Earnings
Less dividends paid, 7 percent, on Preferred
Less depreciation and maintenance
Less reserve for maintenance
Less reserve for Buffalo mortgage
Undivided profits for year ending June 30, 1902
Undivided profits, June 30, 1901
Undivided profit or surplus, June 30, 1902
4 MOODY'S MANUAL OF CORPORATION SacuRms 1349 (1903).
By 1909 five years of statistics were listed for the balance sheet. Assets were divided to include:
Plants and property
Additions and improvements
Materials on hand
Accounts and bills receivable
Due on bonds sold
Cash
Due on construction contracts
10 MOODY'S MANUAL OF RALROADS AND CORPORATION SEcurITiEs 2269 (1909). Liabilities were
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companies providing financial data, the availability of information to the
public remained spotty. The New York Stock Exchange, as early as 1869,
had a policy requiring listed companies to publish an annual financial
report. Not until 1910, however, under threat of government regulation,
did the Exchange really begin to enforce its policy. 61 Even with enforcement,
companies listed on other exchanges, or over-the-counter, were subject to
no such requirement. Finally, what information was published was often of
doubtful help 'due to the disarray in the accounting field where there was
little traimng of accountants and no uniform practices. 62 In sum, public
access to corporate information in the Progressive Era may be characterized
as sparse, not uniform, but growing.
Government access to information was also limited: certain corporations
involved in interstate commerce were required to provide the Interstate
Commerce Commission with detailed information as were national banking
and savings institutions, but this information was often inaccurate or poorly
organized, 63 Moreover, the government had no regular source of information
categorized as: preferred stock, common stock, accounts and bills payable, reserve funds and
surplus. Id. In addition, there was a section listing five years of statistics on vessels built, capacity,
net earnings, dividends paid, depreciation and maintenance, reserve for maintenance and "rebuilding
docks, etc." Id. Note that the company still had no bonds, and stock capitalization is the same
as it was in 1900: $7,900,000 preferred, and $7,600,000 common stock.
All companies did not have such detailed descriptions. For example, m 1909, American Sewer
Pipe Co., with an outstanding stock of $7,000,000 (par value $100), had a much more cursory
balance sheet and no information on earnings. Id. at 2268.
61. Hawkins, supra note 55, at 180-82. The Exchange's pre-1900 reluctance to enforce its
reporting requirement was evidenced by its Unlisted Department. Stocks covered by this
Department were actively traded but the companies were not required to furnish financial
information. The Department was abolished in 1910 under threats of federal regulation. Id.
at 181. The Exchange thereafter actively sought to increase reporting. In 1916, for example,
General Motors agreed to publish an income statement and balance sheet semi-annually. Id.
In 1926 the Exchange recommended publication of quarterly reports of all listed companies.
Id.
The panic of 1907, which many believed was caused by stock mampulation, led to demands
for public control of the stock exchange. Various bills were introduced into Congress to that
effect, most taxing certain transactions or regulating the use of the mails. None of the bills
was enacted. Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
42 STA. L. Rav. 385, 395-96 (1990).
62. Hawkins, supra note 55, at 175-76. The first umversity-level department of accounting
was established in 1900 at New York Umversity; the American Association of Public Account-
ants was formed in 1905 (becoming the American Institute of Accountants in 1916). Id. at
184-85. Uniform Accounting, published in 1917, was the first attempt to establish auditing
and reporting standards. Id. at 186.
63. In his annual report to Congress the Comptroller of the Currency was required to
include a summary of the reports he received from the national banks and a statement on the
assets and liabilities of state banks and savings associations. This information was to be
gathered from the reports filed by these companies with state officials and "[w]here such
reports can not be obtained, the deficiency to be supplied from such other authentic sources
as may be available." H.R. Doc. No. 195, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1909). Information filed,
however, was not always accurate. See, e.g., Hearings Before the National Monetary Com-
mission on Suggested Changes in the Administrative Features in the National Banking Laws,
S. Doc. No. 404, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 238-39 (1908) (In some cases the report given the
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concerning the average corporation engaged in intrastate or interstate com-
merce. Although the Bureau of Corporations, established in 1903, had
investigatory powers, it was without steady access to information about
corporations. Both Congress and the President desired access to regular,
annual information in order to deal rationally and "scientifically" with a
variety of issues, including revenue raising (especially tariffs), antitrust
regulation and currency reformA4
Publicity of information about corporations was an important facet of
both the Roosevelt and Taft administrations' efforts at federal regulation
of corporations, especially regulation of trusts.65 Publicity had at least two
meanings. In its broadest sense publicity meant giving the general populace
access to information about corporations. In a narrower sense publicity was
limited to providing the government with information. Both Presidents
Roosevelt and Taft and Congress used the phrase in both senses, not always
specifying which sense they meant. 6
Congressional attempts at publicity began as early as 1901 when Repre-
sentative Littlefield of Maine introduced into Congress a bill requiring every
corporation engaged in interstate commerce to file with the Secretary of the
Treasury a return containing information such as the amount of authorized
Comptroller of the Currency did not agree with the banks' books and records.).
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 authorized the Commission to require common carners
to submit annual reports using uniform accounting practices prescribed by the Commission
"showing the amount of capital stock, funded and floating debt, interest paid, cost of property,
number of employed and salaries paid, earnngs and receipts, operating and other expenses,
balance of profit and loss, annual balance sheet, rates and fares, and miscellaneous statistics."
BuREAu oF STATisTIcs, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AcTrvus: 1887-1937, at 105 (1937).
The original act, however, had no enforcement provision. This defect was not remedied until
the Hepburn Amendment of June 29, 1906, which provided, in § 20, for penalties for failure
to comply. Id. at 107. The Amendment also extended the annual filing requirement to carriers
other than railroads and expanded the requirements for monthly and special reports. Id. at
74.
64. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
65. Roosevelt, in his 1907 annual message to Congress, for example, coupled his call for
amendment of the Sherman Antitrust Act with a call for "the compulsory publication of
accounts and the subjection of books and papers to the inspection of the Government officials."
Seventh Annual Message, 42 CONG. REc. at 70 (Dec. 3, 1907). In his 1908 Message regarding
federal control of corporations he stated that one of the "chief features of this control should
be securing entire publicity in all matters which the public has a right to know." Eighth
Annual Message, 43 CONG. REc. at 17 (Dec. 8, 1908). President Taft's support of the 1909
Corporate Excise Tax stressed the publicity aspect. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
66. Roosevelt, for example, used both senses of the phrase in his 1907 Annual Message to
Congress. First, in recommending the amendment of the antitrust laws so as to forbid only
harmful combinations, he stated that the government needed to have supervision over businesses
engaged in interstate commerce, such supervision including "the compulsory publication of
accounts and the subjection of books and papers to the inspection of the Government officials."
Seventh Annual Message, 42 CONG. REc. at 70 (Dec. 3, 1907). Then, in discussing a federal
incorporation law, he advocated publicity in its broad sense: "Provision should also be made
for complete publicity in all matters affecting the public and complete protection to the
investing public and the shareholders in the matter of issuing corporate securities." Id.
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stock, par value, amount of stock issued and outstanding, amount paid in
and whether m cash or property, amount of debt, current assets and
liabilities, total earnings, operating expenses, interests, taxes, net earnings
and dividends. 67 Any corporation that had outstanding capital stock which
was not fully paid would, under the proposed legislation, be subject to a
tax equal to one percent of its capital stock. 68 The Secretary would publish
each year "a list of all corporations making returns, showing the condition
of each corporation and its capital stock, for free public distribution. .69
No action was taken on the bill.
In 1902, the Industrial Commission, in connection with a federal incor-
poration proposal, recommended that corporations publish information of
value to investors and send stockholders annual financial reports. Larger
corporations would be required to publish annual audited reports containing
lists of assets, liabilities, profit or loss. 70 The recommendation was not
adopted by Congress.
In early 1903 a bill bearing the same number, H.R. 17, but substantially
different than the 1901 Littlefield Bill, was introduced. Among other things,
this bill required new corporations engaged in interstate commerce to file
with the Interstate Commerce Commission a return containing, among other
information, the amount of bonds outstanding, the amount of capital stock
issued and outstanding, par value and the amount paid in for stock and
whether in cash or property. Existent corporations were required to file a
return only upon the request of the Commission. 71 The Commission was
required to publish a "list of all corporations making returns, with an
abstract of such returns, for free distribution ...- 72 The bill failed
73
because Roosevelt favored the establishment of the Bureau of Corporations
which placed more discretionary power in the hands of the President. In
addition, the Bureau was a less drastic measure than Littlefield's proposal. 74
67. The bill, H.R. 17, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., is reprinted in 36 CoNG. Rac. 1786 (Feb. 6,
1903).
68. H.R. 17, § 3, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 36 CoNG. REc. 1786 (Feb. 6, 1903).
69. H.R. 17, § 4, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 36 CONG. Ric. 1786 (Feb. 6, 1903).
In 1902 the Industnal Commission had recommended the publication of accurate prospectuses
and annual financial reports. 19 INDUSTRAL COMMISSIONER FINAL REPORT 649-52 (1902) as
described in L. Loss & J. SEUGMAN, supra note 36, at 152-54.
70. 19 INDUSTRIAL COmmsION FINAL REPO RT 649-50 (1902), as described in L. Loss & J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 36, at 150-53.
71. H.R. 17, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 36 CONG. Rc. 1786 (Feb. 6, 1903). New
corporations would file a similar report on request of the Commission. Id. H.R. 17 also
contained antitrust provisions, including anti-rebate provisions (§ 5) and denial of interstate
facilities to corporations which violated § 5 or attempted to monopolize or control production,
manufacture or sale (§ 6).
72. H.R. 17, § 3, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 36 CONG. REc. 1786 (Feb. 6, 1903).
73. The bill passed the House, 36 CONo. REc. 1915 (Feb. 7, 1903), but the Senate refused
to consider the bill. 36 CONG. REc. 1931 (Feb. 9, 1903).
74. See H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 538-49; Johnson, supra note 34, at 572-74.
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Despite these failures, by 1903 publicity was a key feature of proposed
antitrust legislation, accepted at least in principle even by the conservative
New York Times. 7 Thus, the first federal measure to regulate all industries,
the 1903 law establishing the Bureau of Corporations, gave the President
discretionary power to publicize information gathered by the Commissioner
of Corporations. 76 In 1905, the Commissioner, commenting on the creation
of the Bureau, stated that the Bureau was created due to public opimon on
industrial developments which was "vigorous, but confused and vague." 'n
Neither the problems nor the solutions were clear, but "upon only one
point can it be said that public opimon was fairly clear and unammous and
that point was the desire for 'publicity'-in other words,-the desire for
information."78 Although it was not always clear what information should
be gathered, nor for what purpose, the Commissioner agreed that "the
demand for accurate information was fundamentally sound."7 9
75. See, e.g., The Financial Situation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1903, at 29, col. 2 ("Anti-trust
legislation is taking the shape of a certain degree of publicity for the corporations.
[I]t is difficult to see why Wall Street should fear it or the corporations should oppose it. It
will hurt nobody except those who have something to conceal."). Corporations such as
Standard Oil, however, resisted proposed trust measures, "especially those measures intended
to insure publicity." Standard Oil and Trust Legislation, N.Y Times, Feb. 9, 1903, at 1, col.
5. These articles are referring to the proposal to establish the Bureau of Corporations. See
infra note 76. Perhaps the Times' support of publicity reflects its relief that stronger antitrust
proposals were rejected.
76. The Act provided that:
The said Commissioner [of the new Bureau] shall have power and authority to
make, under the direction and control of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor,
diligent investigation into the organization, conduct, and management of the
business of any corporation, joint stock company or corporate combination
engaged in commerce among the several States and with foreign nations excepting
common carriers and to gather such information and data as will enable the
President of the United States to make recommendations to Congress for legis-
lation for the regulation of such commerce, and to report such data to the
President from time to time as he shall require; and the information so obtained
or as much thereof as the President may direct shall be made public.
Act approved Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 825, 828 (emphasis added).
Several congressmen complained that the bill containing the establishment of the Bureau of
Corporations was a mockery of antitrust legislation, especially compared to the defeated
Littlefield bill. E.g., 36 CoNo. REc. 2003-05 (Feb. 10, 1903) (statement of Rep. Richardson
of Alabama). Of particular concern was the fact that all it provided for was the gathering of
information for the President, who could then decide whether to publicize the information,
and what legislation to recommend. Id. at 2005; see also id. at 2007 (statement of Rep. Ball
of Texas complaining of the President's discretion as to whether to publicize information).
77. BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR AND COMMERCE, 1905 ANNUAL REPORT 5-6
(1905). Earlier, in the very first annual report for the Bureau of Corporations, Commissioner
Garfield proposed a federal franchise or licensing law, similar to the one proposed earlier by
the Industrial Commission, which provided for "publication of so much information as is
necessary to allow the public to protect itself against fraud and the abuse of minority interests."
69-A FTC UTrIrY CORPORATIONS, supra note 36, at 6.
78. BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR AND COMMERCE, 1905 ANNUAL REPORT 6
(1906).
79. Id. at 69, 73. By the 1908 Annual Report, the Commissioner states: 'Efficient publicity'
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Despite the Commissioner's somewhat vague statement supporting pub-
licity, publicity was a vital part of attempts to regulate corporations.
Provisions for publicity consistently appeared in calls for federal regulation
of corporations generally, antitrust regulation, in proposals for federal
incorporation and, as I shall show, in the Corporate Excise Tax. Moreover,
people could and did articulate several reasons why publicity was so im-
portant. First, the power of publicity lay in its exposure of abuse. This
was, after all, the era of muckraking. In the words of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Corporations, Bureau actions showed that "[a]gain and
again the mere exposure of improper business methods has led to their
abandonment without any further action." 0 Second, publicity was a means
of gathering information which could serve as a basis for rational govern-
ment regulation of the corporations." The need for regulation to be both
"rational" and "scientific" was a typical concern in the Progressive Era.
This concern manifested itself in the area of tariff revision, a hot topic of
the times related to the trust issue and from which the corporate tax arose. 2
Third, publicity could help with the specific problem of watered stock or
overcapitalization which was seen by both Presidents Roosevelt and Taft as
a major area of corporate abuse, an area which many of the federal
incorporation bills addressed. 3 "Stock watering" was intertwined with the
means that sort of publicity which reaches the average citizen under everyday conditions. The
mere publication of large columns of facts and great masses of figures is not enough
[Material must be summarized] in brief, clear, and reliable conclusions, showing important
permanent corporate tendencies." BuzrEu OF CoRps., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR AND COMMERCE,
1908 ANN AL REPORT 303, 307 (1909).
80. BUREAU OF CoRPs., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR AND COMMERCE, 1908 ANNuAL REPORT 303,
307 (1909).
81. As Theodore Roosevelt so clearly stated: "The first essential in determimng how to
deal with the great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts-publicity." First Annual
Message (Dec. 3, 1901), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRSmiDENTS 6641, 6648.
Congressional debate also talked of the need to get reliable information on corporations so
that Congress could legislate properly. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 34, at 573. Tariffs were
a breeding ground for trusts in that to the extent they provided too much protection, they
were a barrier to competition.
82. E.g., Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L.
R-v. 285, 292-93 (1986) (discussing the need for scientific information); 44 CONG. REc. 3759
(June 24, 1909) (reprint of Sen. Newlands' comments to the House on December 15, 1900,
stating that the government needs information to "act intelligently in the future in legislation
relating both to the taxation and regulation of these industrial combinations. There is hardly
an econormc writer who does not insist that publicity is the first thing to be secured."). See
the discussion of publicity and the Corporate Excise Tax infra notes 262-90. The tariff was
seen as aiding trusts by protecting them from competition. For example, Rep. De Armond of
Missouri in favoring Rep. Littlefield's 1903 antitrust amendment requiring corporations to file
returns, proposed an amendment giving the President power to suspend a tariff when necessary
to "protect the public." The tariff "had been made a sheltering place and a breeding ground
for trusts." Anti-trust Debate Over, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1903, at 3, col. 1.
83. President Roosevelt sounded a recurring theme when he stated that because corporations
were generally useful, much legislation of them was wrong, yet there were "real and grave
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"trust fund" doctrine which held that the paid-in capital of a corporation
was a trust for the creditors. Any "watenng" was, therefore, a fraud upon
the creditors . 4
evils, one of the chief being over-capitalization," which needed correction. First Annual
Message (Dec. 3, 1901), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 6641, 6647.
In 1905 he elaborated on the evils of overcapitalization, the chief abuse of corporations:
[O]vercapitalization often means an inflation that invites business panic; it always
conceals the true relations of the profit earned to the capital actually invested,
and it creates a burden of interest payments which is a fertile cause of improper
reduction in or limitation of wagers; it damages the small investor, discourages
thrift, and encourages gambling and speculations; while perhaps worst of all is
the trickiness and dishonesty which it implies-for harm to morals is worse than
any possible harm to material interest, and the debauchery of politics and business
by great dishonest corporations is far worse than any actual material evil they
do the public.
Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905), reprinted in 16 MEssAoFs AND PAPERS OF THE PsImENrs
6973, 6976.
President Taft also focused on the dangers of overcapitalization generally, and of railroads
in particular. On January 7, 1910 Taft sent a special message to Congress to deal with the
regulation of interstate commerce. 45 CONG. REc. 378 (Jan. 7, 1910). Besides his recommen-
dation to establish a commerce court, his other major recommendation was a federal micor-
poration law which provided for the issue of stock only for cash, or, if for property then at
a "fair valuation, ascertained under approval and supervision of a federal authority, after a
full and complete disclosure of all the facts pertaining to the value of such property and the
interest therein of the persons to whom it is proposed to issue stock in payment of such
property." Id. at 383. Corporations also could not hold stock of other corporations without
approval by the federal authority.
The Taft-Wickersham bills, introduced into the 61st Congress on February 7, 1910, provided
for a minimum capital stock of $100,000, the filing with a federal agency if stock was issued
for property and the necessity of approval by the Comrmssioner of Corporations to increase
capital stock. S. 6186 and H.R. 20142 as described in 69-A FTC UTILITY CORPORATONS, supra
note 36, at 8-9, 38-39.
In February, 1910, Sen. Newlands introduced a federal incorporation bill, similar to ones
he had introduced for the preceding five years, which regulated issuance of stock. 69-A FTC
UTmrrY CORPORATIONS, supra note 36, at 13. Similarly, Sen. Doniver, on May 26, 1910,
introduced an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act governing the issuance of stock
and limiting the issuance of debt. Id. at 14-15. Section 14 of his amendment stated that the
date of maturity of debt could not exceed 50 years, the interest rate could not exceed six
percent and the amount of debt could not exceed the amount of capital. Id. at 14.
84. The "trust fund" or "American" doctrine was first articulated by the Supreme Court
in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873): "Though it be a doctrine of modern date,
we think it now well established that the capital stock of a corporation, especially its unpaid
subscnptions, is a trust fund for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation." Id.
at 620. This theory was later rejected in such cases as Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car
Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W 1117 (1892), wich held that corporate property could not be
seen as held in trust since the corporation had legal as well as beneficial right to any property.
A corporation is "a trustee for its creditors in the same sense and to the same extent as a
natural person, but no further." Id. at 193, 50 N.W at 1119. To recover, the court said the
creditors must show that they were defrauded by the stockholders. The problem of watered
stock and shareholder liability for it "represented one of the two or three most important
issues in corporate law during the late nineteenth century and generated hundreds of cases
and thousands of pages of legal writing." Horwitz, supra note 12, at 349. By 1909, the time
of the Corporate Excise Tax, some courts rejected the theory, but the issue was by no means
settled. It continued to cause problems and discussions during the Progressive Era. See
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Stock watering or overcapitalization also struck at the heart of the trust
issue. This occurred in two ways. First, there was a belief that the large
combination of trusts could not have occurred without stock watering. For
example, in the 1903 debates on H.R. 17, Representative Littlefield of Maine
stated:
It is doubtful if any of the large overcapitalized combinations now in
existence could have been financed if the facts as to value involved in
their organization had been fully known to the public. In a great many
instances the bonds negotiated represent all of the actual investment in
the corporation, the stock being largely speculative. It is certainly
doubtful if the public would buy a bond when it knew that the only
cash capital invested in the enterprise was the proceeds of the bonds in
which it was invited to invest.,,
Thus, overcapitalization or stock-watering led to the very creation of trusts.
It was harmful to the investing public who bought bonds they otherwise
would not buy: "Where is the individual who, proposing to engage in any
enterprise, would have the courage to go into the market and endeavor to
borrow, secured by a mortgage on the enterprise, all the capital to be
invested therein?"' 16 Prospective buyers were at risk because, unlike the
purchasers of a horse, a farm or other tangible property, they could not
evaluate the worth of the bond or stock by examining it, or even by reading
a prospectus. 87 Publicity, however, would give the prospective investor the
information necessary to make a reasoned decision as to whether to purchase
the stock or bond.8" Both Roosevelt and Taft suggested publicity in matters
connected with issuance of securities in order to protect investors. 89
Wickersham, The Capital of a Corporation, 22 HARv. L. Rv 319 (1909). Morton Horwitz
notes that the decline of the "trust fund" doctrine, which began in the 1890s, was paralleled
by the growth of large corporations, the division between stock ownership and control and
the rise of the "natural entity" theory of corporations. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 349-56.
The theory made sense when the corporation was conceived as a mere aggregate of the
individual shareholders (a partnership model) but made little sense under a "natural entity"
model of corporations under which the corporate entity and the shareholders were separate
entities. Horwitz, supra note 12, at 355-56. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text for
the entity and aggregate models.
85. 36 CoNo. REc. 1842 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield); see also 36 CoNo.
Rc. 1898 (Feb. 7, 1903) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
86. 36 CONG. REc. 1842 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield) (Obviously, this is
before leveraged buy-outs!).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. In a 1910 message to Congress, Taft, citing the 1908 Republican platform which.favored
such
supervision as will prevent the future overissue of stocks and bonds by interstate
carriers . recommend[ed] the enactment of a law providing that no railroad
corporation subject to the interstate-commerce act shall hereafter for any purpose
connected with or relating to any part of its business governed by said act, issue
any capital stock without previous or simultaneous payment to it of not less than
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Overcapitalization, the argument continued, did not just endanger the
investor, it harmed the general public, the consumer. The real purpose of
overcapitalization was to increase artificially the worth of the stock and
thereby increase prices above their "natural normal level."' 9 Prices, the
argument went, must be at a level so that the enterprise would earn enough
profit so that there was a "fair return" on the capital, but not more.
An actual investment of $1,000,000 would require a price for the product
that after the payment of operating expenses and fixed charges would
yield in profit, say, $60,000. On the other hand, if $10,000,000 actual
investment were employed in the same enterprise, with the same output,
the net earnings would have to be $600,000 in order to give the same
fair return on the investment.
Assuming, for the purpose of testing this idea, that all the other
elements, such as cost and output remain the same, clearly in the last
instance the public must pay a largely increased price by reason of the
large investment. If, for the purpose of the illustration, $9,000,000 of
this were overcapitalization or inflation, the public would be clearly
paying in price $540,000 more than it ought to pay 91
Overcapitalization, by concealing true profits, stifled competition. What
looked like a six percent dividend on a $1,000,000 investment could really,
due to overcapitalization, be a twelve percent dividend on only a $500,000
investment. Because of this stock-watering other enterprises would not enter
the business since they did not realize how profitable the business was.
the par value of such stock, or any bonds or other obligations without the
previous or simultaneous payment to such corporation of not less than the par
value of such bonds and that no property, services, or other thing than
money, shall be taken in payment to such carner corporation, of the par or
other required price of such stock, bond or other obligation, except at the fair
value of such property, services or other thing as ascertained by the commission[.]
Second Annual Message, 45 CONG. REc. 380-81 (Jan. 7, 1910). In regards to corporations
generally, Taft recommended, in conjunction with Is voluntary incorporation law, that it
should provide for the issue of stock of such corporations to an amount equal
only to the cash paid in on the stock; and if the stock be issued for property,
then at a fair valuation, ascertained under approval and supervision of federal
authority, after a full and complete disclosure of all the facts pertaimng to the
value of such property and the interest therein of the persons to whom it is
proposed to issue stock in payment of such property.
Id. at 383; see also 43 CONG. Rnc. 18 (Dec. 8, 1908) (Roosevelt suggests publicity and
supervision of the issuance of securities).
90. 36 CoNG. Ric. 1842 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield).
91. Id. The goal of a fair price was two-sided. The public needed the protection from
price-gouging monopolies which would come from free competition, but businesses needed
protection from ruthless price-cutting competition that swept away all profit. Rudolph Peritz
interprets early antitrust history as a search for a guarantee of a fair return, a solution that
would balance the tensions between property (the entrepreneur's right to the fruits of his labor)
and equality (ensuring free competition). Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law:
Property Logic In Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTMNGs L.J. 285 (1989). For a discussion
of the economic thought of the times, see M. SKLaR, supra note 2, at 52-85.
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Publicity would help cure this by providing accurate information about
capitalization in order to determine a fair price.-
George Wickersham, Taft's attorney general, published an article in the
Harvard Law Review on the eve of Taft's inauguration dealing with over-
capitalization. 93 Unlike others, he did not get carried away by trust-busting
rhetoric. The issue, he said, was not overcapitalization per se, but lack of
information: "The real evil is not so much in over-capitalization, or in
exaggerated valuation of property constituting a part of the capital stock
as it is in the nsrepresentation or concealment of material facts in soliciting
financial aid for the corporation. '" 94 "Strained construction and forced
analogies" of the trust fund doctrme would not be needed if "laws were
modified so as to require full, frank disclosure of all the facts concermng
the property serving as a basis for stock issue, and safeguards as to its
valuation . . . -95 Publicity would solve the problems created by the trust
fund doctrine as well as solve the underlying problem which the trust fund
doctrme was invented to cure.
Publicity, in short, was implicated at the most basic level of the economy:
fair prices, fair returns on investment and the very existence of competition.
Even those people (such as Roosevelt and Taft) who accepted the existence
of large corporations and advocated their advantages (efficiencies of scale,
for example)96 had to deal with these issues.
Once the existence of large consolidations was acknowledged, free com-
petition could not be relied on for market regulation. Publicity was part of
the alternative to free competition. Publicity would help control prices and
encourage, at least potentially, competitors. This critical rationale for pub-
licity accounts for the "emphatic, indeed impassioned, advocacy of publicity
of corporate affairs by Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, alike to guard against
stock-watering and secretive accounting, wich might conceal improper
prices and excessive returns." 97
In sum, publicity was necessary for a variety of reasons. Publicity was
an end in itself in that exposure of abuses often was enough to correct
92. 36 CoNo. REc. 1843 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield).
93. Wickersham, supra note 84.
94. Wickersham, supra note 84, at 338.
95. Wickersham, supra note 84, at 338.
96. 36 CoNo. Rc. 1842 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield).
97. M. SKLAR, supra note 2, at 379-80; see also H. THoRmm, supra note 8, at 321.
Publicity was essential to the concept of oligopolistic price, defined as that pnce
wich yielded a fair return on real investment and assets, and which spurred or
did not obstruct innovation and rising efficiency; that price and rate of return
above which competition, either direct or indirect by substitution would be
induced. In keeping the field open to the threat of new investment, if not new
investment itself, publicity was the corollary of regulation against unfair practices.
Together, publicity and policing business practices constituted the regulatory
equivalent of competition.
M. SKaR, supra note 2, at 380.
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
them. Second, publicity enabled the government to gather information
preparatory to further legislation. Third, publicity could help protect inves-
tors. Finally, publicity was a substitute for market regulation; it was a
means of obtaining fair prices and allowing at least potential competition.
To be effective, publicity needed to occur at the federal level. To begin
with, many states provided for little or no publicity of information."
However, even if all states were to provide adequate information, it was
unlikely that they would provide for uniform information. Yet to be useful
information needed to be uniform. 99 Furthermore, if the information were
required at the federal level, access to it would be easier than if information
were spread out all over the country at the state level.
In 1909 a special committee of the New York state bar investigated the
matter of overcapitalization and concluded that the popular belief that
overcapitalization deceives the public "may have been greatly exagger-
ated.'"'1 Nevertheless, the committee concluded that, despite its falsity, the
belief hurt business and the perceived problem needed to be cured. Inter-
estingly, the committee's solution was no-par stock.'0' The committee's
thinking was slightly ahead of that of the populace and the government
since both Roosevelt and Taft proposed to deal with the problem through
measures govermng stock issuance and publicity.i °2 The Corporate Excise
98. Representative Littlefield, in is 1903 speech on H.R. 17, provided in his Exhibit B a
summary of state laws on the subject. 36 CONo. Rc. 1854-57 (Feb. 6, 1903). While tis list
must not be taken as definitive, it does show the variety of laws on the subject and the limited
amount of information stockholders, let alone the public, often had access to. In New Jersey,
for example, stock books were open to shareholders thirty days before an annual meeting. In
Texas, upon request by one-third of the shareholders, the directors had to make a report on
"the situation and amount of business " Id. Several jurisdictions (e.g., Tennessee, North
Dakota, District of Columbia) provided for annual publication in a local newspaper of
information about capital stock and liabilities, and sometimes of a list of shareholders. Other
jurisdictions (e.g., Nevada, Idaho, New Hampshire) provided creditors with access to books
as needed. At common law shareholders had access to books and records. 14 CoRPus JUis
Corporations §§ 1298-1301 (1919). See id. §§ 1302-1303 for statutory and constitutional
provisions.
99. 36 CONo. REc. 1840-41 (Feb. 6, 1903) (statement of Rep. Littlefield).
100. Report of the Special Committee on Corporation Law, presented at the 32d Annual
Meeting of the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 28-29, 1909, reprinted in 1 CoRP. TR.
Co. J. (Supp. Mar. 1909) (pages unnumbered).
101. Id.
102. For example, in 1908 President Roosevelt had asked Congress to deal with three issues,
including the "question of overcapitalization, either through Federal license or by some
provision securing Government supervision of the issues of stock and bonds by inter-State
corporations." Trust Law Changes Don't Satisfy Labor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1908, at 2,
col. 6. The article concerns the introduction of the Hepburn Bill to amend the Sherman Act.
The two other measures Roosevelt wanted Congress to deal with were employer liability and
amendment of the Sherman Act to permit reasonable combinations. Id. Many states also
attempted to deal with the issue of stock-watenng or overcapitalization. What the Governors
Say About Corporations, 1 Coap TR. Co. J. (Supp. Feb. 1909) (pages unnumbered); see also
supra note 92 and accompanying text. The first state to enact legislation permitting no-par
stock was New York in 1912. See Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 CoLUM. L. REv 1618, 1636-37 (1989).
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Tax, as I shall show, dealt with the overcapitalization issue directly through
a publicity feature and less directly through its interest deduction provision.
Frequently, publicity proposals distinguished among corporations, calling
for more publicity for large corporations than for small.103 In 1908 the
National Incorporation Committee of the powerful National Association of
Manufacturers reported that it favored national incorporation and publicity,
however:
A clear distinction should be made in the laws regarding publicity
between corporations which list their stocks for sale on stock exchanges
and those private corporations which do not.
Those who appeal to the public to deal in their stocks should explain
to the public; those who do not should be required only to report to
their stockholders.
Generally speaking, publicity is mconsistent with the successful conduct
of competitive business.1°'
This statement foreshadows the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax debate both
in its concern for privacy to protect business secrets and its distinction
between types of corporations which should be subject to publicity. Ex-
cepting private corporations from widespread publicity obviously served the
interests of small businesses. But it did so without defeating the major
purpose of publicity to the general public. That purpose was to give investors
information so they could choose investments wisely and avoid promoter
schemes. Investors needed this information only as to possible investments.
Only corporations which offered their stock to the public were possible
investments; thus, only these corporations needed to comply with broad
publicity laws.
Businessmen as well as presidents and other government officials sup-
ported publicity. Many called it a "great safeguard," but convemently
omitted any details.105 Possibly, they supported it for the theoretical reasons
of ensuring fair prices. More realistically, they supported it because of its
very vagueness. By supporting publicity, they could favor regulation which
would not impose any significant restrictions upon them but at the same
time would fend off more serious regulatory attempts."1 6
D. Summary
By the time of Taft's inauguration in March, 1909, the corporate restruc-
turing of America was well underway with the major consolidation of the
103. The 1902 Industnal Commission Report, for example, required only large corporations
to publish annual audited reports. 19 INDusmiAL CominssioN, supra note 39, at 649-50.
104. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the National Association of
Manufacturers, 230-33 (1908), reprnted in 69-A FTC UrTM CoRPoRAnrONS, supra note 36,
at 56-57.
105. R. WiBE, BusnTEssMMN AND REFoRm, supra note 2, at 50.
106. This interpretation of businessmen's support of publicity is consistent with Kolko's
view of the Progressive Era as the triumph of conservatives m forestalling more radical changes.
G. KoLKo, supra note 2.
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great corporations just accomplished. Congress had been debating the trust
issue for almost two decades but had actually passed little legislation. The
two major legislative accomplishments were the passage of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890 and the establishment of the Bureau of Corporations
in 1903. The Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act as abolishing
common law "reasonable restraints" on trade while the Bureau of Corpo-
rations argued for the acceptance of reasonable restraints and the regulation
of large corporations. President Roosevelt had selectively enforced the Act,
using his executive discretion under the Bureau to reach gentlemen's agree-
ments rather than instituting prosecutions. Roosevelt, by the end of his
term, had sketched out a vision of active federal regulation of corporations
with the executive branch, rather than the judicial or legislative branches,
taking the predominant role. Two of his tools for regulation were federal
incorporation or registration and publicity, both of which were present in
the Hepburn Bill of 1908, the most recently failed attempt at federal
regulation. President Taft took a more conservative view of government
action in the area, favoring less government regulation and more deference
to the judicial branch. Taft did, however, support federal incorporation
and publicity Publicity, in fact, was a key reason for his support of the
Corporate Excise Tax. Underpinning attempts at regulation through publicity
and federal incorporation was the view that corporations were artificial
entities, as opposed to the conception of corporations under the competing
aggregate and natural entity theories.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS BEFORE 1909
On the eve of Taft's inauguration, the government had traditionally raised
most of its revenues through vanous excise taxes, including some on
corporations. During the Civil War, under the press for revenue, the federal
government passed its first income taxes. These income taxes, beginning in
1861 and ending in 1871,107 were relatively small sections of much larger
107 The first income tax was enacted in August, 1861, and was never collected because
Congress expected to amend it shortly. S. RATteR, AMaRicAN TAXATION 68 (1942). The Act
was passed instead of a bill taxing real estate only, as the latter was objected to on a
constitutional basis as a direct tax. E. SELIGMAN, Ti INCoaM TAX 431-32 (1911), referrng to
congressional debate in the CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., Ist Sess. 246-49, 252, 268, 272, 282,
325 (1861). The Act imposed a three percent tax on the income above $800 of every person.
Act approved Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. The tax appeared to be on gross
income since no deductions were provided for. The intent, however, was to tax only net
income, delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to allow deductions from
gross income. S. RATNER, supra, at 67; E. SELIGMAN, supra, at 434 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1861)). In July, 1862, Congress did in fact repeal the 1861 income tax
provisions and imposed instead a new tax on income in excess of $600 on "every person
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revenue bills imposing a variety of taxes including imposts or duties on
certain products, and excise taxes, measured by gross receipts, on indivi-
duals, compames and corporations engaged in certain businesses. 108 The
income taxes were taxes on the income of individuals, including dividends
and interest received from corporations. 109 However, certain corporations,
mostly those of a public nature such as those engaged in banking or
transportation, were required to pay taxes on dividends and interest pay-
ments and individuals could accordingly deduct these payments from income" 0
or, in later acts, receive a deduction for the tax paid by the corporation."'
Because of the deduction given individuals for taxes paid by the corpo-
ration, the tax paid by corporations on dividends and income appeared to
be merely a withholding at the source and not a separate tax on corporations.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was confused as to whether the statutes
imposed a tax on corporations. The Court first held that this tax was not
part of the income tax, but was a separate tax imposed on the corporation,
not the shareholders and bondholders;" 2 later in the same year, in apparent
contradiction of its earlier opimon, the Court stated that the tax was not a
tax on the corporation but was a tax on the shareholder or bondholder
residing in the United States." Act approved July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
The tax was slightly graduated: three percent on $601-$10,000; five percent on over $600 if
total income exceeded $10,000. The Act also created a Commissioner of Taxes in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Id. § I at 432. Income tax acts were also passed in 1863, 1864, 1865,
1866, 1867 and 1870. The 1870 Revenue Act provided for the expiration of the income tax at
the close of 1871. Act approved July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
108. E.g., Act approved July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 80, 12 Stat. 432, 468-69. The Act imposed
a three percent tax on gross receipts of railroads and steamboats, and a 1.5 percent tax on
fermes. The Act gave these businesses the right to add the tax to their fares. Id. at 469. Thus,
many believed, as Edwin Seligman stated in 1911, that the tax "was virtually shifted to the
public." E. SELiGmA, supra note 107, at 515. He is assuming, it seems, that there is no
competition to put a limit on the amount a business will pass on to consumers. In a system
based on market pricing the tax would be borne partly by the consumer and partly by the
supplier of the good, assuming that there is not an endless supply of the good. How much
the price nses depends on the slopes of both the demand and supply curves for the taxed
good. See, e.g., A. AcHAN & W ALLEN, ExcHANGE & PRODUCTION 65 (3d ed. 1983).
Because a gross receipts tax singled out occupations, not corporations, it was really an
occupation tax similar to earlier state taxes. For example, in 1777 Maryland imposed a tax of
0.25% on the profit of "every person practising law or physics, every hired clerk acting
without comnussion, every factor, agent or manager trading or using commerce in this state."
E. SELIGMAN, supra note 107, at 379 (quoting Maryland Laws of 1777, ch. 22, §§ 5, 6).
109. E.g., Act approved July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473; Act approved Mar.
3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479.
110. E.g., Act approved July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 91, 12 Stat. 432, 473-74.
111. Act approved Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479. This language meant that
individuals who paid at a higher tax rate than that paid by the corporation would be required
to pay more taxes.
112. Barnes v. The Railroads, 84 U.S. 294, 303 (1872). In contrast, the dissent stated that
the 1864 Act imposed only one tax, an income tax under § 116, and that §§ 117-23 merely
stated how to collect the tax (i.e., the corporation would withhold). Barnes, 84 U.S. at 311-
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
(and thus part of the income tax).113 Not surprisingly, the lawyers m ihe
first case asked for a rehearing on the ground that the cases were inconsis-
tent. The Court demed a rehearing for the case." 4 Clearly, there was
confusion as to what (or whom) was being taxed.
While the Supreme Court appeared confused as to whether the dividend
and interest tax was a separate tax on corporations or merely a withholding
device, another section of the income tax lent credence to the withholding
interpretation. The 1864 Act included in an individual's income "the gains
and profits of all companies, whether incorporated or partnership . m
estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled to
the same, whether divided or otherwise." 1" 5
The Act ignored the corporation as an entity (real or artificial) and,
treating it as a mere aggregate of individuals, taxed the income earned by
the corporation to its shareholders. In modem parlance, the Act integrated
corporate and individual taxes by taxing the individual on all business
income, no matter what entity earned it and no matter whether it was
distributed. If the money was distributed as interest or dividend the cor-
poration withheld the tax and the individual was allowed to deduct the
interest and dividend income from her income. Undistributed profits were
taxed to the individual also, but no provision was made in the Act to
provide for a deduction or exclusion for this income when it was actually
distributed.
113. United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. 322 (1872). In 1911, Edwin Seligman, the noted
tax expert, viewed the 1864 tax on dividends and interest withheld by the corporation as really
a part of the income tax. E. SELioMw,, supra note 107, at 444. He contrasted this stoppage
at the source with the gross receipts tax which was "supposed to hit the ability of the
corporation itself." Id. at 472.
114. Barnes, 84 U.S. at 335; see also Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U.S. 595, 598 (1879)
(section 122 of the 1866 Act is an excise tax on the business of a corporation). In Railroad
Co., the Court said that Congress intended the Act to "levy the tax on the net earnings of
[the specified] companies." Id. Congress could chose to tax the earnings after deducting
interest paid on debt or it could include that interest as part of net earnings. It choose to
include interest in earnings. Id.
115: Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282. The companies mentioned in
the section are those that withheld taxes on interest and dividends as in the 1862 Act. The
companies specified were those which withheld taxes on interest and dividends. Although the
1862 Act only included in an individual's income dividends paid by a corporation, the
Commissioner attempted to also include in an individual's income her share of the corporation's
undivided profits. In Magee v. Denton, 16 F Cas. 382 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 8,943), the
collector of internal revenue had assessed the plaintiff Magee on his share of corporate profits
which had not been distributed but spent on corporate repairs and improvements. Magee sued
to enjoin the collection of the tax on the basis that "the profits of an incorporated company,
itself an artificial person, are not, in the contemplation of the act of congress, a portion of
the gains, profits, or income of the stockholders, until they are distributed as dividends, or
embraced in a dividend declared by the managers of the corporation " Id. at 383. The
court denied the injunction, without deciding whether undistributed profits were income, on
the grounds that declared but unpaid dividends were clearly income to the stockholder, and
that the plaintiff had not stated that no dividends had been declared. Id.
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The Supreme Court considered the issue in Collector v. Hubbard"6 in
which it reversed a Connecticut superior court's holding that undistributed
profits were not income to shareholders because under well-settled state law
shareholders were not entitled to profits until the directors declared a
dividend." 7 Although the Court reversed the ruling on procedural grounds,"'
it stated that even if the statute did not bar the suit, the taxpayer was still
liable for the tax. While acknowledging that for other purposes a shareholder
is not entitled to profits until the directors declare a dividend, the Court
stated that for tax purposes, the shareholder is entitled to undistributed
profits because those profits immediately become incidences of the share-
holder's ownership of the stock: the value of his property has immediately
increased and he can sell, gift or devise the stock (and its enhanced value)
or he can retain it and receive future dividends from the current profit." 9
The Court concluded by saying that the "decisive answer" was that Congress
had the power to tax and that taxing undivided profits fell within that
power. 'a
The Court's analysis is interesting. It acknowledged the separate existence
of the corporation for state law purposes, but nevertheless found that the
shareholder had income. In order to do this the Court did not ignore the
corporate entity entirely, but did ignore it for tax purposes. This partial
disregard of the entity appears to rely on an economic theory of income
that holds that a person has income when her net wealth has increased,
116. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
i17. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563 (1869) followed
the earlier case of Exparte Ives, 13 F Cas. 179 (D.C. Conn. 1865) (No. 7,114), which had
also noted that dividends were not a matter of right for the shareholder since in many cases
directors could not declare dividends but had to use profits to pay debts. Id. at 180-81. Ex
parte Ives is the only other case on point. Given the apparent enormity of the undistributed
profits provision, it is peculiar that neither courts nor commentators paid it much attention.
Even Edwin Seligman ignored the provision in his detailed discussion of the 1864 Act. E.
SEuoiA, supra note 107, at 430-80.
118. The Court held that an 1866 amendment to the 1864 Act prohibiting suits in any court
unless appeal had first been made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue applied to state
courts as well. Hubbard, 79 U.S. at 14-15 (referring to Act approved July 13, 1866, ch. 184,
§ 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152).
119. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 17-18.
Profits are incident to the share to which the owner at once becomes entitled
provided he remains a member of the corporation until a dividend is made.
Regarded as an incident to the shares, undivided profits are property of the
shareholder, and as such are the proper subject of sale, gift, or devise. Undivided
profits invested in real estate, machinery, or raw material for the purpose of
being manufactured are investments in which the stockholders are interested, and
when such profits are actually appropriated to the payment of the debts of the
corporation they serve to increase the market value of the shares, whether held
by the original subscribers or by assignees.
Id. at 18.
120. Id.
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regardless of whether realization, that bugaboo of tax, has occurred.12' More
likely, however, the Court was merely following an artificial entity theory
in that it recognized the corporation as an entity only for those certain
purposes granted by the state.
The first federal income tax statute to clearly tax corporations was the
1894 Act. Section 27 imposed a two percent tax on the income of individuals'n
and section 32 imposed a similar tax on corporations. 2 1 Integration occurred
121. A classic economic definition of income is found in H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcomE TAX
(1938): "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and end of the period in question." Id. at 50.
A discussion of other conceptions of income dunng the first decade of the twentieth century
is in Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got To Do With It?,
39 Sw L.J. 869, 880-93 (1985).
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), held that income does not occur until realization
occurs, that is, the income is separated from the capital. The government had relied on
Hubbard but the Court replied that Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601
(1895), overruled Hubbard. The government replied that the sixteenth amendment overrode
Pollock, but the Court disagreed since the amendment applied only to income and to be
income the gain must be separated from the capital.
122. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
123. Id. § 32, at 556. The tax bases for both individuals and corporations were similar. In
particular, both could deduct interest paid or accrued. Individuals included in income interest
received or accrued less interest due or paid by the individual and deducted all expenses
necessary in carrying on any business or profession including "all interest due or paid within
the year by such person on existing indebtedness." Id. § 28, at 553. Corporations were taxed
on net profits "above actual operating and business expenses, including interest on bonded
and other indebtedness." Id. § 32, at 556. Interest deductions were not mentioned in either
the 1861 or 1862 Acts. However, congressional debate did occur on the matter in 1862. One
commentator has stated that this debate shows that Congress "evidently believed that the
income base implied, inter alia, a deductible interest expense." Berger, Simple Interest and
Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 219 (1981) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1513-32 (1862)). The debate actually shows some confusion and even indicates that many
Congressmen felt that no interest was deductible. First, Morrill of Vermont moved to deny a
deduction for personal and family expenses; this passed, with no vote being given. CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1532 (Apr. 3, 1862). Morrill then proposed that interest on land
not be deductible, explaimng: "A great many persons may owe debts, some on their farms
and some on other things. We do not deduct any debts." Id. Congressman Mallory responded
that interest on real estate that produced income should be deductible. Id. Mr. Hickman then
stated:
It is not contemplated, as I understand, that the indebtedness of a man shall
enter at all, as a general thing, into or modify his taxation. There is no
more reason, I apprehend, why the farmer shall be relieved from taxation on
the amount of his indebtedness for land than why I should be relieved from my
taxation on account of indebtedness for my personal effects
Id. White of Indiana then requested that the restriction on interest be extended to "other
productive capital out of which such income proceeds." Id. Tlus was rejected by a vote of 50
to 46, but Morrill's original amendment excluding interest on the value of land was adopted.
Id.
The 1864 Act provided for an interest deduction by taxing interest income to the extent it
exceeded interest paid. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 1187, 13 Stat. 223, 282-83.
Under the 1870 Act, non-business interest expenses could only be offset against interest
income whereas business interest expenses could be deducted without limitation. Berger, supra,
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through the exclusion from an individual's income of dividends received
from corporations which already had paid the two percent tax. 124
Because the 1894 Act and the debate concerning it dealt with many of
the issues raised in 1909, a closer look is valuable. Congress grappled with
the issue of corporate personality and whether corporations could or should
be taxed separately from individuals. The result was mixed. On the one
hand, Congressman William Wilson, chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee, rested his support of the corporate tax on a corporation's
separate identity and the special privileges it enjoyed, especially limited
liability.2' Wilson's stress on the artificial nature of the corporation and
its special privileges was reflected in the House version of the bill which
taxed only for profit corporations and associations "organized under the
laws" of the United States, a state or territory, "by means of which the
liability of the individual stockholders is in anywise limited."' 26 Without
discussion the Senate changed tis language, taxing only "corporations,
companies, or associations doing business for profit in the United States,
no matter how created and organized, but not including partnerships." 127
The Senate language, ultimately adopted,' 28 seems to rely on a natural
entity theory in contrast with the House's version which fits an artificial
entity theory. The Corporate Excise Tax, as will be seen later, resurrected
the House language.
Both versions apparently established the corporation as an entity sepa-
rately taxable from the individual. This separate taxability was denied to
some extent by integration of the taxes achieved through the exclusion
from income of dividends tax. 29 Integration was only partial, however,
at 219 (citing 11 I.R.R. 89, 97).
The bill as it came to the Senate from the House of Representatives did not allow corporations
to deduct interest m computing net profits. The Senate added this provision. 26 CONG. REC.
6831 (June 26, 1894).
124. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 554.
125. Corporations, he stated, were "a class of citizens" who owned and controlled
large amounts of wealth and enjoyed
certain public franchises ..and who therefore [had] no right to object to some
public scrutiny of their incomes in view of the exemption from personal
liability of stockholders, and other pnvileges which corporations enjoy, but which
the individual business or professional man cannot enjoy, the equity of a tax
upon their net earnings seems the more apparent, while the ascertainment of
those earnings would generally be easy and reasonably accurate, and free from
the offensive inquisition so much declaimed against in the case of the individual.
Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. REv 1, 7 (1894). He also thought the
supervision "might be salutary in its influence." Id.
126. 26 CONG. Re. 6831 (June 26, 1894).
127. Id. at 6833.
128. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 31, 28 Stat. 509, 556.
129. Id. § 28, at 554.
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because corporations, unlike individuals, had no exemption amount. 130
The lengthy exemption debate is worth a detailed look for the information
it yields about attitudes toward corporations generally, the legal nature of
corporations, federal-state relations and taxation. Those Senators favoring
an exemption for corporations similar to that for individuals acknowledged
that corporations "were entities in a sense" but viewed the corporation as
primarily an aggregate of individuals who would be harmed by the failure
to grant corporations a $4,000 exemption.' The harm was most clearly
delineated in the example given by Senator Hoar from Massachusetts in
which he stated that small corporations had replaced partnerships as the
mode of operating businesses and then described "five little grocers . . or
five mechanics. Each of them gives his individual work, hard day's
work, and the profit of the concern is $5,000. That is a thousand dollars
apiece.' 3 2 Hoar felt that the bill was unfair because it did not allow each
little grocer or mechanic to get his $1,000 out of the corporation because
the corporation had to pay a corporate tax. Ignoring the ability of the
corporation to pay that money out as deductible salary and not as a
dividend, Hoar argued, that the tax on the corporation was really a tax on
the individual. Consequently, he proposed an amendment giving a corpo-
ration an "exemption equal to the aggregate of the exemptions to which
such stockholders would be entitled in estimating their individual tax, not
including, however, any exemption which may have been allowed to such
stockholders as individuals."'13 Several other amendments to the bill, not
all as artfully drawn, were proposed to achieve the same purpose, but all,
like Hoar's, were defeated. 34 Some proposed amendments attempted to
exempt only small corporations, those that were basically incorporated
partnerships. 3 '
Most proponents of the corporate exemption did not object to taxing the
corporation on undivided surplus. 36 Although such a tax would be on the
corporate entity, in a sense it was just premature withholding from the
individual. 3 7 In effect, proponents argued for integration of taxes,
130. Individuals paid tax only on income in excess of $4,000. Id. § 27, at 553. However,
they were required to file returns if income exceeded $3,500. Id. § 28, at. 554.
131. E.g., 26 CONG. REc. 6868 (June 27, 1894); see also id. at 6874 (statement of Sen.
Higgins) (corporations are "but aggregations of the capital of individuals for joint profit
"); 26 CONG. Rc. 6876 (statement of Sen. Aldrich) ("A corporation is sumply an
aggregation of individuals.").
132. Id. at 6877.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 6865-88. A similar discussion occurred the previous day. 26 CONG. REc.
6832-35 (June 26, 1894).
135. 26 CONG. Rac. 6879 (June 27, 1894) (statement of Sen. Allison) (exempt corporations
having capital, including capital surplus of $80,000 or less).
136. Id. at 6881-82.
137 Presumably, there would be some mechanism for crediting the tax when the surplus
was dividended out, but no mention is made of this.
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recognizing the corporate entity as a mechanism for collecting tax but not
recognizing it as a separate taxable entity. Foreshadowing current economic
thought, one Senator stated that "an income tax is either a tax upon the
personal earnings of an individual or else it is double taxation."'' 8 Thus,
not giving a corporation an exemption discriminated against corporate
investment; the corporate exemption was needed not for the sake of cor-
porations but "because it is right and just to individuals.' 13 9
Opponents of the exemption, however, saw the corporation as a separate
legal entity subject to taxation like an individual. Senator Vest was the most
eloquent defender of this position. Using a benefits theory of taxation, he
stated that although corporations were incorporated by states, they received
federal benefits, in the way of protection, just like any individual and
therefore should pay tax just like any individual. 4' Individuals received an
exemption because they paid import duties and other taxes; since corpora-
tions did not, they were not entitled to the exemption. 41 To complain about
138. 26 CoNG. REc. 6881 (June 27, 1894) (Statement of Sen. Chandler). For current economic
thought on integration, see, for example, D. BRADFORD, BLUEPRNrrS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
(rev. ed. 1984); C. McLuRE, MusT CORPORATE INcOME BE TAXED TwicE? (1979); J. MEADE,
THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM: OF DIRECT TAXATIoN 245-58 (1978); Rudmck, Who Should Pay
the Corporate Income Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W REs. L. REv. 965 (1989);
Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes and the ALI Proposals, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REv 715 (1983); Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to
Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 TAx NoTFs 637 (May 6, 1985) (discussing the Carter and the
Reagan integration proposals); and Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HA~v. L. REv. 717 (1981). Integration is currently being
reconsidered by the Treasury Department. See, e.g., Gideon Holds Secret Meeting With CFOs
to Discuss Integration Study, 46 TAX NoTEs 379 (Jan. 22, 1990).
139. 26 CoNo. REc. 6872 (June 27, 1894) (statement of Sen. Hill). "The whole controversy
this mormng arises, not over the lack of exemption per se of a corporation, but over the
exemption which is claimed for individuals who do not have more than $4,000 income." Id.
at 6873 (statement of Sen. Hill).
140. Id. at 6866.
141. Id. Earlier in the year, Rep. Benton McMillin of Tennessee, a member of the House
Ways and Means Committee, explained why the Committee did not give corporations an
exemption similarly:
The corporation pays upon all its net income. And why9 We will give you our
reasons for it.
Here are artificial parties; here are creatures of the law that have peculiar
privileges. They have in some instances the right of ennent domain; they have
the right to sue and be sued as individuals.
A MEMBER. The right to go to the courts.
MR. McM~i~N. Yes; the right to go to the courts. They have the right to be
exempt from personal liability. As the Government has to keep its courts in
existence for the benefit of many of these corporations, as all or a majority of
them are presumed to be founded upon surplus, we have thought that an exception
might be made in their case, and that the exemption need not apply
26 CoNG. REc. 420 (Appendix Part I) (Jan. 23, 1894).
Interestingly, in response to this statement, Rep. Lacey queried whether the Committee had
taken into accqunt the fact that many corporations would switch back to partnerships. Id.
McMillin responded that the Committee had not taken that into consideration; if corporations
wanted to disincorporate, that was their option. Id.
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small stockholders of corporations being made to pay a tax is irrelevant,
he stated, because "[w]e do not deal with the stockholders. We deal with
a corporation as a legal being, doing business, artificially created, receiving
protection upon its property from the General Government like citizens
receive protection upon theirs.' 42 Senator Hill's response to this argument
was that corporations are created for the benefit of shareholders and "the
theory of the bill should be to treat all citizens alike and not discriminate
against those having corporate investments."'' 43 In other words, Hill looked
through the corporate entity and saw a mere aggregation of individuals. He
then went on to state that if corporations were "injurious to the country,"
the remedy was revocation of the corporate charter. 44
This linkage of sentiments about the goodness of corporations and their
taxability pervades the debate,145 indicating that the role of corporations in
society and corporate regulation was an underlying concern in the tax
legislation. This is particularly obvious in the discussions regarding exemp-
tions of small corporations, which were seen as the equivalent of partner-
ships, 1' and large corporations, which were seen as a different species,
which could (and perhaps should) be regulated. For example, Senator Allison
of Iowa favored a corporate exemption not just to eliminate unfairness to
individual shareholders with income below the exemption amount, but
because the "small corporations [should] not be disturbed at all by this
army of taxgatherers,"' 47 and should be on a par with partnerships which
did not pay tax. 4
Another theme raised in the tax debate that was also raised in the
corporate regulation area was the issue of federalism. Did the federal
government have the power to tax corporations that were franchised by the
state? Senator Hill raised the issue starkly with his proposed amendment to
142. 26 CONG. REc. 6866 (June 27, 1894). Senator Vest stated: "Senators may talk about
citizens, about widows, for instance, who have their all in these corporations. We do not deal
with them. We deal with corporations as artificial beings, whether large or small." Id. at
6867
143. Id. at 6873.
144. Id.
145. Congressman Teller, agreeing that a corporation was "a proper subject for an income
tax," seemed to do so reluctantly seeing it as the only way to tax the large corporations. Id.
at 6870. See also id. at 6872 (Sen. Hill on the reality and merits of corporations); id. at 6874
(Sen. Higgins wondering if the provision is part of the "general cry against corporations,"
and asserting that the Senate must distinguish between "certain overgrown, bloated corpora-
tions, which make an unfair and unjust use of the quality of corporate power"-notably
Standard Oil, "the great octopus," and the sugar trust-and other corporations); 1d. at 6879
(Sen. Allison distinguishing between large and small corporations).
146. 26 CONG. REc. 6833 (June 26, 1894) (statement of Sen. Hale) ("It is the fashion now
instead of making a partnership to form these little associations and put in twenty-five, forty,
or fifty thousand dollars. They ought to be encouraged rather than discouraged.").
147. Id. at 6833 (June 26, 1894).
148. See also id. at 6834 (Sen. Hale stating that little corporations "take the place of small
partnerships" and are excluded from the tax).
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exempt from the tax any corporation created by a state wich paid tax to
the state on its earnings, dividends or franchise. 149
The 1894 Act also dealt with the issue of publicity of returns which
became a major issue in 1909. The allegedly inquisitorial nature of the
income tax had been an issue since the Civil War statutes. In his annual
report for 1864, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had stated:
In order that it may not be felt to be inquisitonal in its character, the
instructions issued by this office required that the returns of income
shall not be open to the inspection of others than officers of revenue.
Some doubt having been entertained whether a proper construction of
the law sustains the instructions, I recommend that the doubt be removed
by express enactment. 50
While the 1864, 1865 and 1866 Acts remained vague on this issue, the
1870 Act specifically provided that no government employee "shall permit
to be published in any manner such income returns, or any part thereof,
except such general statistics, not specifying the names of individuals or
firms, as he may make public, under such rules and regulations as the
commissioner of internal revenue shall prescribe.""' Section 34 of the 1894
Act revised section 3167 of the revised statutes to provide that no government
employee could disclose information contained in returns, except as provided
by law. 52
These themes of corporate entity, federal-state relations and publicity all
emerged again in the debates in the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909. Mean-
while, amidst much sound and fury, the 1894 income tax was ruled uncon-
stitutional in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co."3 in 1895 on the grounds
that taxes on real and personal property were direct taxes which had to be
apportioned among states by population according to article I, section 2,
clause 3 of the Constitution.
The next major revenue need, occurring during the Spanish-American
War, was met in 1898 through non-income tax provisions, including an
excise tax, measured by gross receipts, on "every person, firm, corporation,
or company [with gross receipts exceeding $250,000] carrying on or doing
the business" of sugar or petroleum refimng or owmng or controlling any
pipeline.5 4 This provision was a concession by Senate Republicans to
149. 26 CONG. Ric. 6883 (June 27, 1894); see also id. at 6621 (June 21, 1894) (Sen. Hill
questioning whether the federal government can tax and therefore destroy instrumentalities of
the state).
150. Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the Year Ending June 30, 1863,
at 183-84 (1864), quoted in E. SELiGMAN, supra note 107, at 439.
151. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 11, 16 Stat. 256, 259.
152. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509, 557.
153. 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
154. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464. The Act also included a tax
on legacies. Id. § 29, at 464.
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Democrats and populists who had wanted a general excise tax on corporate
franchises of .25% of gross receipts of large corporations, as well as a
response to the mass outrage at the accumulation of wealth and power by
the Standard Oil Co. and the Sugar Trust. 155.
The income tax issue, though seemingly quiet after the Pollock decision,
was actually in "sub-surface ferment,' ' 156 and in the years immediately
before 1909 began to reach boiling point. The Democratic Party platform
for the presidential election of 1908 supported an income tax; the Republican
platform was silent on the issue. 157 Taft, in accepting the Republican
candidacy in Cincinnati on July 28, 1908, stated that a constitutional
amendment was unnecessary for an income tax. 5 The real campaign issue
in 1908, however, was tariff reform, not the income tax. 59 Proponents of
tariff revision favored it for a variety of reasons including reasons connecting
the tariff question to the trust issue. This argument held that high tariffs
helped lead to the creation of trusts.'6 Some felt that consumer prices were
too high because of the tariff' 61 and, like President Taft, favored a reduction,
especially on products that were "necessities."' 62
155. S. RATNER, supra note 107, at 233. The Republicans refused to yield on the income
tax issue in part because they did not want the Supreme Court to have to overturn itself and
thereby confirm criticism of the Court. Id.
156. R. BLAEY & G. BLAY, THE FEDERAL INCOmE TAX 22 (1940).
157. Id. For other studies of the events leading to the passage of the sixteenth amendment,
see J. BUENrER, THE INCOME TAX AND T PRoGRassrvE ERA (1985); S. RATNER, supra note
107.
158. R. BLAKEY & G. BL.AY, supra note 156, at 23. Roosevelt, in his 1907 annual message
to Congress, had stated that he thought that both an income and an inheritance tax should
be part of the federal tax system. After noting the difficulties of an income tax, he stated:
Nevertheless, a graduated income tax of the proper type would be a desirable
feature of Federal taxation, and it is to be hoped that one may be devised which
the Supreme Court will declare constitutional. The inheritance tax, however, is
both a far better method of taxation, and far more important for the purpose
of having the fortunes of the country bear in proportion to their increase in size
a corresponding increase and burden of taxation.
Second Annual Message, 42 CoNG. REc. 71 (1907).
159. R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 156, at 23.
160. See, e.g., Tarullo, supra note 82, at 289. President Roosevelt stated, however, that the
growth of'large corporations was due to "natural causes," not tariffs. First Annual Message
(Dec. 3, 1901), reprinted in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THM PRESmENTS 6641, 6645.
161. Tarullo, supra note 82, at 289.
162. Taft Would Reduce Tax on Necessities, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1909, at 2, col. 1. The
Times noted that some in the Republican Party feared that too heavy a tax on necessities
might cause the women "to persuade the men to vote out of power the party responsible for
the increased prices." Taft Approves Bill for an Income Tax, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1909, at
1, col. I (the article is subtitled "Women's Influence Feared"). The article notes that after
the McKinley tariff bill raising prices on necessities, the Republicans were voted out because
"It]he women of the country were against the Republicans." Id. As Speaker Reed explained
it, the women heard from store clerks that the cause of increased prices was the McKinley
bill. The women "went home and told their husbands and fathers and their stones had a
tremendous effect at the ballot box." Id.
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Taft had favored downward tariff revision for several years. 63 In Is
inaugural address on March 4, 1909, Taft called for a special session of
the 61st Congress, to convene March 15th, to deal with tariff reform and
with the revenue need reported by the Secretary of the Treasury.'" If tariffs
could not provide enough revenue, he suggested that an inheritance tax
should be enacted. 165 By April, 1909, the dissident or "insurgent" Repub-
licans had revolted against the tariff and several income tax bills had been
introduced into the Senate. Enough Republicans had joined the Democrats
in support of the income tax that passage in the Senate of an income tax
appeared likely.'"
The traditional view of the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 focuses on the
tax's role in the passage of the income tax. This view sees the suggestion
of the Corporate Excise Tax by President Taft on June 16, 1909, in a
message to Congress, 67 as one half of a political compromise (the other
half being the proposed sixteenth amendment) to postpone the passage of
an income tax until the adoption of a constitutional amendment authoring
the income tax.'6s It Is certainly true that Taft was against an income tax
act for political reasons: he did not want a vote on it to split the Republican
party, and he did not want the Supreme Court to be in the position of
either having to reverse itself (and thus impugn its authority) or to uphold
163. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft 1-5 (June 27, 1909) (Papers of
William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497).
164. The 1908 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury showed that the economic depression
had produced a deficit. R. BIAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 156, at 24. Sereno Payne of
New York, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, estimated that about $20,000,000
was needed to make up the deficit. 44 CONG. REc. 194 (Mar. 23, 1909). President Taft, in
his inaugural address of March 4th, stated that expenditures exceeded revenues by $100,000,000.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1909, at 4, col. 1.
165. Taft Wants Tariff on Revenue Basis, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1909, at 4, col. 1.
166. See, e.g., R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 156, at 32-36; J. BuENKER, supra note
157, at 98-108. The various income tax bills treated corporations differently. On April 15,
Sen. Bailey introduced an income tax bill that was practically identical to the 1894 Act, which
imposed a tax of three percent on net income m excess of $5,000 on individuals and
corporations. See R. BAKEY & G. BIAKEY, supra note 156, at 30. On April 21, Sen. Cumnumns
proposed a tax plan similar to Bailey's except that it was graduated and did not tax corporations
because a corporate tax put too much of a burden on shareholders (especially small ones) as
opposed to bondholders. 44 CONo. Rac. 1420 (Apr. 21, 1909). On May 18, the insurgent
Republicans and the Democrats agreed on a compromise bill that taxed both individual and
corporate incomes at a flat rate; a rebate prevented double taxation of income individuals
received from corporations. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1909, at 1, coL 1.
167. Message from the President, 44 CoNo. R c. 3344.
168. E.g., S. RATNER, supra note 107, at 291 (The reasons given for the Corporate Excise
Tax were all "flimsy rationalization."); id. at 288 (The real reason for the Corporate Excise
Tax was to defeat the income tax.). Much contemporary opimon agreed. E.g., 44 CoNo. R c.
4383 (July 9, 1909) (statement of Sen. Clark of Missouri) ("[I]n my humble judgment this
corporation tax was cooked up for the purpose of defeating the proposition for an income
tax."); 44 CONG. REc. 4725 (July 31, 1909) (statement of Rep. Underwood) (The Corporate
Excise Tax is a "weapon to defeat an honest income tax that would equalize the burdens of
taxation on all the people.").
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
its prior decision and face the wrath of the public. 69 However, Taft's
support of the excise tax was substantive as well as political. The tax
furthered his goal of corporate regulation. This substantive interest in a
corporate tax preceded his political interest in the tax caused by the spring
1909 threat of immediate passage of the income tax. While other commen-
tators have noted Taft's positive endorsement of such an act, 170 none has
given the Act and Taft's support of it the attention it deserves as an
expression of the period's concern over corporate regulation (especially
capital structure and issuance of stock) and the debate concerning the nature
of the corporate entity The next section addresses these omissions.
III. ThE CORPORATE EXCISE TAX OF 1909
A. Background to the Passage of the Act
By 1909, both federal and state governments had applied a wide variety
of taxes to corporations.17' On the federal level, corporations had paid
excise taxes based on gross receipts, paid taxes on dividends and interest
paid and, under the 1894 income tax law, paid taxes on net earnings. To
some extent, which is not entirely clear (as discussed previously), these last
two taxes were seen simply as collections at the source. The proper taxation
of corporations was difficult to obtain. To tax income to the corporation
and then to the shareholder was, to many, a double tax. While corporations
were recognized as separate legal entities, questions remained:
Should the corporation's property be made the basis of taxation to the
corporation itself, or to the stockholders alone, or to both? Obviously
a tax on the corporation is really a tax upon its stockholders, for
otherwise than as a matter of legal reasomng a corporation and its
stockholders are one. Hence the question of whether both the corporation
and the stockholders shall be taxed is an interesting problem in double
taxation. 72
Although corporations and their stockholders were really one, corpora-
tions were also a special class of entities "composed of artificial entities
169. J. German, supra note 54, at 201; see also J. BUENC ER, supra note 157, at 108.
170. J. BUENKER, supra note 157, which began in the 1960s as a doctoral dissertation, is
rare in its fairly lengthy exploration of Taft's (and Root's and Wickersham's) support of the
Act, especially the publicity feature, as a positive piece of legislation. See id. at 108-12.
171. The Bureau of Corporations published a multi-part series on state taxation of corpo-
rations beginmng in May, 1909 with a report on the New England states and ending on March
15, 1915. The states used a variety of taxes, most of which can be divided into categories:
taxes on property values, taxes on gross receipts, taxes on capital stock values, and for
transportation corporations, a tax based on mileage. See Report on the System of Taxing
Manufacturing, Mercantile, Transportation, and Transmission Corporations in the States of
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, TAXATION
OF COR'ORATIONS: PART I-NEw ENGLAND 5-6 (May 17, 1909).
172. Id.
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created by the state and enjoying special privileges," and therefore some-
times, appropriately, subject to special rules. 7 1 Moreover, when only cor-
porations were to be taxed, the problem should, theoretically, have been
simpler. Yet, as will be seen, the Corporate Excise Tax raised troubling
issues.
In his inaugural speech, Taft had suggested an inheritance tax be enacted
if a tariff failed to provide sufficient revenue. 74 Nevertheless, he had at
that time also been considering some type of a corporation tax and had
proposed the inheritance tax because Ins attorney general, George W.
Wickersham, had not yet drafted a corporate tax bill at the time of the
inauguration. 17 Wickersham, however, shortly thereafter drafted a series of
corporate provisions which Congressman Longworth of Ohio presented to
the House Ways and Means Committee later m March before the tariff bill
was presented to the full House.176 This occurred, according to Taft, because
after the House abandoned a proposed tax on coffee and tea (for fear it
would be too unpopular) a substitute revenue measure was needed:
The Speaker and I then conferred as to what kind of a tax we ought
to substitute for the coffee and tea tax, and the Speaker asked me
whether it was not possible, in accordance with one of my speeches, to
introduce a form of income tax; and I said that it was on corporations,
and that I would direct the Attorney General to prepare a law, or
sections of the law, creating such a tax on dividends. He did so, and
the Speaker went before the Ways and Means Committee and urged its
adoption, but they declined to consider it at the time.'"
173. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the System of Taxing Manufacturing,
Mercantile, Transportation, and Transhmission Corporations in the States of Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, TAXAaON oF CoRPORATioNS: PART III-EAsTERN CENTAL
STATES 3 (July 31, 1911).
174. Message from the President, 44 CONG. REc. 3344.
175. J. BUENKER, supra note 157, at 94.
176. 44 CONG. REC. 4002 (July 1, 1909) (Sen. Root tracing the lustory of Taft's support of
the corporate tax); 44 CONo. REc. 4717 (July 31, 1909) (Rep. Longworth states that he
presented the bill at the President's request).
177. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 27, 1909) (Papers of William
Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497). I could not locate the
draft of the law to which he refers, but I did find a memo from Taft to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Franklin MacVeagh, in which Taft asks for revenue estimates on a bill which "at
the instance of the Speaker, [Taft had] prepared tentatively for insertion in the tariff bill."
Letter from William Howard Taft to Franklin MacVeagh (Mar. 15, 1909) (Papers of William
Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 495). Presumably, this is the
corporate tax, but the bill was not enclosed.
In July, Sen. Root told the Senate that he had seen the paper Rep. Longworth presented
to the Ways and Means Committee in March; the draft was the corporate excise tax under
consideration in July with a few changes, and "it bore upon its face corrections in the
handwriting of the Attorney-General and blanks filled in the handwriting of the President."
44 COtrG. RPc. 4002 (July 1, 1909).
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Two versions were considered: one taxing dividends, the other taxing net
earnings. 7 As to either version, some saw a corporate tax as double tax,
either in the sense that corporations already paid state taxes, 7 9 or in the
sense that a holding company would pay a tax when it distributed dividends
to its shareholders on earnings already taxed when its operating companies
distributed dividends to it.1so Representative Sereno Payne of New York
told the House on March 23rd that the Committee had rejected a tax on
the net earnings of corporations because many corporations were in a
precarious financial condition (due to the Panic of 1907), states already
taxed corporations, and the bill would not raise enough revenue. 8' Con-
gressman Longworth, speaking in July after the introduction of the cor-
porate excise bill, stated that the, Committee had rejected the proposal
because it did not think the revenue was needed and also because the
Committee had decided already to propose an inheritance tax, as suggested
by Taft at his inauguration. 8 2 At any rate the revenue bill that the House
sent to the Senate for consideration consisted of the tariff provisions plus
an inheritance tax but not a corporate tax.
While other commentators have dismissed this early interest of Taft in
the corporation tax as being not very sincere, given his endorsement of the
inheritance tax, I believe that their dismissal of his interest is colored by
the traditional focus on the income tax. First, this traditional view ignores,
or at least devalues, the consistent attention Taft gave to a corporate tax
from the beginning of his presidency; although he favored an inheritance
tax first, he consistently mentioned a corporate tax as an alternative. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, when viewed in the context of his concern
about regulation of corporations, Taft's March exploration of the issue, his
June introduction of the tax and vigorous support of its publicity features
appear not simply as a political compromise to stave off the income tax
and a break in the Republican party but, in addition, as a logical means
to attain his goal of corporate regulation without undue federal interference.
As previously stated, Taft favored some type of federal regulation of
corporations, but seemed ambivalent both about the exact nature of the
regulation and the degree to which he would support it."' 3 Being more
conservative than Theodore Roosevelt, Taft was more sensitive to concerns
178. See, e.g., Tax on Corporation is Planned by Taft, N.Y Times, Mar. 23, 1909, at 1,
col. 1 (bill "now in course of preparation" will levy a tax of two percent on dividends of
corporations except certain ones such as banks).
179. Editorial, A New Source of Revenue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1909, at 8, col. 1.
180. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1909, at 8, col. 1.
181. 44 CONG. REc. 194 (Mar. 23, 1909).
182. 44 CONG. REc. 4717 (July 31, 1909).
183. J. German, supra note 54, at 231-44 (especially at pp. 236-37).
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about excessive federal power.i8 Moreover, federal incorporation proposals
were complicated by the states' rights issue of whether the federal govern-
ment was interfering with the states' sovereign power to incorporate cor-
porations. 8' The corporation tax, m particular its publicity feature, was an
ideal way to achieve very mild control given the complications of federal
incorporation and Taft's and Congress' ambivalence towards federal regu-
lation.
Given the difficulty Congress experienced in dealing with the antitrust
issue and the constitutional question involved in federal incorporation, a
corporate excise tax provided an easy entry into federal corporate regulation.
First, taxation, unlike incorporation, was an acknowledged federal function.
While objections might be made (and, as will be seen later, were made) to
taxing corporations as an encroachment on state taxing prerogative, there
was some precedent for dual state and federal taxation. In 1900 the Supreme
Court had affirmed the right of the federal government to impose an
inheritance tax even though states also taxed inheritances. 8 6 Second, there
was some basis in tax history (the aborted 1894 Act) and in contemporary
legal theory to identify corporations as taxable entities.1 7 Moreover, the
publicity feature, which Taft claimed was the most important feature of
the Act,' also fit in with the spirit of the times: it was a common feature
of attempts to regulate corporations as well as a general feature of the
Progressive Era. 8 9 The information obtained through publicity would further
other governmental goals. For example, as previously stated, tariff reform
was a major issue of the 1908 campaign and was in fact the major focus
of the 1909 bill. In order to make proper decisions regarding tariffs, more
information was needed, and the publicity feature of the corporation tax
could help provide it. Publicity would also provide information that would
allow Congress to make informed decisions about antitrust laws.
184. See, e.g., id. at 236 (Taft states that the bill drafted by Attorney General Wickersham
meets the concern of those "who fear too great concentration of power in the Federal
Government ").
185. Federal incorporation was less likely to violate states' rights if it was voluntary, but
then the question became what incentive there was for corporations to voluntarily comply with
the federal law. See, e.g., id. at 234.
186. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
187. E. SEiUGmAN, supra note 107, at 515.
188. J. German, supra note 54, at 203 (Taft stating that the publicity feature was the most
significant, especially since the Act would bnng little revenue); see also Letter from William
Howard Taft to Horace Taft 9 (June 27, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497); Letter from William Howard Taft to Frederick Fish
(June 28, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Reel 497); Letter from William Howard Taft to E.G. Buckland, Vice President, N.Y.N.H. &
H.R.R. (July 17, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Reel 497).
189. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Some contemporaries saw the tax as a first step in Taft's program to
supervise corporations-the next step being a federal incorporation bill.'9'
Others more cynically felt that Taft never had any intention of enacting a
corporate supervisory system. The tax was simply an expedient way to
forestall the income tax, or perhaps it was a method of fulfilling his
campaign pledge to carry out Roosevelt's policy regarding corporations, 19'
but in a way so mild that it was possibly more hype than reality
Taft himself, in a lengthy letter written on June 27, 1909, laid out his
position on the corporate tax, the tariff, and the income tax. 92 First, the
letter, as does the rest of his correspondence for that summer, shows that
his primary concern is the passage of a tariff with downward revisions in
rates. 93 Second, it is also evident that he saw the tax not only as a political
compromise, but also as a positive measure to help implement his agenda
for corporate regulation. His chronology of events mentions the tax pro-
posed in March but really begins with the Senate rejecting the inheritance
tax provision passed by the House on the grounds, according to Taft, that
since states already taxed inheritances, a federal tax would be a "double
tax" and therefore possibly "oppressive.' '1 94 Taft then suggested to Senator
Aldrich, as a means to make up the revenue, the corporation tax, for which
he "had expressed [him]self a number of times in favor of such a corporation
income tax."'' 9 Aldrich rejected the tax because he believed the Treasury
had enough of a surplus to cover the deficit. 96 Taft even spoke to Senators
Borah and Cummins, who both favored an income tax, about the corpo-
ration tax stating that he favored the corporation tax, despite being for an
income tax "in theory," because he believed the Supreme Court would
most likely rule an income tax unconstitutional in order to remain consistent
with its prior ruling in Pollock. 97 Taft recounted that when Senators
190. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
191. Taft Planned Tax on Roosevelt Lines, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1909, at 1, col. I (Taft
sees the tax as carrying out Roosevelt's policy as he pledged to do in his campaign).
192. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 27, 1909) (Papers of William
Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497). Taft states that he wrote
the letter "for the purpose not alone of informing you, but of putting in permanent form, so
to speak, for my own use, my state of mind at the present moment as to the political
situation." Id. at I.
193. Id. at 1-3.
194. Id. at 6. Taft disagreed with this view because he felt the state taxes were not heavy.
Id.
195. Id. at 7
196. Id. Besides Taft, others feared embarrassing the Court by forcing it to decide once
again the constitutionality of an income tax act. E.g., 44 CoNr. REc. 3941 (June 29, 1909)
(Sen. Dixon supported an income tax but "I respectfully and earnestly commend the embar-
rassment that would follow either a favorable or an unfavorable decision by the Supreme
Court.").
197 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust.Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Letter from William
Howard Taft to Horace Taft 7 (June 27, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of
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Cummins and Bailey obtained a coalition of Democrats and Republicans
sufficient to pass an income tax, Senator Aldrich came to him and accepted
the comprormse of a constitutional amendment for an income tax and the
passage of a corporation tax. Originally, Aldrich wanted the tax to last
only two years (to cover the years of deficit revenue), but Taft insisted on
no limitation because he did not think he "could break up the mneteen
Republicans, or get support from the people from whom it was necessary
to get support, if that limitation was in."Isi Thereupon Aldrich withdrew
Ins opposition to no limitation and Wickersham proceeded to draft a bill. 99
So far, this accounting fits in with the standard view concerning the
introduction of the corporate excise tax, although Taft clearly indicates
early support for it. The letter's next sentence, however, plainly shows
Taft's support for this tax extended beyond political expediency; he viewed
the tax as a means to further his agenda for regulation of corporations:
The things that were requred in the Bill were two: First, the tax as an
excise tax upon corporations, [for the tax to pass constitutional muster]
and, second, a certain degree of publicity with reference to the returns.
That publicity gives a kind of federal supervision over corporations,
which is quite a step in the direction of similar reforms I am going to
recommend at the next session of Congress 20
The remainder of this Part will focus on this non-tax element of the
Corporate Excise Tax: the tax as part of the efforts at corporate regulatory
control and as an expression of legal theories of corporate personality. In
Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497); see also Letter from William Howard Taft to
Edward Colston 2 (June 24, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Reel 497) ("I am really in favor of an income tax, but I fear the Court
would follow the Pollock case and declare it unconstitutional, and I don't desire that result.").
In his acceptance speech at Cincinnati, Ohio on July 28, 1909, Taft apparently favored an
income tax only in times of need. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1908, at 4, col. 1; S. RATNER, supra
note 107, at 269.
198. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft 8 (June 27, 1909) (Papers of William
Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497).
199. Id. at 9.
200. Id. (emphasis added). His corporate agenda is contained in the "plan which I outlined
in my Letter of Acceptance and in my Inaugural Address, and which is outlined in the
platform-it is with reference to the amendment to the anti-trust law, the amendment to the
interstate commerce law, and a generai carrying out of the Roosevelt policies " Id. at
11-12; see also Taft Planned Tax on Roosevelt Lines, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1909, at 1, col.
I (Taft sees the corporate tax as carrying out Roosevelt's policy as he pledged to do in his
campaign; once the tax is passed, Taft can "go straight at the main provisions on his
programme" in December.).
In a June 28, 1909 letter, Taft wrote:
The men who are in favor of this [corporate] tax are not in favor of disturbing
business, but they are in favor of putting it on as sound a basis as possible, and
one of those bases is publicity where there is the enjoyment of such a franchise
as that which exempts men from the ordinary general liability of partners.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Frederick Fish I (June 28, 1909) (Papers of William
Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497).
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particular, I will focus on the publicity feature, and to a lesser extent, the
interest and dividend provisions and the exemption amount since these most
reflect the non-tax aspects.
B. Discussion Prior to Passage: June 16, 1909 - August 5, 1909
On June 16, 1909, President Taft sent a message to Congress recom-
mending an amendment to the Constitution to permit an income tax and
proposing an excise tax on all corporations measured by a two percent tax
on a corporation's net income.20 1 He called the tax "an excise tax upon the
privilege of doing business as an artificial entity and of freedom from a
general partnership liability enjoyed by those who own the stock. 1 202 As
authority for the tax he cited Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v McClain, 20 3
which had upheld the 1898 excise tax on all persons, associations and
corporations engaged in certain businesses. 204 In his message Taft specifically
mentioned as an advantage of such a tax the federal supervision of the
annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations which would
result from enforcing the tax. While acknowledging the usefulness of cor-
porations, he stated:
If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective system of taxation, we
are incidentally able to possess the Government and the stockholders
and the public of the knowledge of the real business transactions and
the gains and profits of every corporation in the country, we have made
a long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which may
prevent a further abuse of power. 2°1
In this message Taft clearly stated his support of the tax not simply for its
revenue-raising potential, but also for its regulatory functions. It is important
to note that he saw regulation as coming not just from the federal govern-
ment, but also through private market control by giving stockholders and
the general public access to information.
This message was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance2°6 and
deliberations in the Senate started June 25th. 207 The bill, as presented,
201. 44 CONo. REc. 3344 (June 16, 1909). Taft was not particularly concerned as to what
the rate should be. Letter from William Howard Taft to Sen. Albert Beveridge 1 (July 13,
1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497)
("I am not particularly anxious as to what the rate of the corporation tax shall be. I am m
favor of the tax in principle and to supply the needs of revenue wich are not made up by
the other provisions in the bill.").
202. 44 CONG. RPc. 3344 (June 16, 1909). He mentions the freedom from partnership
liability elsewhere. E.g., Letter from William Howard Taft to Frederick Fish 1 (June 28, 1909)
(Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497).
203. 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
204. Spreckels, 192 U.S. at 412-13.
205. 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (June 16, 1909).
206. Id. at 3345.
207. There was some discussion of corporate taxation prior to that, e.g., 44 CONG. REc.
3756-59 (June 24, 1909), but the amendment to the revenue bill proposing the corporate excise
tax was not read into the record until June 25th. 44 CONG. Rxc. 3836.
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provided for a "special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing
business" on all corporations and associations "organized under the laws
of the United States, or of any State or Territory" with capital stock
represented by shares. The rate of tax would be two percent of net income
in excess of $5,000. Net income was to be computed by subtracting from
gross income dividends received from other corporations that paid the tax
and all "ordinary and necessary expenses," depreciation, losses and "interest
actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness to an
amount of such bonded and other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-up
capital stock of such corporation .. outstanding at the close of the year. ') 20
8
The Commissioner would determine the exact form of the returns, but the
law provided that the form should include: (1) paid-up capital stock, (2)
total amount of debt at the end of the year, (3) gross income, (4) dividends
received from owning stock of other corporations, (5) expenses, (6) losses,
(7) interest actually paid, not exceeding paid-up capital stock, (8) taxes paid
and (9) net income.20 All returns would "constitute public records and be
open to inspection as such.
' 21 0
The bill passed both houses in essentially the form in which it was
introduced.2 1' Debate occurred on two levels: The first level was theoretic
and dealt with the wisdom and constitutionality of the tax; the second level
looked at specific provisions. Debates on the secondary level focused mainly
on four features: exemption amount, interest deductions, dividend deduc-
tions and publicity-features which involved the theoretic aspects and which
had given the drafters the most trouble. 21 2 These secondary issues will be
discussed in the context of the larger theoretic issues they illustrate.
208. 44 CONG. REc. 3836 (June 25, 1909). These provisions were reflected in § 38 of the
tariff act. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. II, 116.
209. 44 CoNG. REc. 3837 (June 25, 1909); Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. II,
114.
210. 44 CONG. REc. 3837 (June 25, 1909); Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(6), 36 Stat. 11,
116.
211. One change was the decrease in the rate from two percent of net income to one percent.
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 116.
212. Legislative history, other than congressional debates, is frustratingly sparse. That which
follows, though full of holes, is the best I could discover after extensive research. In the fall
of 1989 I spent one week at the Library of Congress and the National Archives researching
the Corporate Excise Tax with disappointing results. After much searching, the Archives
librarians could discover no official history, drafts of the bill, committee hearings or reports.
They did locate, and I read, the various petitions to Congress concerning the Act. I have
incorporated into this Article relevant information found in this material. I then went to the
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress to read the papers of two principal players
in the drafting of the Act: William Howard Taft and Elihu Root. In addition, I read the
papers of two secondary players: Sen. Aldrich and Secretary of the Treasury Franklin
MacVeagh. Unfortunately, the papers of the principal drafter, Attorney General George W
Wickersham, are scattered across the country, none being at the Library of Congress. Therefore,
I read none of his private papers, except to the extent that they are included in somebody
else's papers, such as Root's. In addition the Library of Congress does not hold all of Root's
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On July Ist Senator Elihu Root of New York, who was intimately involved
in the drafting of the corporate tax, gave a lengthy speech in support of
the tax. The speech serves as a good vehicle to explore the main theoretical
issues involved in the debate over the tax. First, he dealt with the consti-
tutionality of the tax. This issue had several facets. At the outset, he asserted
the constitutionality of the excise tax in contrast to the unconstitutionality
of the income tax proposals. 2 3 This statement was necessary given the
strength of congressional support for the income tax and the feeling that
the excise tax was just a ploy to defeat it. Next, he asserted the constitu-
tionality of the excise tax by referring to various Supreme Court precedents
which, he claimed, supported three propositions: (1) the legality of the
federal government imposing an excise tax measured by profits, as opposed
to an income tax, (2) the constitutionality of imposing an excise tax only
on corporations for the privilege of doing business and (3) the constitution-
ality of the federal government taxing corporations franchised by the states.21 4
Root principally relied on the same case President Taft had mentioned
in his June 16th address: Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain.2 5 Since
much debate occurred concerning the meaning of the case, and the debate
raised important issues concerning the nature of corporate personality and
states' rights, a closer look at the case and the debate is warranted. The
Spreckels case upheld the 1898 statute imposing an excise tax, measured by
gross receipts, on every person, corporation or firm engaged in certain
businesses, namely refining sugar or petroleum. 2 6 Two critical differences
between the 1898 Act, upheld by the Supreme Court, and the proposed
corporate excise tax were, as some congressmen pointed out, 2 7 (1) the latter
or MacVeagh's papers, and I did not search elsewhere. Consequently, although my search was
extensive, it was not exhaustive. I can tell you a lot about President Taft's diet or golf game
during the summer of 1909, but little about his thoughts on the corporate tax.
My search discovered no copies of drafts of the corporate tax proposed in March and only
the following drafts of the bill proposed in June: June 17, June 21, June 22 and June 24 with
revisions. Since the earliest draft I have refers to yet an earlier draft, I obviously do not have
all drafts.
In addition to my original research, I have found several good secondary sources: R. BLAKEY
& G. BLAKEY, supra note 156; J. BUENKER, supra note 157; and J. German, supra note 54.
213. 44 CoNG. REc. 4005 (July 1, 1909).
214. Id. at 4005-07.
215. Id. at 4005. He also mentioned Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899) (Congress can tax
the privilege of selling or buying merchandise at boards of trade or exchanges) and Knowlton,
178 U.S. 41 (upholding a federal inheritance tax). Another commonly cited case in the debate
over the constitutionality of the tax is Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 553 (Congress
can impose a tax upon the circulation of banks chartered by the states), cited by Root at 44
CONG. REc. 4006 (July 1, 1909).
216. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464.
217. E.g., 44 CoNG. REc. 4016 (July 1, 1909) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (the 1898 Act
taxed gross receipts, not net income); 44 CoNG. Rac. 4026 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen.
Cummins) (the present bill discrimnates by only taxing corporations); see also 44 CONG. REc.
3757 (June 24, 1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands) (The tax in the Spreckels case taxed any
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tax was on net income not gross receipts, and (2) the proposed tax singled
out corporations as the subject of the tax whereas the 1898 Act had taxed
any corporation or individual engaged in the enumerated businesses. Root's
response to the first difference was that the tax was on the privilege of
doing business, not on profits and therefore was an excise, not an income
tax. 28 The second difference between the two provisions raised two other
basic issues: whether Congress could single out corporations from other
enterprises engaged in the same business, and even if one type of business
could be singled out from the others for special taxation, whether such a
singling out of corporations interfered with the states' right to control
corporations.
The first issue involved the nature of the legal personality of corporations.
If corporations were somehow different from individuals or partnerships
engaged in the same business, then there was a basis for distinguishing
between corporations and others engaged in similar occupations. President
Taft himself m his message to Congress noted the distinctiveness of cor-
porations and used it as the basis for taxing only them: "This is an excise
tax upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial entity and of
freedom from a general partnership liability enjoyed by those who owi
stock." 219 Senator Root reiterated the advantages of limited liability as a
basis for distinguighing between corporations and others and added two
other features of corporate form as bases for the distinction: continuous
life and easy transferability of interests. 220
person or entity, not just corporations engaged in certain businesses. Newlands favored such
a tax rather than a tax only on corporations.). The debates of July 1-2, 1909, m the Senate,
44 CONo. Rc. 4003-36, are filled with discussions on these issues.
Care must be taken in valuing all statements both for and against the corporate tax because
often the speaker's ultimate intent is to further (or hinder) the income tax rather than to
criticize (or help) the corporate tax. Cummins, for example, was a strong advocate of the
income tax.
218. 44 CoNo. REc. 4016 (July 1, 1909). An excise tax is defined as follows:
A tax inposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or
the enjoyment of a privilege Tax laid on manufacture, sale, or consumption
of commodities or upon licenses to pursue certain occupations or upon corporate
privileges. In current usage the term has been extended to include various license
fees and practically every internal revenue tax except the income tax.
BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979).
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911), the case upholding the Corporate
Excise Tax, the Supreme Court stated that, due to extensive precedent on the subject, "It is
unnecessary to enter upon an extended consideration of the technical meaning of the term
'excise."' 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911). The only definition it gave was a quotation: "Excises are
'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the country,
upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges."' Id. at 151
(quoting T. CooLEY, A TREATisE ON TH CONsTuTiONAL Lu'irATioNs 680 (7th ed. 1903)).
219. 44 CONG. REc. 3344 (June 16, 1909) (emphasis added); see also 44 CoNo. Rac. 4036
(July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Davis on the advantages of limited liability).
220. 44 CONG. REc. 4006 (June 16, 1909).
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Opponents, both in and out of Congress, refused to recognize these
differences as a basis for differing treatment of two firms-one a corporation
and one a partnership-engaged in the same business?'2 Senator Brandegee
saw no difference between corporations and partnerships; they "are both
combinations of men to do business."mn He stated that whether a corpo-
ration was an "individual" was a question that he "want[ed] a little time
to consider."2'm When asked whether he recognized that there was "a great
deal of difference in the extent of the liability of members of partnerships
and members of corporations, '"22 he admitted the difference and then
queried whether the taxation of partnerships had also been considered by
the Committee.?5 This "unfair" discrimination against corporations vis-a-
vis partnerships was one of the complaints commonly recited in various
corporate petitions to congressmen concerning the tax.?6 There was even
221. E.g., 44 CONG. Rac. 4026 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins); 44 CoNG. REC.
4028 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Brandegee); 44 CONG. REc. 3757 (June 24, 1909) (Sen.
Newlands) (stating Spreckels is not on point, and then moving to tax gross receipts of every
person or corporation); 44 CoNG. REc. 4036 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Bristow); 44
CONG. REc. 4365 (July 9, 1909) (statement of Rep. Townsend of Michigan) ("I can see no
reason why a corporation should be taxed while a partnership or individual doing the same
kind of business, with an equal amount of capital and as great earnings, is permitted to
escape."). But see, e.g., 44 CONG. Rnc. 4036 (July 2, 1909) (Sen. Davis responding to Sen.
Bristow that Bristow ignores the limited liability of shareholders).
Some pointed out that the unfairness lay in reaclung only the wealth of those who had
incorporated but not the wealth of those held in partnership or other form. E.g., 44 CoNG.
Rac. 4229 (July 7, 1909) (statement of Sen. Dolliver); see also 44 CoNG. Rnc. 4025 (July 2,
1909) (Sen. Borah, who favored an income tax, asked why the tax was not extended to
partnerships, if it was a tax on carrying on business. Senator McCumber responded that it
could have been, but it "was thought best" not to extend it.).
222. 44 CONG. Rnc. 4028 (July 2, 1909).
223. Id.
224. Id. (question by Sen. Curtis).
225. Id.
226. E.g., Collar ind Shut Manufacturers' Association Petition to Senate Finance Committee
(June 30, 1909) (Petitions to Senate Finance Committee regarding Corporate Tax, Record
Group 234, Sen. 61A-K6, National Archives); see also Letter from E. Conway (Chicago
manufacturer of pianos and organs) to Secretary of the Treasury Franklin MacVeagh (June
30, 1909) (Franklin MacVeagh Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) ("All our
small manufacturers and merchants must be on an equal footing with their competitors or go
out of business.").
In a long letter to Sen. Root outlining the evils of the proposed tax, a Wall Street lawyer
named Charles Mathewson listed as flaws the taxing dividends and the limitation on interest
deductions. Mathewson also complained of the inequity of taxing a corporation but not a
partnership engaged in the same business. Letter from Charles Mathewson to Elihu Root 2-3
(June 25, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). He then
suggested a stamp tax instead. Id. at 3. Root's response was that the choice was between an
income tax or the corporation excise tax, not between the corporation tax and a stamp tax or
no tax. Letter from Elihu Root to Charles Mathewson (June 26, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers,
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). This response illustrates the difficulty of determining
intent. It can be read as either indicating a cynical approach to the tax (i.e., to prevent the
much worse income tax) or as a politically astute attempt to gain support for the tax by
appealing to the complainant's fears (support this or sometlung worse will pass). See also
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talk of corporations dissolving into partnerships because of the tax.227 Other
opposition was phrased in natural entity terms. Under this theory it was
illegal to tax corporations, which "have all the powers and privileges of
natural persons," without taxing other natural persons. 22
The use of theories of corporate personality (or, in modem language,
theories of the firm) m the tax debate was complex. An artificial entity
theory used by proponents of the tax also permitted these proponents to
look through the entity (since it was artificial) to the owners. Thus, Senator
Root could argue, in an attempt to gain support of pro-income tax senators,
that the tax was a tax on unearned wealth,229 and Congressman Longworth
could argue that the tax was like the English tax, a tax at the source.? 0
But relying on an artificial entity theory to reach individuals meant only
certain individuals-those who availed themselves of the corporate form-
would be taxed. The pro-income tax group noted this, stating that the tax
ignored certain wealth, especially interest income, while taxing small busi-
nessmen who utilized corporations.? 1 Thus, income tax opponents often
used an aggregate theory to oppose the tax because they wanted to tax all
wealth via an income tax. Under a pure aggregate theory, owners of
businesses-whether they are partnerships or corporations-would be taxed
Letter from Elihu Root to George Wickersham (July 28, 1909) (Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division), quoted in full:
I am obliged to you for sending me the reply of the accountants. You seem to
failed [sic] to grasp a great truth, that business is done for the convenience of
the book-keepers. The Trust Company's protest and Sheldon's letters are merely
the natural reaction against interference at all by Governnent. I wonder how
they would like an income tax which would require them to make a separate
return for each trust and involve an examination of the affairs of each trust?
The fact is, of course, that there is no kind of business which is less entitled to
be secretive than the administration of a trust, which ought always to contemplate
a public accounting. But, of course, the protest is not rational at all. It is purely
instinctive just as a man winks his eye when a bug gets in it.
227. E.g., Letter from E. Conway to Sen. Cullom (June 28, 1909) (Franklin MacVeagh
Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division) ("We certainly will have to surrender our
charter and do business as co-partners if it [passes]."); Making a Mistake at Washington, 109
Lasun's WnaniY 1 (July 1, 1909) (John Sleicher, President of the Publisher, Judge Co., sent
this "forthcoming editorial" to Root in a letter of June 22, 1909). This complaint-or threat-
was reiterated right after the passage of the Act. See The Federal Corporation Tax Law, 1
Coup. TR. Co. J. No. 13 (Supp. Nov. 1909) (pages unnumbered). In actuality few corporations
dissolved. Further Developments Regarding the Federal Corporation Tax, 1 CoRp. TR. Co. J.
No. 16 (Jan. 1910) (pages unnumbered).
228. The Federal Corporation Tax Law, supra note 227.
229. 44 CoNG. REc. 4006 (July 1, 1909) (taxing only wealth concentrated in corporations,
the tax acieves "the great object of the income tax").
230. 44 CoNo. Rc. 4719 (July 31, 1909) (the tax "taxes the income received by the
stockholders, not in their hands, but at its source, namely, upon the income of the corpora-
tion.").
231. E.g., 44 CoNo. REc. 4038 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins). The argument
about not taxing bondholders appears again as a criticism of the interest deduction. E.g., 44
CoNo. REc. 4006 (July 1, 1909).
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on the business income. This is somewhat ironic since a populist income
tax advocate would also support regulation of corporations for antitrust
purposes and such regulation would find support in an artificial entity
theory
An attempt to resolve the conflict between two goals (income tax and
corporate regulation) and two different theories appears in the exemption
and publicity debates. In these debates, there was a recognition of an
essential distinction between large and small corporations.
The original bill, containing no exemption proision, taxed all corpora-
tions on all income. However, in a letter dated June 17th, Attorney General
George Wickersham suggested an exemption of $25,000 "analogous to the
exemption of small incomes in the income tax law of 1894.' 2 This comment
is somewhat disingenuous since the 1894 Act, after extensive debate, pro-
vided exemptions for individuals but not for corporations. Despite Wick-
ersham's suggestion, revisions of the draft bill as late as June 21st did not
provide any exemption. However, by the June 22nd revision a handwritten
insertion of a $5,000 exemption was in place.23
There appear to be three reasons why people favored an exemption for
small corporations, however defined. Each is connected with one of the
major objections to the corporate tax: (1) the conceptual difficulty of
distinguishing between partnerships and small corporations (a problem still
with us today), (2) a states' rights issue and (3) a belief that only large
corporations needed federal regulation.
The first reason has been explored in the discussion of legal personality
Nothing more need be said other than to state that exempting small
corporations would blunt the criticism of unfair discrimination against
corporations because those corporations most similar to partnerships were
small ones and under an exemption provision they would not be taxed.
Senator Daniel stressed this reason in his proposal to exempt corporations
with capital stock not exceeding $300,000 since "ordinary" partnerships did
not exceed this amount; thus, corporations with less than this amount
should be treated as partnerships; those with more capital "enter into a
different class and come under different views. ' ' 2 4 He stated that one of
the "striking" differences between a corporation and a partnership was that
partnerships were natural persons whereas corporations were "purely a
232. Letter from George W Wickersham to Sen. Nelson W Aldrich (June 17, 1909) (Nelson
W Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 34). I could find no copies
of the provisions drafted in March in any of the documents I searched.
233. Revision of June 22 (June 22, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Special Subject labelled
Corporation Excise Tax, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). I do not know whose
handwriting is on the draft; it may be reasonable to assume it is Root's since the draft is
found in his papers.
234. 44 CONG. REc. 4237 (July 7, 1909).
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fiction of the law; an artificial creation; a figment only out of the brain of
man."*35
Whether the federal government had the power to tax corporations was
a much discussed issue. Since corporations were both franchised and taxed
by the states, many saw the Corporate Excise Tax as an infringement of
states' rights. The issue was heightened because, as will be discussed below,
the proposed bill was seen not merely as a tax but as the beginmngs of
federal control of corporations as President Taft had stated in his message
to Congress. 236 Thus, as Congressman Underwood stated, "I think there
has been no more dangerous proposition [than this tax] ever presented to
those . . who believe in the sovereign power of the state government. '237
In response to President Taft's and others' allegations that the corporation
ought to pay for the privilege of being a corporation, Congressman Pickett,
for example, admitted that this was so, but that the privilege being granted
by the state ought to be taxed by the state.?8 If there were a federal
incorporation law for corporations engaged in interstate commerce, he
continued, then it would be proper for the federal government to tax those
corporations. As it stood, however, it was "an invasion of the rights that
properly inhere in the States" for the federal government to impose the
excise tax on the privilege of doing business as a corporation. 2 9 While
Pickett viewed taxing purely intrastate corporations as violating state sov-
ereignty, Senator Rayner disagreed on the basis, ultimately upheld by the
Supreme Court, that imposing a tax on corporate businesses was not the
kind of vital state power the federal government could not tax. 4
An exemption provision would help meet the states' rights objections in
the sense that small corporations, largely engaged in intrastate business,
would not be covered by the tax while large corporations which were
235. Id. Daniel stated that there were at least five important differences. The other differences
were that a partner generally goes under his own name whereas a corporation does not, limited
liability, perpetual life and a common seal for a corporation and, finally, corporations "may
be as migratory as any bird of the air," organized in one state and doing business in another
whereas a "partnership is fixed; it has a fixed residence according to its own place of business
and according to the status of its members." Id. Note that these other differences occur
because the corporation is artificial.
236. 44 CoNG. Rac. 3344 (June 16, 1909) ("Another merit of this tax is the federal
supervision which must be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts
and business transactions of all. corporations.").
237. 44 CoNG. Rac. 4725 (July 31, 1909).
238. 44 CONG. REc. 4395 (July 12, 1909).
239. Id., see also 44 CONG. REc. 4027 (July-2, 1909) (Sen. Elkins of West Virginia questioning
the constitutionality of taxing corporations formed under state law); The Federal Corporation
Tax Law, supra note 227 (quoting from the president of the Department of Taxes and
Assessment of New York City, that the tax "encroaches upon the powers of the states").
240. 44 CONG. REc. 4032 (July 2, 1909); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 154-58
(1911).
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engaged in interstate commerce, a proper subject of federal governmental
powers (though the exact extent was unclear) would be covered. Obviously,
an exemption phrased in terms of dollar amounts (as the proposals were)
rather than type of commerce, would be somewhat over- and under-inclusive,
but a bright-line test would be more easily administered than an inquiry
into the nature of the business engaged in.
The $5,000 exemption also met to some extent the objection that if
corporations needed regulation, it was only the large corporations, and not
the small ones, which were similar to partnerships. This attempt to assuage
the small corporation advocates was important because several of the other
provisions-those concerning interest, dividends and publicity-were seen as
detrimental to small corporations while not sufficiently attacking the prob-
lem of large corporations.
The tax treatment of dividends received from other corporations was
problematic in the 1909 corporate tax bill (and continues to be so today),24
If dividends are taxed, then income which has been earned only once would
be taxed several times as it wended its way through the many layers of
corporate structure. Depending on who bears the incidence of the corporate
tax (whether it is shifted in whole or in part to consumers and/or wage
earners), taxation of intercorporate dividends can be seen as multiple tax-
ation of one person.2 2 If corporations are consistently seen as separate legal
entities, it would logically follow that each corporation should be taxed on
all income it receives, including dividends. Whether this makes economic
sense is another question given the uncertainty of where the incidence of
the tax lies. In 1909 not only was the incidence of the tax unclear (although
some congressmen believed that it ultimately fell on the consumer)23 but so
was the nature of the corporate entity It is not surprising, then, that the
subject of whether to include in income dividends received from corporations
which were subject to the tax was an issue.
The corporate tax bill, as introduced in the Senate, excluded from a
corporation's income dividends received from corporations which were
subject to the tax. Earlier drafts, however, 24 had included dividends, and
241. An excellent discussion of the issue is found in Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorporate
Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime, 44 TAX L. REv 1 (1988).
242. The incidence of corporate taxation is not at all clear. See id. at 18-19; C. McLUaE,
MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAX ED TWICE? (1979). During the 1909 debates, some congress-
men believed that the tax was borne by the consumers in the form of higher prices charged
by the corporation. See, e.g., 44 CONG. REc. 4422 (July 12, 1909).
While taxing intercorporate dividends may result in multiple taxation, a dividends exclusion
or deduction may result in a windfall to some persons. Mundstock, supra note 241, at 18-42.
243. E.g., 44 CONG. Rac. 3941 (June 29, 1909) (statement of Sen. Dixon); 44 CONG. REc.
4422 (July 12, 1909).
244. The June 17th draft included dividends received; by the June 21st draft they were
excluded from net income as they were in the draft presented to the Senate on June 25 (though
the drafts continued to play with the language). Revision of June 17th (June 17, 1909) (Papers
of Nelson W Aldrich, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 34).
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discussion of the issue occurred in both congressional debates and corre-
spondence. The discussion focused more on the validity of holding com-
pames than on the revenues that taxing dividends would produce. 245 The
controversy concerning the treatment of dividends was heightened by its
connection to the issue of the legitimacy of holding companies, the very
corporations seen as the most abusive (being the method by which trusts
and monopolies were produced) and the most in need of regulation. Pres-
ident Taft himself was against holding compames.246
Senator Clapp argued strongly for the taxation of dividends received.
Without such taxation holding companies, whose incomes consisted largely
of dividends, would be exempt from the tax; yet he believed these were the
very corporations which ought to be taxed since they embodied the corporate
traits people feared. "You talk about the power of great aggregations of
capital; you talk about the crushing out of the life and of the nghts and
of the opportunities of the individual ... "247 On the other hand, some
245. Herbert Knox Smith, the head of the Bureau of Corporations, prepared a thirteen page
memorandum at the request of Attorney General George W Wickersham on corporations
owning stock of other corporations. Smith divided these corporations into six categories:
simple holding companies (only function is to hold stock); companies combining holding
function with the direct operation of plants; companies whose stock holdings are chiefly in
subsidiary companies which carry on a distinct, though related, business; companies whose
chief business is the direct operation of plants and properties; compames holding stocks
primarily for the purpose of investment and not for the purpose of control (this large category
primarily includes banks, insurance companies and other investment companies); and holding
companies, the subsidiary companies of which are also holding companies. Herbert Knox
Smith, Memorandum on Corporations Owning Stocks of Other Corporations (July 26, 1909)
(Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). Wickersham's cover letter of
July 26, 1909, to Root indicates that Wickersham is sending the memo to Root because of
Root's request for some information on holding compames (the specifics of which are
unidentified in the letter). Smith states that four companies, Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, American
Tobacco and Central Leather would produce a little more than $1 million if a one percent tax
applied to dividends. Id. Tis amount would be "a very substantial proportion of the total
revenue derivable from the taxing of holding companies in the industrial group[,]" only $2
million being derived from other industrial holding companies and other industrial compames.
Id. Public utilities, mining companies, etc., would produce $1 million and railroad companies
would produce $2.3 million. Id. at 17. If revenues from dividends paid on stock held for
investment only and not control were included, the total revenue from taxing dividends would
range from $8 to Si million. Id. at 18.
246. E.g., Tenth Annual Message, 45 CONG. RiEc. 378, 380 (Jan. 7, 1910) (proposing that
railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce Act not be permitted to hold stock in any
corporation which competes with it); id. at 383 (corporations choosing to incorporate under
his proposed voluntary measure could not hold stock in other corporations without approval
because the holding company "has been such an effective agency in the creation of the great
trusts and monopolies").
Senator Clapp believed that the dividend exemption, by offering "immunity from taxation,"
actually encouraged the formation of holding companies, which were "great, powerful,
overshadowing, absorbing industries, absorbing industrial life and industrial affairs." 44 CONG.
Rc. 4010 (July 1, 1909).
247. 44 CONG. REc. 4010 (July 1, 1909). On July 7, Sen. Clapp introduced an amendment
taxing all dividends received. 44 CONG. REc. 4229 (July 7, 1909). In addition, Sen. Clapp
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Senators and large corporations believed that taxation of dividends at each
level in the corporate structure would be vastly unfair (as well as expensive)
regardless of the merits of holding compames because it was "unjust" to
stockholders of holding corporations to pass a law "retroactive In effect."
2
Moreover, such a tax would be double taxation because it would tax twice
money earned but once.Y9 One response to this criticism was the entity
theory. A corporation which owned 100% of a subsidiary corporation and
whose sole income consisted of dividends from that corporation could
rightfully be taxed on those dividends even though the subsidiary had
already paid tax on the income used to pay the dividend because a "cor-
poration is a separate entity with a different relation to the subject matter
[the income]." 20 But the argument raised for taxation of dividends even
more frequently than the entity argument was a corporate regulation ar-
gument: holding companies were in general not good and should be dis-
couraged or forbidden.
This hostility to large corporations and a feeling that they needed regu-
lation runs through the entire debate on the corporate tax. I have shown
these sentiments in the discussion of exemptions for small corporations as
stated that even if taxing dividends was "double taxation" as some claimed, that was acceptable
since the tax was an excise tax rather than an income tax. 44 CONG. REc. 4228 (July 7, 1909).
Senator Newlands also spoke out against what he saw as an exemption for holding companies
which "hold the stock of other companies for the purpose of monopolizing production." 44
CONG. REc. 4232 (July 7, 1909). Senator Bailey agreed with Cummins on the need to tax
especially holding companies. 44 CONG. REc. 4233 (July 7, 1909). Note that both Bailey and
Cummins strongly supported an income tax. But even the Attorney General seemed to hold
the holding company in disfavor. Charles MacVeagh, General Solicitor for the United States
Steel Corporation, had written him that in calculating the amount of interest deduction for
holding companies one should "take the entire net income of the holding company and its
subsidiary compames and deduct from that income (first) the interest payable upon the bonds
of the subsidiary compames; and (second) the interest upon all the bonds issued by the holding
company except those issued in exchange for such bonds of the subsidiary companies as were
kept alive and included in the credit given under (first)." Letter from Charles MacVeagh to
George W Wickersham (June 29, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division). Actually, this letter is a clarification of a letter sent to Wickersham on June 26th.
Wickersham had responded to that letter by stating that such a provision was not possible:
I think the strong tendency of the time is to discourage rather than to encourage
holding companies. The abolition of holding companies.would practically prevent
any large trusts or monopolies being formed; while, of course, such companies
having been organized under provisions of law inviting such organizations should
not be disenfranchised as it were yet it does seem to me that no encouragement
should be extended towards [sic] their further formation or growth, and I feel
quite confident that no such provision as you suggest would stand any chance
of passing the Congress.
Letter from George W Wickersham to Charles MacVeagh (June 27, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers,
Library of Congress, Manuscnpt Division).
248. Letter from E.H. Gary, U.S. Steel Co., to Sen. Nelson Aldrich (July 10, 1909) (Nelson
W Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 34).
249. 44 CONG. REc. 4231 (July 7, 1909) (Sen. Aldrich stating that the exemption for
dividends was designed to prevent double taxation).
250. 44 CONG. REc. 4231 (July 7, 1909) (Sen. Daniel).
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well as in discussion of the dividend issue. On the exemption issue, the
small corporate interests largely won, although they still had to file returns.
The large corporate interests won on the major issue of dividend exclusion:
in the Act as passed, corporations were permitted to deduct dividends
received from other corporations. However, on two other issues large
corporations did not do so well. They lost on the publicity issue and
achieved only a compromise on the interest provision.
Like the dividend issue, the treatment of interest was an issue in 1909
and remains one today. Whether an interest deduction should be allowed
had been, according to Senator Root, "the subject of repeated discussion
in which the President, the Attorney-General, and other members of the
Cabinet and members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate took
part." 25 The June 17th draft contained no interest deduction. However, by
June 21st there was in place the provision which was ultimately enacted
allowing a deduction for interest on an amount of corporate indebtedness
equal to the amount of paid up capital stock .2 2 It will be remembered that
one of Taft's major concerns, and a major concern of the time, was stock
watering or overcapitalization. A tax law denying interest deductions would
further the goal of preventing such overcapitalization by discouraging debt;
at least two commentators saw this goal as the purpose of the provision. 25s
Many congressmen opposed an interest deduction on the grounds that it
encouraged corporations to substitute debt for equity and thereby avoid the
tax.214 Senator Root's response to this was that the limitation on interest
deductions was enacted to prevent excessive conversion. 2 55 Some questioned
the taxation of interest payments on the ground that it was really double
taxation of shareholders in that dividends would be reduced by the amount
251. 44 CONG. RiEc. 4007 (July 1, 1909).
252. Last Revision of June 21st at 2 (June 21, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division).
253. R. Biu= & G. Brxn, supra note 156, at 46. In the 1916 congressional debates on
the income tax, Rep. Hull stated that the original theory in the 1909 Act on the limitation on
interest deductions was to prevent, shifting from stock to debt and to prevent the use of
watered stock. The issuance of debt would result in avoiding the real purpose of the law. 53
CONG. REc. 10,656 (July 8, 1916). Hull was then asked whether this limitation was still
necessary in 1916 since individuals now paid tax on interest received, unlike in 1909. Hull
vaguely responded that a corporation is not allowed the same interest deductions as individuals
"in view of the manner in which it was organized and its superior business advantages." Id.
254. E.g., 44 CoNG. REc. 4007 (July 1, 1909) (conversation between Sens. Root and Bacon).
This argument has a familiar ring. See Rudmck, supra note 138, at 975 n.16 (hearings and
press commentary on leveraged buyouts).
255. 44 CoNG. REc. 4007 (July 1, 1909). Senator Bacon responded that even with the
limitation some conversion of stock to debt was possible, and he cited the steel example. 44
CONG. Rac. 4062 (July 2, 1909).
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 173 (1911), the Supreme Court stated that the
interest limitation "may have been inserted with a view to prevent corporations from issuing
a large amount of bonds and thereby distribut[e] profits so as to avoid the tax." Whatever
the reason for the provision the Court felt that the limited deduction was valid. Id.
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of tax on interest paid.2 6 Others, looking through the corporate entity to
the individual owners, felt that it was unjust to tax dividends but not to
tax the unearned wealth held in the form of bonds.2 7 Still others felt that
there ought to be no interest deduction. One reason for tis belief was that
many small corporations had no debt and therefore the limited deduction
worked to their disadvantage in comparison with large corporations which
did have debt or could convert equity to debt. 5 8
Another reason seems to have been a belief that interest should not be
deductible in arnving at income. Although the 1894 Act had allowed both
individuals and corporations to deduct interest payments,2 9 there was some
confusion as to whether corporations, being artificial entities, should be
able to deduct interest. The noted tax expert Edwin Seligman in his 1911
treatise stated:
From the economic point of view there is a distinction between individual
income and corporate income. In the case of individuals, true taxable
property consists in the surplus above indebtedness. Net income can
therefore be arrived at only by deducting interest on debts. But in the
case of corporations the matter is somewhat different. Capital stock
represents in many cases only a portion of the property, the remainder
being represented by the bonded indebtedness. It is stocks and bonds
together that represent the property and the earmng capacity of the
corporation; and for tis reason the most advanced tax laws in America,
as well as in Europe, permit an individual to deduct is indebtedness
or interest on his debts, while the corporation is assessed on both bonds
and stock, or both on interest and dividends.m
Thus, Seligman concluded that the 1894 income tax, which allowed corpo-
rations to deduct interest, "was really not a corporate income tax, but only
a tax on corporate profits over and above fixed charges. ' '26
The fourth provision around which much debate revolved was that
concerning publicity This debate did not stop with the enactment of the
tax but continued after, leading eventually to a dramatic revision of the
provision. This prolonged discussion is not surprising given the pivotal role
256. 44 CONG. REc. 4007 (July 1, 1909); see also R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 156,
at 46.
257 E.g., 44 CoNG. Rnc. 4007 (July 1, 1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon). Bacon was in
favor of a general income tax. Later, he suggested taxing bond interest in the hands of the
bondholder. 44 CoNG. REc. 4061 (July 2, 1909). See also 44 CONG. REc. 4043 (July 2, 1909)
(statement of Sen. Hughes).
258. 44 CONG. REc. 4422 (July 12, 1909) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
259. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
260. E. SELIGMAN, TaE INcoME TAx 513 (1911); see also 53 CoNG. Rnc. 10,656 (July 8,
1916) (Rep. Hull stating that a corporation is not entitled to the same interest deduction as
an individual due to "the manner in winch it was orgamzed and its superior business
advantages").
261. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 260, at 513. Seligman noted that an argument could be made
that this was not "so senous" since individuals included interest in their income. Nevertheless,
he stated that such a definition of income was "uneconomic." Id.
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publicity played in corporate regulatory theory and consequently in the
enactment of the tax.
C. Publicity and Control of Corporations
In the Progressive Era, as discussed previously, a wide spectrum of public
opimon (from the President on down) believed in publicity or access to
information. Thus, from the very inception of the corporate tax, the
publicity feature was a key element. It was the instrument whereby govern-
ment would acquire information about corporations; acquiring information
was the first step towards supervision. President Taft sounded this note in
his June 16th message to Congress in which he proposed the tax:
Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision which must be
exercised m order to make the law effective over the annual accdunts
and business transactions of all corporations.. If now, by a perfectly
legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are incidentally able to
possess the Government and the stockholders and the public of the
knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and profits of
every corporation in the country, we have made a long step toward that
supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a further abuse
of power.-
Accordingly, the earliest drafts of the bill provided that all returns,
"together with any corrections thereof which may have been made by the
Commissioner, and all documentary evidence and notes of testimony taken
and filed in connection therewith, shall constitute public records and be
open to inspection as such[.]" 263 But in the June 17th draft, reference to
evidence and notes was crossed out, presumably by Senator Root.26 This
pared-down version was enacted as paragraph six of the final tax.26 The
June 17th draft also followed section thirty-four of the 1894 tax and
provided that it was illegal for any employee of the government to make
known "in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person any
262. 44 CONG. Ruc. 3344 (June 16, 1909). Taft's response to Boston lawyer Frederick Fish
who complained of the publicity feature was: "I do not m the least agree with you as to the
publicity which will follow the tax. I think that is a good thing, and it is one of the reasons
why I favor the tax." Letter from William Howard Taft to Frederick Fish (June 28, 1909)
(Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497). See
also Letter from William Howard Taft to E.G. Buckland, Vice President, N.Y. N.H. &
H.R.R. Co., Providence, R.I.) (July 17, 1909) (Papers of William Howard Taft, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 497); 44 CoNo. Ruc. 4720 (July 31, 1909) (Rep. Longworth
stating that publicity will help stockholders prevent abuse).
263. Revision of June 17th at 4-5, sent with cover letter from Elihu Root's secretary to
Sen. Nelson Aldrich (June 17, 1909) (Nelson W Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Reel 34). This was apparently the second draft sent on that date.
264. Id.
265. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(6), 36 Stat. 11, 116.
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information obtained by him in the discharge of his official duty[.]" ' 2  To
do so was a misdemeanor pumshable by a fine or imprisonment.267 By June
21st the draft prohibited a federal employee from making "known in any
manner any document received, evidence taken or report made, under this
section except upon the special direction of the President.'"' This became
the language of paragraph seven of the Act.269 These two sections, and the
federal supervision they symbolized, were the subject of much debate and
commentary before enactment of the tax and were the focus of protest after
enactment.
Senator Root, in his explanation and defense of the tax, echoed President
Taft's enthusiasm for the publicity feature; Root, however, emphasized only
publicity to the government. The Act would provide the government with
annual information which would "show the course and progress of the
business of every corporation of the United States organized for profit." 270
In this respect he aligned himself with those Progressives calling for more
scientific government: such annual information would allow the government
to "take a great and a necessary step forward to the more efficient and
creditable performance of the duties it has undertaken and that are imposed
upon it under our constitutional system." 271 Thus, while he did not support
passing taxes with "ulterior" purposes, Root believed that if the tax provided
"incidental" benefits such as this tax did, then that was a reason to vote
for the tax. 272 The government regulated interstate commerce, passed tariff
laws and regulated the currency, but it did so without adequate information.
This provision would, he stated, provide the government with the necessary
information. 273 He acknowledged that since the provision applied to all
corporations, it would reach the relatively few corporations which engaged
in none of the activities that Congress regulated; nevertheless, information
regarding these corporations was needed:
A full and satisfactory knowledge of the field into which a legislative
body is to enter is not accomplished by including only the things that
come within its necessary action. The whole field should be before us,
and we should be able to form some judgment as to the relative amounts,
266. Revision of June 17th at 5, sent with cover letter from Elihu Root's secretary to Sen.
Nelson Aldrich (June 17, 1909) (Nelson W Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscnpt
Division, Reel 34).
267 Id.
268. Draft of June 21st at 7 (June 21, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division).
269. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(7), 36 Stat. I1, 116.
270. 44 CONG. REc. 4006 (July 1, 1909).
271. Id.
272. Id., see also 44 CoNG. Rc. 3760 (June 24, 1909) (Sen. Newlands stating that it is
permissible to regulate businesses via the taxing power).
273. 44 CONG. REc. 4006-07 (July 1, 1909); see also 44 CONG. REc. 3759 (June 24, 1909)
(Sen. Newlands stating that the tax will provide information for scientific legislation).
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the relative capacities for answenng to taxation, the trade relations
between these corporations with which we are most closely concerned,
and the other corporations of the country.274
Root acknowledged that there would be "certain incidental publicity to
others than the Government. ' 275 Although he did not seem to recognize the
merit of this as Taft did, he implied it by stating that corporations had
"estopped themselves from saying that they ought not to have their business
inquired into, for the very basis of corporate life is freedom from personal
liability for debt and the confinement of the creditor, the person who does
business with the corporation, to the corporate assets. ' 27 6 In other words,
the limited liability feature of corporations gave the public, or at least the
creditor, some right to know the affairs, and therefore the assets, of the
corporation.
While Root, like Taft, believed that a primary good of the tax was the
information it provided the government and the public, others vociferously,
fought the tax primarily because of that very provision. 2" The original
provision, which had made public all statements concerning the tax, was
horrendous: "The hamest Populist... would have thought [that provision]
most likely a reporter's invention." 278 The provision that was actually
proposed made public only the actual return and left to the discretion of
the President whether other statements should be published. Even this more
moderate proposal was too dangerous:
The calm-minded, just, well-poised gentleman who is now President of
the United States might safely be trusted with this immense power. We
have had several Presidents, however, who were impulsive, subject to
fits of violent temper, vindictive, and we shall have no doubt other such
Presidents. It will be in their power to injure or destroy their enemies
by directing the publication of the sworn statements filed under tis
law. 2 9
The provision was offensive because it could provide information not
simply to the government but also to the general public. The New York
Times, for example, editorialized that the disclosure of earnings and other
274. 44 CONG. REc. 4007 (July 1, 1909).
275. Id.
276. Id., see also 44 CONG. REc. 4719 (July 31, 1909) (Rep. Longworth stating that it is
not inquisitorial to look into the affairs of corporations; there is a difference between looking
ino the affairs of individuals and those of corporations).
277. J. BUENUIER, supra note 157, at 117, states that most of the protests about the tax
concerned the record keeping and disclosure features. The correspondence to Sens. Root and
Aldrich which I read, as well as the petitions to Congress, lead me to agree that these were
lughly protested features. The other provision greatly complained about was that requiring use
of the calendar year instead of the fiscal year. See infra note 294. Tlus provision was amended
later. Since the calendar year is of a more techmucal nature than the publicity issue, I will not
deal with it.
278. Editorial, By Direction of the President, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1909, at 6, col. 1.
279. Id. The Times is obviously referring to Roosevelt.
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information nught lead to bankruptcy if creditors became aware of a
corporation's shrinkage in business and called in debt.20 Small corporations,
in particular, worried about large corporations obtaimng information about
them that would hurt their competitiveness.2i
Frequently, however, the reason for complaint was government, not
public, access to information. Corporate representatives swarmed to Wash-
ington in June to object not to the tax as a tax but to the provision to
"supervise them, the so-called 'publicity' features."1282 The New York Times
screamed that the measure was "[h]alf-muckrake and half money-scoop...
[and thus] one of those hybrids abhorred by nature and disliked by man."283
The Times believed that the muckraking feature of the bill, its publicity
feature, was the primary goal because otherwise a "simple" stamp tax
would have raised the necessary revenue.2" The real purpose of the bill,
280. Id. The Times thought it was unnecessary to curb the abuses of the few by the
disclosure of all corporations' information. See also Letter from The Miller Brewing Co. to
Rep. William J. Cary (July 20, 1909) (Petitions to House Ways and Means Committee,
National Archives, HR 61A H34.21, RG 233). The Miller Brewing Co. felt that there was
nothing to be gained from publicity except unnamed abuses: "[M]aking the returns public
records opens the way to a misuse of the information contained in the returns through ways
and means and for purposes too numerous to mention here and for which the information
contained in such returns was never intended." Id. Similar petitions to the Senate Finance
Committee may be found at the National Archives in Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J24. A
rare exception to the protest was a telegram from the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce and
Board of Trade, dated July I, 1909, favoring the corporation tax "as a temporary revenue
measure and as a means of quickly disposing of the tariff debate." Tacoma Chamber of
Commerce and Board of Trade, Telegram to Senate Finance Comm. (July I, 1909) (Petitions
to Senate Finance Comm. Regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives, Record Group 129,
Sen. 61A-J24); see also Spokane Merchants Association, Telegram to Sen. Wesley L. Jones
(July I, 1909) (Petitions to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives,
Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J24).
281. J. BUaENKR, supra note 157, at 117; e.g., Letter from Trans-Mississippi Commercial
Congress to Sen. Root (July 13, 1909) (Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division). See infra notes 330-31 for petitions from small businesses on this issue. Senator
Clapp stated that it was acceptable for the public to have information about banks and public
utilities, but that they should invest in "private" corporations at their own risk. 44 CoNG.
Rac. 4009 (July 1, 1909). It is unclear why Clapp thought that. Senator Dixon supported the
tax because "its chief virtue lies in the publicity feature as applied to large corporations." 44
CoNG. Rrc. 3941 (June 29, 1909). Dixon feared, as did some others, that the tax would be
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. He, therefore, really favored an inheritance
tax. Id., see also 44 CoNG. REc. 4422 (July 12, 1909) (tax will be passed on to consumers).
282. Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1909, at 1, col. 1. The
hordes were in Washington to make "trouble"; they were against the mconvemence of audits,
against snooping by the "cheap Government Inspector type" and against giving information
to rivals. Id.
283. Editorial, Mr. Taft's Tax Bill, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1909, at 6, col. 1; see also
Editorial, By Direction of the President, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1909, at 6, col. 1. The New
York World, on the other hand, thought the tax was not so bad. Editorial, Taxation,
Supervision, and Control, N.Y. World, June 29, 1909, at 6, col. 2. The Times disagreed.
284. Editorial, Mr. Taft's Tax Bill, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1909, at 6, col. 1. The Corporation
Trust Company Journal, summarizing popular sentiment about the tax in November, 1909,
echoed the Times by stating that many assert that "the real purpose was a step towards [sic]
the federal supervision and control of all corporations and that its revenue feature was a
negligible quantity." The Federal Corporation Tax Law, supra note 227.
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according to this view, was supervision and control of Gorporations and not
revenue. While Theodore Roosevelt sought national control of corporations
through federal licensing, Taft sought supervisory control through the
corporate tax. 5 Tins was bad enough as to large corporations, but totally
unnecessary with respect to private corporations which did not abuse their
corporate powers. Why should they be punished by a tax m order to get
at other corporations which were abusive?2 6 The Times' protests were echoed
by many others. (Only a few asked for more supervision.) 8 Some even
suggested that a tax on dividends should be instituted rather than on net
income for the reason that a dividends tax would not be intrusive on the
corporations.2 9
The publicity feature, in sum, was the focus of protests by corporations
primarily because it represented to them the first step toward federal
supervision of corporations. In addition, the provision gave the general
public information that many saw as potentially harmful. Finally, the
discretionary power vested in the president to disclose further information
was troubling in the amount of power it gave to the executive and the
285. Editorial, Taxation, Supervision, and Control, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1909, at 6, col.
I.
286. Editorial, Mr. Taft's Tax Bill, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1909, at 6, col. 1.
287. E.g., Petition from the Miller Brewing Company to Rep. William J. Cary (July 20,
1909) (Petition to House Ways and Means Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National Arclhves,
Record Group 233, HR 61A-H34.21); see also supra note 257 (containing President Taft's
response to various complaints about publicity). Senator Gallinger of New Hampslre stated
that he received several letters complaining about the tax creating "an army of agents and
inspectors sent out by the Government to pry into the affairs of these corporations." 44 CoNG.
Rc. 3937 (June 29, 1909). Senator Flint of Caiforma stated that revenue agents could inspect
corporate books only if the Commissioner was "satisfied" that a false return or no return
had been made. Id. Thus, he believed that the corporations were protected from unnecessary
prying while at the same time the federal government achieved some supervision of corporations
and the general public, through the publicity features, would "be advised of the affairs of
corporations throughout the country." Id. He believed there was, therefore, a balancing of
public, governmental and corporate interests. Id.
288. E.g., 44 CoNG. Rac. 4038 (July 2, 1909) (statement of Sen. Cummins, who was for
the income tax); 44 CoNG. REc. 4230 (July 7, 1909) (Sen. Dolliver, with Sen. Dixon agreeing,
that the publicity features needed to reach holding companies).
289. E.g., Letter from John D. Rockefeller to Sen. Nelson W Aldrich (June 21, 1909)
(Nelson W. Aldrich Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 34). Rockefeller,
on behalf of himself, his father and associates, thought it "would be vastly preferable" to
have a tax on dividends rather than on net earnings. The net earnings measurement was
objectionable because "[i]t would place the affairs of every corporation under inquiry,
surveillance and espionage." Id. at 1. He also objected to the use of net earnings because (1)
it created questions of salary, depreciation, etc., (2) all corporations would have to keep
"uniform" accounts so that the tax could be imposed uniformly and (3) it would involve
corporations and the government in "endless dispute and embarrassment." Id. Others suggested
a tax on gross receipts, for the similar reason that such a tax would not require as much
record keeping or disclosure, or result in as much dispute, as a tax on net income. J. BumiNER,
supra note 157, at 118.
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potential for using that power politically to appease the popular anti-
corporation sentiment. 290
D. Publicity After Enactment of the Statute
The corporate excise tax was enacted in August, 1909, but was not upheld
by the Supreme Court until 1911.291 Between enactment and validation,
opposition to the excise tax was immediate and well-organized. Various
trade associations, individual corporations and even shareholders sent pro-
tests to Congress which were frequently form letters. Opposition followed
lines similar to pre-enactment complaints: (1) the law discriminated against
those doing business in the corporate form as opposed to those doing
business as individuals or partnershups, 292 (2) the law infringed upon states'
rights293 and (3) the publicity provisions were unacceptable. 29 As before
enactment, the publicity feature was the major focus of protest. Given the
widespread view that the main intent of the law was to supervise corporations
and that the publicity provision was the instrumentation of that intent, it
is not surprising that the section garnered so much attention. The remainder
of this Article will focus on the publicity feature and attempt to evaluate
what, if anything, it meant in terms of the era's attempts to regulate
corporations.
290. The Times talks of "easily" finding pretexts to disclose information to appease the
"mob of corporations teasers." Editorial, By Direction of the President, N.Y. Times, June
26, 1909, at 6, col. 1.
291. The Conference bill on the tariff passed the House on July 31, 1909, by a vote of 195
to 183. 44 CONG. Rac. 4755 (July 31, 1909). The bill passed the Senate August 5, 1909, by a
vote of 47 to 31. 44 CoNo. Rzc. 4929 (Aug. 5, 1909). The Supreme Court upheld the Corporate
Excise Tax m its entirety in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
292. E.g., Petition from the Board of Trade, Portland, Maine (Jan. 14, 1910); Resolutions
of the Board of Trade of New Brunswick (Feb. 9, 1910); Resolutions of the Providence (R.I.)
Board of Trade (Jan. 25, 1909); Petitions to Senate Finance Committee (Record Group 129,
National Archives, Sen. 61A-J24 RG 129); see also Petitions to the House Ways And Means
Committee (National Archives, HR 61A-H34.21 No. 6479).
293. See Petitions to the Senate Finance Committee (Record Group 234, National Archives,
Sen. 61A-K6 RG 234). On January 14, 1910, a group of corporations and commercial
organizations met in Chicago "under the auspices of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association,"
and called for the repeal of the tax "as being at variance with established rights and principles,
and especially as infringing upon the domain of the sovereignty of the various States, as
discriminating between individuals operating as individuals and those operating through cor-
porate bodies[.]" Reprinted in 45 CoNo. REc. 1467 (Feb. 3, 1910) (emphasis added) (Various
groups from a variety of states signed the resolution.).
294. Another much discussed issue was the issue of calendar year reporting. Many protested
that such a schedule was unfair. Eventually, the law was amended to permit fiscal years.
Before enactment a group of prominent accounting fnns in New York (including Price,
Waterhouse, Haskins & Sells) had complained about the lack of a fiscal year and the failure
to base income on amounts earned (not received) and expenses incurred (not paid). Letter
signed by various accountants under a cover letter by Suffern & Son (July 23, 1909) (Papers
of Nelson Aldrich, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 35). The fiscal year issue
was later fixed by amendment, but the method of accounting was taken care of by regulations.
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The Act provided in paragraph three for the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to prescribe
the exact form of the tax return. 295 Paragraph six stated that the returns,
together with any corrections, were to be filed in the Commissioner's office
and thereupon became public records "open to inspection as such." 29 6 Under
paragraph seven, no other document, evidence or report could be made
public in any manner "except upon the special direction of the President." 2 M
The first set of regulations, issued December 3, 1909,298 were accompanied
by a statement to the press from the Secretary of the Treasury, Franklin
MacVeagh. The statement touched on several points, two of which are of
interest for purposes of this Article: a statement concermng the purpose
and interpretation of the Act and a statement regarding the publicity
feature.29 The purpose of the Act, stated MacVeagh, was to produce
295. The law required that the form contain language
setting forth, (first) the total amount of the paid-up capital stock of such
corporation, joint stock company or association, or insurance company, outstand-
ing at the close of the year; (second) the total amount of the bonded and other
indebtedness of such corporation , (third) the gross amount of the income
received during such year from all sources , also the amount received
by such corporation . within the year by way of dividends upon stock of
other corporations subject to the tax imposed by this section; (fourth) the
total amount of all the ordinary and necessary expenses actually paid out of
earnings m the maintenance and operation of the business and properties of such
corporation within the year, stating separately all. charges such as rentals or
franchise payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or
possession of property , (fifth) the total amount of all losses actually sustained
dunng the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, stating separately
any amounts allowed for depreciation of property . , (sixth) the amount of
interest actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness to an
amount of such bonded and other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-tip capital
stock of such corporation . , (seventh) the amount paid by it within the year
for taxes unposed under the authority of the United States or any State or
Territory thereof, and separately the amount so paid by it for taxes imposed by
the government of any foreign country as a condition to carrying on business
therein; (eighth) the net income of such corporation
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. 11, 114-15.
296. Id. at 116.
297. Id.
298. Regulations 31, T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131 (1909) [hereinafter Regulations
31].
299. Repnnted m The Treasury Department's Explanation of the Federal Corporation Tax
Law, I CoRp. TR. Co. J. No. 15 (Special No.) (Dec. 13, 1909) (pages unnumbered) [hereinafter
MacVeagh Statement]. MacVeagh made two other points. First, he stated that net income
meant profits from business as well as other sources such as investments. In this regard he
noted that "income" was used rather than the term "profits" because although the terms
were "practically identical," income was "more embrasive." Id. His comments reflected the
definition of gross income found in Regulations 31, art. 2, § 5, at 137.
MacVeagh's second point dealt with methods of accounting, as did Regulations 31, art. 2,
§ 5, at 137, which stated, "It is unmatenal whether any item of gross income is evidenced by
cash receipts during the year or in such other manner as to entitle it to proper entry on the
books of the corporation for the year in which return is made." Id. Similarly, despite
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revenue; the Act would be liberally construed to do so. °° This statement
by itself is innocent, but given the furor surrounding the enactment of the
Act and its purported supervisory purpose, this statement may be read as
an attempt to assuage corporate fears of control. Nevertheless, a broad
construction of the statute aided the supervisory purpose asserted by Pres-
ident Taft, if not by is Secretary of the Treasury For example, while
paragraph three of the statute required each corporation subject to the tax
to submit a return, the statute's language did not make clear whether
corporations whose net income did not exceed the $5,000 exemption amount
were "subject" to the tax and thereby required to file returns. The regu-
lations resolved the ambiguity by stating that every corporation, except
those specifically exempted, was required to file a return "whether it may
have net income liable to tax or not."130' The rationale for this interpretation
was that it allowed the government to compute the tax.c22 While this is true,
it is not irrelevant that this interpretation also cast the broadest net and
allowed the government to amass the most information on corporate busi-
ness, in the manner desired by Senator Root. 303 The issue was repeatedly
litigated; the courts favonng the government interpretation.304
the statutory language requiring that expenses be "actually paid within the year," the regulations
stated:
It is immaterial whether the deductions are evidenced by actual disbursements in
cash, or whether evidenced in such other way as to be properly acknowledged
by the corporate officers and so entered on the books as to constitute a liability
against the assets of the corporation, joint stock company, association, or
insurance company making the return.
Regulations 31, art. 4, at 139.
300. MacVeagh Statement, supra note 299.
301. Regulations 31, art. 1, at 136. This issue apparently caused problems for some time.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue received numerous inquiries on this issue and many of the
failures to comply with the law were caused by corporations with income of less than $5,000
not filing returns. This interpretation conflicted with the 1894 income tax law which did not
require individual taxpayers with income not exceeding $3,500 to file (all corporations had to
file since they had no exemption amount).
302. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 217, 220-21 (1912) (opimon issued in 1911). Wickersham stated:
The law in every respect is to be adnuistered by the officers of the law and not
by those who are subject to it. Efficiency of admimstration would be difficult,
and even impossible, if the corporations could determine, each for itself, whether
or not they were liable for any amount of tax, and make or withhold returns
accordingly.
Id. at 221. He cited as authority the 1898 tax which required all those involved in the specified
businesses to file returns, regardless of the amount of gross receipts. Id. at 218-19 (citing Act
approved June 18, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464). In addition, he stated that under
the 1894 income tax law, Act approved Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, although
individuals with incomes of $3,500 or less did not have to file, id. at 554 (the exempt amount
was $4,000, id. at 553), there was no exempt amount for corporations and every corporation,
regardless of whether it had income, had to file. Id. at 558.
303. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Umted States v. Acorn Roofing, 204 F 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1912); United States
v. Military Constr. Co., 204 F 153 (W.D. Mo. 1913).
[Vol. 66:53
CORPORATE TAX ORIGINS
Several early Treasury decisions also liberally defined those organizations
covered by the Act. In doing so, they broadened the revenue base, and
additionally, by focusing on corporate characteristics, they contributed to
the current debate on corporate personality. For example, a February 14,
1910 opinion of the Attorney General issued at the request of the Secretary
of the Treasury stated that limited partnerships were subject to the Corporate
Excise Tax. 0 5 The partnership involved in the opinion was formed under
Pennsylvania laws, issued certificates to its members, held real property in
its own name, needed to sue or be sued in its own name, had perpetual
life and centralized management and partners' liability was limited to the
amount of capital subscribed to.3°0 Such an association, the opinion stated,
fell
within the definition of a corporation given by Mr. Justice Field in B.
& P R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church (citation omitted) to wit: 'Private
corporations are but associations of individuals united for some common
purpose, and permitted by law to use a common name, and to change
its members without a dissolution of the association. 3 0
While this definition appears to be based primarily on the aggregate theory,
the opinion later appeared to adopt an artificial entity theory of corpora-
tions. Quoting Justice Marshall in the Dartmouth College Case,30 8 the
opinion stated that "[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible, and existing only in contemplation of law." 3°9
The opinion concluded that a limited partnership fell within the scope of
the tax because the law establising the tax contained "no special require-
ments as to what powers this artificial person shall possess, the only
essentials being that it shall be organized under a law, that its object shall
be for profit, and that it shall have a capital stock represented by shares." 10
Shortly thereafter, on April 4, 1910, Internal Revenue Commissioner
Cabell, on advice of the Attorney General, expanded the scope of the Act
even more. He stated that organizations in Massachusetts and elsewhere
known as "associates," "trusts" or "real-estate trusts," which were formed
by agreement and declaration of trust rather than organized under a charter,
were subject to the tax because the organizations were for profit and had
"all of the essential elements of any joint-stock company ''311 Those "es-
sential" elements listed were the presence of certificates, the trading of
certificates and the election of trustees. 3 2 Here the Attorney General and
305. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 189 (1912).
306. Id. at 190-93.
307. Id. at 193.
308. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
309. Id. at 636.
310. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 189, 194 (1910).
311. T.D. 1611, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 50 (1910).
312. Id. at 51.
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the Commissioner apparently overlooked the statutory language referring to
corporations "organized under the laws" and focused on the characteristics
of the association: certificates, transferability of shares and centralized
management. Neither limited liability nor continuity of life were mentioned,
though they had been in the February 14th Attorney General opinion. No
explicit mention was made of the group's personality.
These two opinions created a broad interpretation of which associations
were to be treated as corporations and thereby subject to the tax. Implicitly,
as in the Massachusetts trust case, or explicitly, as in the limited partnership
case, the basis of each decision was that the organization at issue was an
entity separate from its members. A variety of characteristics indicated the
separateness: limited liability, centralized management, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests and the existence of shares.
In two 1911 cases the Supreme Court more clearly defined which entities
were subject to the tax. Although the Court cut back somewhat on the
Commissioner's expansive interpretation, it also focused squarely on the
artificial nature of the entity In Flint v Stone Tracy Co.,3 13 the case
upholding the tax, the Court stated that the tax was an excise tax, not a
direct tax, on the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity with
the advantages of doing business in such a form.31 4 These advantages, the
Court said, were "obvious"- continuity of life, transferability of interests,
centralized management and limited liability 311 Because such characteristics
were so different from those of an individual, the Court stated that the tax
was not unconstitutional in singling out corporations: "[I]t could not be
said, even if the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable
to the present case, that there is no substantial difference between the
carrying on of business by the corporations taxed, and the same business
when conducted by a private firm or individual. '316
In Eliot v Freeman,31 7 a companion case to Flint, the Court dealt with
two Massachusetts trusts similar to those discussed by the Commissioner.3 18
Both trusts had centralized management by trustees and transferability of
interests. However, neither had perpetual life in that each ended twenty
years after lives in being. Moreover, the Court stated that unlike corpora-
tions, these trusts were not organized under the laws of a state, as required
by the statute, at least not "within the ordinary meaning of [the] term
313. 220 U.S. 107, 145 (1911).
314. Id. at 145. A companion case, Zonne v. Minneapolis Syndicate, 220 U.S. 187 (1911),
held that the corporation had to be engaged in business to be subject to the tax. In Zonne
the corporation merely held title to property subject to a lease and distributed rents to the
shareholders.
315. Flint, 220 U.S. at 162.
316. Id. at 161.
317 220 U.S. 178 (1911).
318. Id.
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[organized]. ' 3 19 It then noted that the difference between joint-stock asso-
ciations at common law and those organized under statutes was "well
recognized" with statutory companies being like corporations, except for
the absence of limited liability. 312 The Court concluded that, since the trusts
were not creations of the state, they "do not derive any benefit from and
are not organized under the statutory laws of Massachusetts" and therefore
were not subject to the corporation tax.i2 Thus, the Court directly stressed
the artificial, that is, legally created, nature of the corporation. The Supreme
Court also stressed indirectly the artifical nature of corporations by focusing
on only two characteristics as critical: limited liability and perpetual life.
These two features were so critical because only artificial entities, those
created by the state, could have them.
It is interesting to note that of the features listed by the Commssioner-
limited liability, centralized management, transferability of shares, perpetual
life and the existence of shares-the first four characteristics quickly became
(and have remainea) the touchstones of corporate status for tax purposes.22
319. Id. at 186.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 186-87.
322. Section H(G) of the Revenue Act of 1913 imposed a tax on "every corporation, joint-
stock company or association, and every insurance company, organized in the United States,
no matter how created or organized, not including partnersips." Ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat.
114, 172 (1913). This language also existed in the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39
Stat. 756, 765, and the Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 10, 40 Stat. 300, 333. This language
contrasted to the corporate excise tax language in the 1909 Act and later acts (e.g., Revenue
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 789) which applied only to corporations "organzed under the
laws" of the United States. As I have shown, Eliot interpreted this "under the laws" language
for the excise tax to mean that the corporation or association was created by statutory
enactment. Eliot, 220 U.S. at 186. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924), stated that the
same meaning must be given to the same language in the 1916 Act.
The income tax regulations did not expand on the definition, though they did specifically
classify limited partnerships as corporations. Regs. No. 33 Art. 86 (1914) and Regs. No. 33
(Rev.) Art. 62. Some commentators believe that the inclusion of limited partnerships was based
on Eliot which somehow implied the "organized under" language into the income tax law.
See, e.g., C. BERGER & P WEDENBACK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSIMP TAXATION
71-72 (1989). As support for this, they cite the fact that the 1918 regulations following the
Revenue Act of 1918, which changed the "organized under" language to "created or organized
in the United States," Revenue Act of 1918 § 1, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919), were amended to
provide that limited partnerships would be corporations if the limited partnerships resembled
corporations based on the characteristics of limited liability, transferability of interests and
bnnging suit in the firm's name. T.D. 2943, 1 C.B. 9 (1919).
I believe that these characteristics, particularly limited liability, were also important in the
1913 and 1916 classifications of limited partnerships as corporations, whereas the "organized
under" language was not. First, even the 1913 regulation stated that it was "immatenal" how
such corporations (defined in Art. 78 to include joint-stock compames and associations) were
"created or organized." Regs. No. 33, Art. 79, at 58. The term included real estate trusts
which distributed profits based on capital stock, or if no stock, capital invested. The 1918
regulations revised to cover the 1916 and 1917 Acts, were similar. Regs. No. 33 (Rev.), Arts.
57 & 58. Thus, for income tax purposes, all regulations, from the very first set, flatly stated
that the manner of organization was unimportant. Thus, contrary to Berger and Wiedenbeck's
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Although the emphasis on certificates has disappeared, the existence of
shares was important under the 1909 tax for two reasons. First, given the
state of flux that the legal theory of corporate personality was in, the
presence of certificates served as a clear marker of a personality distinct
from the owners of the certificates. If the association were not a separate
entity, then shares would not exist. After all, people do not own certificates
representing themselves.
Perhaps more important from the standpoint of the particulars of the
tax was the need to know the capital of the association-capital which was
represented by certificates. The tax, it will be remembered, limited interest
deductions in order to help prevent stock watering or overcapitalization. A
deduction was allowed only for interest on the amount of debt equal to the
amount paid in capital. Since the capital was represented by certificates, it
was logical to insist on the presence of certificates.
Certificates of ownership, and their manner of issuance, became an issue
in another matter: the publicity provision. On December 3, 1909, in his
opinion, the difference in wording between the income and excise tax provisions was clearly
recognized. See Hecht, 265 U.S. at 153 (noting the marked contrast between the two). While
it is true that Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223, 233 (1919), held that a Massachusetts trust
was not an association, the basis for that decision was not the fact that the trust was not
organized under any law. Stating that the manner of organization was immatenal, the Court
nevertheless held that it "would be a wide departure from normal usage" to call the trust an
association, basing its rationale on the fact that the purpose for taxing corporations on
dividends received from other corporations was to prevent holding companies, and such a
problem did not exist in this instance. Id. at 233-34. The Court in Hecht later pointed out
that the Crocker decision needed "to be read in the light of the trust agreement there involved,
under which the trustees were merely holding property for the collection of the income
and its distribution among the beneficianes and were not engaged in the carrying on of
any business." Hecht, 265 U.S. at 160-61.
Secondly, article 57 of the 1918 regulations included in the definition of "corporation" "all
business trusts organized or created for the purpose of engaging in commercial or industrial
enterprises, the capital of which is evidenced by certificates or shares of interest issued or
issuable to members on the basis of which profits are distributed or distributable." Regulations
33 (revised), T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170 (1918). This language picks up the 1909
emphasis on the presence of certificates.
The premise of the 1909 law was the artificiality of the entity taxed. Thus, the interpretation
of the law stressed those traits which evidenced that artificiality: limited liability and centralized
management. However, because the tax was an excise tax, the language of the statute and the
Supreme Court required a litmus test for this artificiality: creation by statutory enactments.
Nevertheless, I believe it was these other traits or indicia of artificiality, rather than -the
statutory blessing of limited partnerships, that led to the 1913 regulations' absolute classification
of these partnerships as corporations. The switch in 1918 to regulations that required an
examination of the traits to see whether the limited partnership was like a corporation merely
reflected, I believe, a decreased hostility to corporations and a less doctrinal, more sophisticated
view of corporate personality.
Current regulations state that an unincorporated association will be classified for tax purposes
as a corporation if it has three of the following four corporate charactenstics: centralized
management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests and limited liability. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1983). These traits, of course, are the very ones
highlighted in 1909.
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press statement accompanying the issuance of regulations, Secretary MacVeagh
had noted that he had received "[g]reat numbers of commumcations"
concermng the publicity clause. a23 Nevertheless, and despite the apparent
inconsistency between paragraph six (which spoke of public records) and
paragraph seven (which forbade disclosure except as provided by law or the
president), MacVeagh stated that the language regarding filing and public
inspection was so clear that the Internal Revenue Service had "no discretion
whatsoever in the matter."' 3u The regulations themselves merely repeated
word for word the statutory language without any clarification of the
apparent inconsistency. 321
Nevertheless, at least as early as January, 1910, the Department of the
Treasury indicated that "the extent of the publicity of such returns [was]
... under consideration. '3 26 This consideration was probably due to several
factors. First, Secretary MacVeagh was not totally in favor of the publicity
feature. In a letter to Congress on February 16, 1910, he stated 'that until
Congress appropriated $50,000 to enable the Department of the Treasury
to classify, index and exhibit the returns, he would not treat them as public
records but as Internal Revenue documents open only to the inspection of
the taxpayer, his representative or a person authorized by the President or
the Secretary of the Treasury. 327 More importantly, the complaints against
the publicity feature were volumnous. While many people urged the total
repeal of the tax, others complained specifically about the publicity feature.
Many who demanded total repeal of the tax asked for the immediate
abolition of the publicity provision pending total repeal.3 28
Many of the complaints received by MacVeagh and Congress concermng
publicity came from small corporations. These corporations feared that
disclosure of information to competitors, particularly those doing business
323. MacVeagh Statement, supra note 299.
324. Id.
325. T.D. 1571, 12 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 131, 144-45 (1909).
326. Letter from the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue to G. Charles Horwood
(Jan. 17, 1910) (Petitions to Internal Revenue, National Archives, RG 58, E171, No. 20258).
327. 45 CoNG. REc. 4137 (Apr. 1, 1910). MacVeagh told Taft he did not favor publicity
for small corporations. R. BLAxY & G. BIAKEY, supra note 156, at 57.
328. Further Developments Regarding the Federal Corporation Tax, I Coa. TR. Co. J.
No. 16 (Jan. 1910) (pages unnumbered) (protests were mainly against the publicity feature and
calendar year reporting); see also 45 CONG. Rxc. 1467-68 (Feb. 3, 1910) (reprinting the
resolutions of a group representing various industries and organizations which met on January
14, 1910, under the auspices of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association asking for the total
repeal of the tax and, pending repeal, the immediate abolition of the publicity feature; this
was signed by many groups from many states). Various bills were introduced into Congress
either to abolish the whole tax, e.g., H.R. 14545,. 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 45 CoNG. REc. 139
(Dec. 14, 1909), or to amend the publicity feature, e.g., H.R. 17504, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 45
CONG. REc. 496 (Jan. 10, 1910). The text of these two bills may be found at 45 CONG. REc.
1468 (Feb. 3, 1910).
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as partnerships, would injure their businesses.3 29 Others feared that the big
corporations would use the information provided by publicity to the "dis-
advantage of the less powerful."330 Many of these petitions stated that
publicity for corporations whose stock was sold on an exchange or otherwise
publicly offered (as through a newspaper) was acceptable, but that publicity
"imposes an unjust and unreasonable burden upon mercantile and manu-
facturing corporations, whose stock is closely held and never offered for
sale in the open market." '331 These small corporations thought publicity
"might apply, properly, to public corporations like railroads and industrial
concerns, whose stocks and bonds are sought by the public, as it would
enable investors to judge of the value of such securities. '332
This argument fits in with the concern of the times that overcapitalization
and promoter schemes were due, in part, to the lack of information available
to stockholders. It will be remembered that the rationale offered by President
Taft for the tax when he introduced it in Congress was not just to provide
the federal government with information, but also to give stockholders and
the public access to information.3 33 If stock was closely held and never
offered to the public, then the public did not need information, since the
purpose of providing them with information was to allow them to make
wise investments.
On February 17, 1910, Commissioner Cabell issued a directive to all
Internal Revenue agents and collectors severely limiting, if not overruling,
the public records provision of paragraph six which a few short months
before Treasury Secretary MacVeagh had found so clear that the Internal
Revenue had no discretion. 334 Cabell stated that returns would not be open
to general inspection but would be treated in the same manner as returns
made under other revenue statutes. 3 5 Substantial amounts of money would
329. Board of Trade of New Brunswick, Petition to the Senate Finance Committee (Feb.
9, 1910) (Petitions to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives,
Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J24). The petitions appear to be forms or variants of forms as
their language is similar. See Woonsocket Business Men's Association, Petition to Senate
Finance Committee (Feb. 1, 1910) (Petitions to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate
Tax, National Archives, Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J26); Business Men of Providence,
Petition to Senate Finance Committee (Jan. 25, 1910) (Petitions to Senate Finance Comm.
regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives, Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J26).
330. Various corporations in Bloomington, Indiana, Petition to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee (Jan. 8, 1910) (Petitions to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National
Archives, Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J26).
331. Board of Trade, Portland, Maine, Petition to Senate Finance Committee (Jan. 14,
1910) (Petition to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives, Record
Group 129, Sen. 61A-J24).
332. Merchants Exchange of St. Louis, Missouri, Petition to Senate Finance Committee
(Jan. 14, 1910) (Petition to Senate Finance Comm. regarding Corporate Tax, National Archives,
Record Group 129, Sen. 61A-J26).
333. Message of President to House and Senate, 44 CoNG. Rxc. 3344 (June 16, 1909).
334. See supra text accompanying note 316.
335. T.D. 1594, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 20, 21 (1910).
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be needed to open the records to the public. However, none of the $100,000
Congress appropriated to effect the tax could be used in the District of
Columbia (due to tax could be used in the District of Columbia (due to
statutory prohibitions). 3 6 Therefore, Cabell stated, if "it was the intent of
Congress to make these returns open to general inspection, it will be
necessary for -[Congress] to appropriate a sum sufficient to cover the
necessary expenses. ' 337 Until such time records would not be open to the
public. A person other than the taxpayer making the return, desiring to
view a return, was required to apply in writing to the Secretary of the
Treasury, "who in his discretion [would], upon a proper showing of cause,
approve such request.''338 This pronouncement, for all practical purposes,
abolished the publicity feature.
Meanwhile, several bills had been introduced to formally abolish either
the publicity feature or the entire corporation excise tax. While these bills
ended up in the purgatory of "referred to Committee," another attempt to
amend the publicity feature was more successful. In 1910 the Senate added
an amendment to the appropriation bill, H.R. 22643, amending the publicity
feature of the corporation excise tax to read as follows:
That the reports required by section 38 of said act shall only be made
public when called for by resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives or upon the order of the President when he deems it
for the public interest, and that the Secretary of the Treasury shall
formulate rules and regulations for classifying, indexing, and exhibiting
said reports or any information therefrom; which said rules and regu-
lations shall be approved by the President.
339
On April 1, 1910, the House discussed this amendment at length. Congress-
man Bartlett of Georgia immediately moved to return the bill to the Senate
"with the request that the amendment be stricken from the bill, because it
invades the constitutional privilege of the House to originate bills for the
raising of revenue. ' 340 After much discussion the resolution was rejected. 4i
The separation of powers issue also appeared in connection with the
proposed amendment. Some House members objected to giving the Presi-
dent, or any other administrative or executive officer, "the right to publish
facts as against any particular corporation around election time. '342 If
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. S. Amend. No. 78 to H.R. 22643, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 45 CoNG. REc. 4128 (Apr. 1,
1910).
340. 45 CoNG. Rac. 4128 (Apr. 1, 1910). The debate on this issue comprises several pages of
the Congressional Record.
341. 45 CONo. Rxc. 4134-35.
342. 45 CONG. REc. 4132 (statement of Rep. Hughes of New Jersey); see also 45 CONG. Rac.
4133 (statement of Rep. Underwood); 45 CoNG. REc. 4132 (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
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public disclosure were a discretionary power in the hands of the President,
then political favors (past or present) could ensure privacy while political
disfavor could threaten disclosure. For this reason some congressmen fa-
vored either absolute publicity or none at all.?3
The potential abuse of the discretionary power to publicize for political
purposes was not the only danger. Several members noted that if the
discretion to publicize rested in the executive branch, Congress itself might
be denied information as had already happened with the Bureau of Cor-
porations under President Roosevelt. 44 Congress feared that although the
current President was "benign . the time might come when we might
have a malign President. 3 45 To give the President such power of disclosure
was dangerous.
The exact nature of the publicity feature also gave rise to much debate.
Representative Sherley believed that the original language of paragraph six
making returns "public records" did not mean that anyone could go look
at the records; rather, public returns open for inspection meant, he believed,
merely the "common-rule" that the records "would be open to the inspec-
tion of those having the right to inspect them and not open to the public
generally ",346 Representative Smith of Iowa agreed that the records were
not open to the public in general but were public records of the Treasury
Department and at common law only those who had an interest in the
subject matter of the records could inspect them3 47 Smith stated that no
federal law overruled the common law; rather, the law provided for the
Secretary to promulgate regulations for the use and retention of its records.3"
Congressman Fitzgerald of New York disagreed, stating that the intent of
the original bill was to provide "complete publicity" of returns.349 Many
states, he asserted, already required similar information, a situation which
he believed precluded objections to the publicity feature.350 In addition, the
word "publicity" was used loosely in political speeches, often more for
rhetorical effect than actual effect, sometimes referring to the general public
343. E.g., 45 CONG. REc. 4134 (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
344. 45 CONG. REc. 4134 (statement of Rep. Bartlett); 45 CONG. RC. 4140 (statement of Rep.
Hitchcock).
345. 45 CONG. Rc. 4141 (statement of Rep. Harrison of New York).
346. 45 CONG. Rac. 4136.
347. 45 CONG. REc. 4136; see also 2 W COOK, A TREATisE ON TBE LAW OF CORPORAIONS
HAVING A CAPrrAL STOCK § 511, at 1387-88 (6th ed. 1908). At common law, one had a right to
inspection when a property right or some controversy was involved "or some specific and valuable
interest [was] m question." Id.
348. 45 CONG. REC. 4136 (Rep. Smith citing § 161 of the revised statutes: "The head of each
department is authorized to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law for *** the use and
preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it.").
349. 45 CONG. Rc. 4137.
350. 45 CONG. Rc. 4133. In fact, contrary to Fitzgerald's statement, state requirements vaned
greatly as to what information was required and to whom it was available. See supra note 56 and
accompanying text
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and sometimes referring only to government access to information.35' It is
no wonder that the House was confused as to the extent of publicity
provided in the Act.
A few congressmen, however, had no doubts as to the true meamng of
the original publicity clause in the corporation tax. Congressman Under-
wood, for example, stated that the House never had any intention of
providing publicity as evidenced by its failure to include in the original
appropriation for the tax an appropriation of money for use in Washing-
ton.352 Moreover, Underwood believed that publicity in tax returns was not
needed to regulate the railroads because they already provided information
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. On the other hand, publicity was
needed to regulate "the great trust corporations of this country, but Con-
gress, up to this time, has never said that it proposed to go into the business
of regulating the trusts. ' 353 In fact, he stated, since Congress expected the
Supreme Court to disband the trusts under the Sherman Act,354 the only
corporation left subject to the publicity provision was "the little domestic
corporation in the State that is performing a local business and with which
the Government of the United States should have nothing whatever to
do." 3"5 There was never an intent to enforce publicity, he said, because at
the time of its passage the tax "was a subterfuge .. the sole purpose for
injecting this provision in the law was to side-track an income-tax law that
was about to be passed in the United States Senate. ' 3 56
Underwood, in his rush to condemn the duplicity of those who favored
'the passage of the corporations tax instead of an income tax, overlooked
the whole category of corporations which were not trusts but which engaged
in interstate business. Other congressmen, however, seemed to accept pub-
licity about some corporations, but not about small ones since the provisions
of information about these small corporations "would only gratify the
351. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
352. 45 CoNG. REc. 4131. Underwood referred to a statute that provided that "no appropriation
for a specific purpose shall be used for the employment of a force m Washington m these
departments unless it is specifically provided m that appropriation that it shall be used m the
District of Columbia." Id., see also T.D. 1594, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at.20. Representative
Tawney disagreed, stating that the House believed money would be appropriated for the purpose
of employing clerical staff m Washington to provide for publicity and was unaware of the failure
to so appropriate funds. 45 CoNG. Rac. 4132.
353. 45 CONG. REc. 4131.
354. Presumably, Underwood was referring to United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911), and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), cases then pending
before the Court and decided m 1911. See supra note 29.
355. 45 CoNG. REc. 4131.
356. Id., see also 45 CoNG. Rac. 4139 (statement of Rep. Hitchcock) ("I believe the corporation
tax and the publicity provisions were merely devices used by President Taft's administration to
escape from the inheritance tax, to wich the administration was pledged, and also to defeat the
income tax, which was popular, and a majority for which already existed m the two Houses of
Congress at that time.").
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curiosity or malice or ill will of others,13 7 or provide the big corporations
with enough information to drive them out of business. 58 Representative
Sherley of Kentucky was against the publicity feature and against the
corporation tax (he favored an income tax). Nevertheless, given the existence
of the corporation tax, he favored a distinction between corporations which
had "a relationship with the public" and those that did not.3 59 The small
corporations, which had no such relationship, should not be subject to the
publicity clause: "The thing that has made America great beyond all things
else has been the freedom of the individual from undue governmental
control And as to certain corporations [i.e., small ones] involved
herein, they are really the same as the individuals that compose them."
316
Thus, many congressmen differentiated between the large corporations
which were public in some vague sense and small corporations which were
really like partnerships, that is, simply aggregations of individuals. As
Representative Tawney of Minnesota stated:
The public have an interest in knowing what the actual financial con-
dition of certain classes of corporations is. Under this amendment the
public will have the opportunity to examine and verify the statements
of these corporations made to stock exchanges where their stock is listed
for public sale. By comparing the same with their published statements,
they can determine their truth; their actual financial condition will be
known. As to corporations whose stock is not offered to the public for
investment, an investigation of the returns may or may not be necessary
for the benefit of the public, and as to all such corporations the matter
of making their returns subject to inspection is left to the discretion of
the President of the United States.161
The House ended its debate on publicity by rejecting the Senate amendment
and passing its own version which provided an appropriation of $25,000
for "classifying, indexing, exhibiting, and properly caring for the returns
of all corporations required by section 38" and made all returns open to
"inspection only upon the order of the President, under rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the
President. 3 62 The provision was enacted on June 17, 1910.363
On November 25, 1910, pursuant to an executive order of President Taft,
the Treasury Department issued regulations governing the publicity of
357. 45 CONG. RFc. 4136 (statement of Rep. Gillett).
358. 45 CoNG. REc. 4136 (statement of Rep. Smith that he was aware of many small and
moderately-sized corporations which feared being destroyed by large corporations); see also 45
CoNo. Rac. 4139 (statement of Rep. Hitchcock that small corporations complained of the publicity
feature).
359. 45 CONG. REc. 4140 (statement of Rep. Sherley).
360. Id.
361. 45 CoNG. Rac. 4141 (statement of Rep. Tawney).
362. 45 CONG. REc. 4142, 4144.
363. Act approved June 17, 1910, ch. 297, 36 Stat. 494.
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returns.3 4 As a consequence of the rationale that publicity could help prevent
stock watering and promoter schemes, the regulations created two classes
of corporations, those whose stock was offered to the public and those
whose stock was not. Since the latter stock was closely held there was no
danger of promoter abuses deceiving the investing public. Consequently,
the returns of closely held corporations were open to inspection only to
proper employees of the Treasury Department. Other government employees
could inspect them for proper cause on approval of the Secretary. State
access to returns was upon approval of the Attorney General. Shareholders
of a corporation might be permitted to inspect a corporation's return upon
application to the Secretary "setting forth what constitutes a proper showing
of cause.' '36 No definition or example of proper cause was given. The
general common law rule was that a shareholder had a right of inspection
"at any reasonable time, and for any reasonable purpose." 36 Generally,
shareholders could inspect when some property right, controversy or "some
specific and valuable interest [was] in question.''367 However, the right
would not be granted "to satisfy curiosity, nor to aid the stock-market
speculations of the stockholders. "3 6 Many states had enacted statutes giving
shareholders various rights to inspect books. 69 Exactly what rights of
inspection shareholders had under these statutes and what constituted proper
cause were never made clear in the regulations nor in later Treasury
announcements. This provision, then, was of limited help to shareholders,
and of no help to non-shareholders.
In contrast to closely held corporations, more publicly held corporations
presented situations of potential abuse of investors. The regulations, there-
fore, required publicity of the returns of these corporations in order to
provide potential investors the information needed to make informed deci-
sions. In this respect the regulations became the forerunner of Securities
and Exchange Commission reporting. The key to whether a corporation's
returns would be open to the inspection of any person was whether the
corporation offered its stock for sale to the public. Paragraph three provided
that:
364. T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 117 (1910). These regulations followed the suggestions
set forth by Rep. Tawney m April.
365. Id. at 119.
366. 2 W CooK, supra note 347, § 511, at 1387-88. At common law, non-shareholders had no
right to inspect corporate books, even if they were suing or being sued by the corporation. Again,
some states had passed statutes providing for some publicity, but these vaned from state to state
and were of limited use to out-of-state persons interested m a particular corporation. Id. § 519,
at 1409.
367. Id. § 511, at 1388.
368. Id. § 515, at 1394.
369. See, e.g., id. § 518, at 1404-07.
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The returns of the following corporations shall be open to the inspection
of any person upon written application to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury
(a) The returns of all compames whose stock is listed upon any duly
organized and recogmzed stock exchange within the United States, for
the purpose of having its shares dealt in by the public generally.
(b) All corporations whose stock is advertised in the press or offered to
the public by the corporation itself for sale. In case of doubt as to
whether any company falls within the classification above, the person
desiring to see such return should make application, supported by
advertisements, prospectus, or such other evidence as he may deem
proper to establish the fact that the stock of such corporation is offered
for general public sale.370
Although these regulations provided less than total publicity for all
corporations, they were nevertheless a major achievement for proponents
of corporate regulation. As Senator Root suggested, the government might
want information on all corporations so as to get a complete picture of the
business world. However, the general public did not need this information
to protect themselves as potential investors . 7' The regulations met both
these needs, providing the government with access to information on all
corporations, but limiting public access to information to corporations
offered for sale to the public. Arguably, the public had the right to
information about small corporations so as to ensure a fair, competitive
price. Certainly, in some local markets, a closely held corporation did
dominate the market enough to dictate prices. In general, however, the
large corporations-not these small ones-set prices. Therefore, information
on closely held corporations would generally not be helpful to the public.
Consequently, a conservative admimstration such as Taft's, especially when
it was beset by a deluge of complaints from small corporations, would not
dictate publicity for these small corporations.
The regulations addressed the main perceived abuses-stock watering and
abusive promoter schemes-in a manner in keeping with the Progressive
Era: the provision of information by itself acted as a corrective to the
problem. This is a conservative approach in that the government does not
actively prevent the abuse by regulation or law; rather, it provides infor-
mation which allows the private sector to do the regulating. According to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this modest method achieved results.
In 1912 he reported that the tax was having a "most wholesome effect on
the commercial world. ' 3 72 First, in order to file returns, corporations had
to keep accurate books and records, the accuracy of which was heightened
370. T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 119-20 (emphasis added).
371. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
372. ANNuAL REPORT OF = CoMIssIoaN OF INTrNAL REvENUE FOR THE FisCAL YEAR ENirD
JuaN 30, 1912, H.R. Doc. No. 941, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 16 (1912).
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by the Bureau of Internal Revenue checking up on the returns and by
penalties for false and fraudulent returns. 373 Secondly, these records and the
fact that they were checked by the Bureau provided "powerful assistance
in detecting and punishing the promoters of 'get-rich-quick' and other
fraudulent and stock-jobbing concerns. ' 374
CONCLUSION
The Corporate Excise Tax was a result of the interaction of two major
areas of change in the Progressive Era: taxation and the growth of large
corporations. Income taxation rose from the ashes of constitutional defeat
in 1895 to constitutional victory (an amendment) in 1913. In the same time
period corporations grew and consolidated, achieving a restructuring of the
marketplace. The traditional view of the Corporate Excise Tax, focusing
on the tax's income component, holds that the tax was a political ploy to
defeat the income tax in 1909. This view is incomplete because it ignores
the second area of change: corporate growth. While Taft clearly wanted to
forestall -an income tax, the method of doing so did not need to include a
tax on corporations.
Taft's predecessor, President Roosevelt, had announced a policy of strong
federal regulation by the executive branch under which corporations engaged
in interstate commerce would be federally incorporated (and possibly de-.-
franchised for non-compliance). Such a policy raised troubling questions
about federal-state relations and the growth of the federal government,
particularly the executive branch. Taft's announced policy was also to
regulate corporations. However, given his more conservative, pro-business
stance, Taft's regulatory program was less activist. Taft's stance is evidenced
by the fact that he eventually dropped his support of federal incorporation.
Taft's choice of such a tax occurred because of the second area of change.
Taft, reflecting the concerns of the time, had announced his intent to
regulate corporations in order to curb their abuses.
Concern about corporations focused on the large corporations and their
monopoly of the market. Related to this concern was a concern about
protecting investors from overcapitalization and promoter schemes. The era
strongly believed in the power of information. Publicity of abuse by itself
could help eradicate the abuse. Moreover, access to information would help
both the government and the public act to limit abuse. The government
needed data to make effective, scientific laws in areas affecting corporations
such as tariffs, currency, antitrust and interstate commerce. The public,
provided with financial information on corporations, could make informed
373. Id. at 17.
374. Id.
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decisions about which companies to invest in and thus could foil promoter
schemes. Information, or publicity, was critical to regulation; information,
however, was scarce. Private financial services, though growing rapidly,
were still in their infancy Nor did the government have a regular source
of information on corporations, except in specialized areas such as railroads.
Publicity was a well-recognized method of regulation and was widely
advocated-though whether it was publicity to the government or to the
general public was often unclear. The extent of regulation beyond publicity,
how it should be accomplished and who should accomplish it were all highly
debatable.
Taft's proposal and support of the Corporate Excise Tax reflected his
desire to both regulate corporations and to halt the income tax. From the
earliest days of his presidency, Taft considered some type of tax on
corporations. His proposal to Congress in June, 1909, specifically mentioned
the merits of the tax as an aid to supervising corporations. His specific
support of the publicity provision, through which the supervision would be
accomplished, during the debates on the law and after enactment, supports
the position that Taft viewed the tax as part of a regulatory program.
Despite this, the modern reader, like some of Taft's contemporaries, is not
without justification in questiomng Taft's sincerity in the matter. The initial
publicity feature was not enforced and was, in fact, replaced the next year
with a more limited provision. Furthermore, although Taft did propose a
federal incorporation bill in 1910, he later withdrew his support for the
idea.
Was the tax simply all rhetoric and no substance? I believe not. The tax
can rightly be seen as a legitimate, though moderate, attempt to impose
some regulation on corporations. Other regulatory methods such as federal
incorporation were more controversial, raising issues of federal-state rela-
tions, increased federal power in general, or specifically, excessive executive
power. The excise tax, in contrast, raised these same issues, but on a much
smaller scale. It was, therefore, an appropriate regulatory mechamsm for a
conservative president. Taxing corporations for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in corporate form, for example, was criticized as impinging on states'
rights since states incorporated corporations and already taxed them. Com-
pared to federal incorporation, however, these objections lacked strength.
First, taxation was an established federal power, unlike incorporation.
Second, the tax did not impact the corporation to the same extent as some
federal incorporation proposals which gave the federal government the power
to prevent corporations from engaging in interstate commerce.
The tax achieved its regulatory purposes through its reporting and pub-
licity features. These features, even as amended by the 1910 Act, met basic
supervisory goals. All corporations, no matter how small, had to file returns
with the Internal Revenue Service. This requirement theoretically provided
the government with the steady flow of data it needed to make informed
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decisions in areas such as tariffs and trusts. Only returns of corporations
listed on an exchange or offering their stock to the public were available
to the general public. Since these were the very corporations which most
threatened the investing public by means of overcapitalization (stock water-
ing) and promoter schemes, the limited publicity feature addressed the major
problem.
Perhaps, as Taft himself stated and others believed, publicity was merely
the first step in his program; perhaps, given his subsequent inaction in the.
area, it is all he ever intended. Nevertheless, publicity was a well-respected
form of regulation. Moreover, it was a preliminary step necessary for any
further regulation. Being a mild form of regulation, it was particularly
suited to a conservative president. Because publicity is such a mild form of
supervision, people today may tend to dismiss its power. That would be a
mistake given the era's faith in its efficacy. Nor is that faith outdated. It
is this faith which led to the securities regulation acts of the 1930s and
which still invigorates these laws.
Debate on the Corporate Excise Tax reflected the then current flux in
corporate legal theory occasioned by the proliferation of corporations, and
the growth of large, non-owner managed corporations. As corporations
evolved from specially chartered creatures of the state with limited powers
into entities with broad powers established under general incorporation laws,
the theory of legal personality evolved from an artificial entity theory into
a natural entity theory. Both sides on the tax debates drew support from
the various theories of the firm, particularly the artificial entity and aggre-
gate theories. The law taxed corporations as corporations per se, and differed
in that respect from earlier taxes on businesses (no matter what form they
were carried on in). Opponents of the tax used either aggregate or natural
entity theories to criticize the tax as unfair; it was unjust to tax a corporation
engaged m a certain activity if a partnership was not taxed because a
corporation was merely an aggregate of individuals. Proponents of the tax
stressed the corporation's artificiality m two ways. One approach, addressed
to income tax advocates, stressed the artificial aspect of the corporation in
order to emphasize that corporations were owned by individuals and these
wealthy individuals really bore the tax. The other, more common approach
focused on the legal entity aspect. Singling out corporations was permissible
because only they had advantages created by the state. This rationale drew
added strength from the form of the tax; it technically was not an income
tax but was an excise tax on the privilege of doing business. Both strands
reflected popular hostility to large corporations as centers of power and
wealth.
While discussing the nature of corporate personality, Congress evidenced
an awareness that small corporations by nature were different from large
corporations. Small corporations were akin to partnerships, but large ones
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were a different species. This awareness resulted m the law treating small
corporations somewhat differently from large ones. Small corporations were
exempt from paying taxes, but they did have to file returns. Corporations
not listed on exchanges nor sold to the public were exempt from the
publicity provision.
The corporate tax debates and the final form of the law not only reflected
the times but also foreshadowed current problems and indeed still influence
the tax laws. Present law continues to grapple with major issues faced in
1909. There is a continuing attempt to differentiate between large and small
corporations. Interest and dividend treatment also remain problematic.
Ironically, Congress is now experimenting with limitations on interest de-
ductions to curb perceived corporate abuses in the takeover area just as the
1909 Congress imposed interest limitations to curb abuses in the stock
issuance areas.
The most important reflection of the past upon the present is the continued
existence of a separate corporate tax. This Article has shown how theories
of corporate personality can influence the manner of taxation of corpora-
tions. In 1909 the artificial entity theory justified treating corporations
separately from their owners and differently than individuals. Today cor-
porate theory recognizes a mixture of entity and aggregate features, de-
pending on the situation. 375 Indeed, today's pet theory, the economic theory
of the firm as a nexus of contracts between individuals, tends to eliminate
the corporation as an entity This theory supports full integration of
corporate and individual taxes since it sees the corporation as a mere conduit
rather than as a separate entity.
Economic theory's drive toward integration, however, encounters the
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 as a roadblock. At a practical level, the
roadblock consists of resistance to integration shaped by eighty years of
precedent dating back to 1909. At a theoretical level, the history of the tax
exemplifies and reminds one of the intertwining of corporate theory and
taxation. So long as various conceptions of the corporation exist, as they
do today, economic theory's justification of integration is a claim of
theology, not of truth.3 6
375. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNMa L.
Ry. 407, 426, 436-38 (1989).
376. The American Law Institute did not advocate integration m its 1982 Federal Income Tax
Project on Subchapter C allegedly because of Stanley S. Surrey's opposition. In Surrey's view,
the theoretical justification for integration-the conduit theory of the corporation-was simply a
matter of "tax theology." Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to Eliminate
the Corporate Tax, 27 TAx NoTs 637, 640 n.6 (1985). I would expand that to say it is a claim
of corporate theology also.
Econormcs might claim that regardless of the theoretical conception of corporations, the truth
is that the actual incidence of the tax ignores the corporation. Given the difficulty of determining
who bears the burden of the tax, the response nught be that theones of personality must ultimately
influence the shape of the tax.
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